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Introduction 
Michael Dummett opens his monumental Frege: Philosophy of Language in 
a rather personal mood: "I am always disappointed when a book lacks a 
preface: it is like arriving at someone's house for dinner, and being conducted 
straight into the dining-room."1 Transferring the comparison from prefaces to 
introductions, I could, in the same personal vein, say that I am always glad 
when a book lacks a lengthy introduction. If I am hungry, I prefer to skip the 
drinks and snacks in the antechamber; they might, and frequently do, spoil my 
appetite. This introduction, then, will be short, but, I hope, not too short to be 
useless. 
This is not, nor pretends to be, a work of classical scholarship. Its 
purport is not historical; nor is it my intention to reproduce 'what Aristotle 
really thoughf. It is perhaps best described as a modest contribution to what 
one could call the 'neo-scholastic revival' of the study of Aristotle. It provides a 
rather speculative, and probably controversial, interpretation of the adage 
'ethics is practical'. It self-consciously exploits modern apparatus in arguing 
that the key to its decipherment lies not in Aristotle's ethical writings, but 
rather in its presuppositions. The argument is, in essentials, not difficult, 
although it might be easy to loose track. I shall not therefore, beat about the 
bush and rise to the occasion this introduction offers - to give a concise version 
of the story, which may serve the reader, so to speak, as an itinerary rather than 
a travel guide. 
In the first chapter, I design an argument against a fashionable, but 
mistaken interpretation of Aristotle's ethical method. It centers around a 
principal methodological term, phainomena, or, as it is frequently rendered 
'appearances'. Contrary to what the 'new orthodoxy' (as I shall call it) claims, 
these are not, in a key passage in the Nicomachean Ethics, endoxa, or, common 
beliefs. Ethical inquiry, it is true, proceeds by examination of beliefs, but this it 
can do because they presuppose a command of the 'appearances' on the part of 
the subject These 'appearances' are, to put it bluntly, facts; and there are other 
ways than dialectical examination in which one becomes familiar with these. 
1
 Dummett (1973), p. DC 
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In chapter 2-4, this distinction between phainomena and endoxa becomes a 
vital instrument in the study of Aristotle's procedure by which he sets about to 
specify the contents of the first principle of ethics, eudaimonia, or well-being. 
Not everyone's beliefs should be examined; and this is so because certain 
beliefs are rooted in what are taken to be, but are not, facts. These beliefs, so to 
say, bear testimony to a more primitive stage of moral development, a stage in 
which the student has not yet managed to subject the bodily appetites to 
rational control. This is why such persons are excluded from ethical inquiry: I 
argue that the practical character of ethics can be best understood by studying 
Aristotle's grounds for the exclusions. 
To do 'ethics with Aristotle', to play on the title of a recent monograph,2 
one needs to satisfy certain conditions; I have tried to dam these strands into a 
texture the meshes of which become progressively finer. One must be well-
versed in (one form of) dialectic, one must have practical experience, and one 
must have the wish to become a good person. It is this overarching wish (which 
I take to be of an immense complexity) which is analysed throughout chapters 
4-7. 
Chapter 4 aims to accomodate for one species of imagination, to wit, 
visualisation, in Aristotle's conception of wish (boulêsis). I contend that there is 
room for this faculty, but that it cannot be descried if we only take account of 
the surface of his thoughts on motivation. The pivotal importance of the 
imagination will become clearer in chapter 5, where I shall introduce the notion 
of prospective shame as the principal agent in overcoming the 'evil passions'. 
The workings of this basic ethical emotion will be studies on a character from a 
tragedy of Sophocles, the Philoctetes, viz. Neoptolemus, whom Aristotle 
mentions twice in his treatment of akrasia. The final two chapters, then, will 
press for an integration of the affection of shame and practical reason; here 
ethical dialectic comes again to the fore, to forge a synthesis between 
deliberation and the preparation for ethical inquiry. 
I would like to conclude this introduction in the personal spirit I opened 
it with. As the subtitle of this thesis betrays, I am deeply indebted to the work 
of Richard Wollheim. With his essay 'The Ends of Life and the Preliminaries of 
Morality: John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin'3 he not only furnished its basic 
idea; his beautiful book 77ie Thread of Life, based on the William James Lectures 
delivered at Harvard University in 1982, has taught me how to overcome a 
paralysing hesitation to write about interiorised persons while I was living 
through one of the most distressing episodes of my life. In an age which is 
obsessively preoccupied by the philosophical extirpation of the subject and its 
innermost stirrings, I have found much comfort in his work. 
2
 Sarah Broadie's l-thtcs with Aristotle, Broadic1 (1991) 
3
 Repnntrd m Wollhcim (1993) 
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1 
A method of ethics 
1. Our chapter heading is, in fact a platitudinous pun on the title of what is 
standardly stigmatised as an 'extremely boring' or 'stodgy7 work of moral 
philosophy.1 Nevertheless, in The Methods of Ethics, first published in 1874, 
Henry Sidgwick managed to develop and present what has been called, with a 
keen sense for hyperbole, "the prototype of the modern treatment of moral 
philosophy."2 
Our pun is not only trite, but also confusing. A 'Method of Ethics' for 
Sidgwick is "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual 
human beings 'oughf - or what it is 'righf for them - to do, or seek to realise by 
voluntary action".3 These several co-existing 'Methods' should be kept distinct 
from, so to say, the Method of The Methods. Sidgwick strikes a well of self-
evident starting-points in the "Common Sense Morality of mankind" to test the 
Methods against, so as to secure a wide acceptance of his conclusions by the 
more reflective segments of society.4 The procedure of mapping the market of 
common belief, the "impartial reflexion" and "reduction to consistency" of 
dialectic, Sidgwick owes to Aristotle. It is this method to which our pun refers. 
Sidgwick's acknowledgement, proffered in an upsurge of 
autobiographical excitement, marks one of those scant moments at which the 
Methods' monotonous hum is pierced through.5 Like Sidgwick, modern moral 
philosophers are, in their more self-scrutinising moods, fond of labelling 
themselves heirs to Aristotle. For instance, John Rawls regards his own 
approach in moral theory as an offshoot of this conception "adopted by most 
classical British writers through Sidgwick", but (in a footnote) ultimately traced 
back "to Aristotle's procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics".6 
1
 See Bernard Williams' Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture, held at Newnham College, Cambridge, 'The 
point of view of the universe: Sidgwick and the ambitions of ethics', reprinted m Williams (1995), p. 156. 
2
 Schncewind (1977), ρ 1 The italics are mine. 
3
 Sidgwick (1907), ρ 1 The methods Sidgwick discerns are intuitionism, philosophical egoism, and 
utilitarianism. 
«Schneewind (1977), p. 193 
5
 Sidgwick (1907), p. xx-xxi. 
« Rawls (1971), ρ 51 and n26 See Nussbaum (1978), p. 105 and n7. The footnote leads us to a passage 
from the third chapter ('The Nature of the Inquiry') of W.F.R. Hardie's 1968 book on Aristotle's Ethical 
Tlteoiy, which is for a considerable part devoted to the refutation of Bumet's view that the Nicomachean 
Ethics is "dialectical throughout". Hardie (1968), pp. 37-45; Burnet (1900), pp. v, xxxtx-XLVl, 
13 
Considerable tracts of the project, then, are reserved for description of 
common belief. This is brought out well by Sidgwick himself when he says that 
his "immediate object - to invert Aristotle's phrase - is not Practice but 
Knowledge."7 The question is whether this seemingly innocuous inversion 
leaves Aristotelian ethical method where it is. Perhaps it can only begin to 
assume clarity of contour if we re-invert the phrase: ethics, for Aristotle, is, and 
essentially is, practical, and this has its repercussions on its method. These, 
however, will not become articulate until the subsequent chapters. The 
argument of this chapter is only a necessary step in that direction. 
Its colour is, on the whole, dimly iconoclastic, lit up by an occasional 
constructive twinkling. It aims at liberating Aristotelian ethical methodology 
from the 'Sidgwickian' cuffs into which it has been manacled by a recent 
interpretation. Since this interpretation is sail very much in vogue, it will take 
some effort to shoot holes in its incrustation.8 This 'newly orthodox' 
interpretation, as I shall grandiloquently call it, epitomises one conception of 
moral philosophy, which, so much is sure, goes back at least to Sidgwick. But it 
may not go back to Aristotle. 
2. The newly orthodox interpretation takes for a point of departure the 
methodological remarks at EN 1145b2-7,9 which introduce the treatment of 
akrasia. An akratic person does what is wrong knowingly, on account of 
affection (EN 1111ЫЗ-4; 1145Ы2-3).10 This treatment is generally considered a 
paradigm case of the application of dialectic to a particular inquiry.111 shall for 
a start comply by quoting a well-known commentator's translation of the bulk 
of this passage (b2-6), and supply the missing clause in accolades.12 
Here as in other cases'* we must set down [hthenlas] the phatnomena and begin by considering 
the difficulties [proton diaporêsantas], and so go on to vindicate if possible all the common 
conceptions [ta endoxa] about these states of mind [pen lauta ta pathê], or at any rate most of 
them and the most important; {for when both the difficulties are solved and the endoxa are left 
[kataleipêtai], it would have been proven adequately [dedeigmenon hikanôs].} (EN 1145b2-7) 
7
 Sidgwick (1907), ρ vi 
9
 Some exegetical detail has to be dealt with to bring home the point of this chapter The reader who 
prefers to skip these issues is advised to make a leap to the next chapter 
' See, for instance, Owen (1961), Barnes (1981), Nussbaum (1986), eh 8, Irwin (1988), ρ 30, Reeve (1992), 
ρ 34 
10
 Prevailing translations of the Greek term akrasia are 'incontinence', 'weakness of the will', 'temptation'. 
Although all these renditions are, for some reason or other, unfortunate, the last is particularly so 
because of the fact that self-control (enkrateia) involves temptation as well 
" So e g Cooper (1975), ρ 69 
12
 Owen (1961), ρ 114 I shall for the moment forgo commenting on the perennial debate on the question 
whether dialectic is the method of ethics, since I think this question is ill-conceived Now that it is fairly 
clear that Aristotle's works resist capture in the syllogistic strait)acket, which for ages has been violently 
imposed upon it by the commentators, we should beware of the tendency to tip the scale in favour of 
dialectic 
1 1
 Owen is nght to translate epi ton alien this way Ross and others construe, not implausibly, 'in all other 
cases', however, there is no trace of 'all' in the Creek text 
14 
This text has catalysed rethinking of some key concepts of Aristotle's 
methodology. In particular, it has been argued that because Ross' empiricist 
construal of phainomena ('observed facts')14 cannot be consistently maintained in 
a dialectical examination of beliefs on moral matters, the term must be 
systematically ambiguous, referring to solid empirical data in one context 
(notably APr 46a20) and to endoxa or legomena (EN 1145b20), or 'common 
conceptions', in the other.15 
The argument goes on two legs. First what Aristotle actually proceeds to 
'set ouf are endoxa (=legomena (1145b20)) on the subject and these "turn out as 
so often to be partly matters of linguistic usage or, if you prefer, of the 
conceptual structure revealed by language". This pleads for the 
intersubstitutability of phainomena and endoxa(-legotnena). As the brackets make 
clear, my chief grudge concerns the first pair, and I shall leave the second pair 
in peace. Hence the abbreviation (Γ) (for 'intersubstitutability thesis'), which I 
shall adopt for brevity's sake, should be taken to cover only the extensional 
(but not intensional) assimilation of phainomena and endoxa. 
Secondly, both the fact that Socrates' position, to the effect that "those 
who act against their own conviction of what is best do so in ignorance", 
contradicts (amphisbêtein) the phainomena (1145b23-8) and that Aristotle 
eventually vindicates this position (1147ЫЗ-7) conjointly show that the 
phainomena cannot be 'observed facts', but must be "what would commonly be 
said on the subject".16 This, the other leg, I coin (Q (for 'coherence thesis'). Both 
legs stride with a graceful gait - yet the argument carried by them threatens to 
trip over its own feet 
(I) has rapidly gained the status of an unquestioned assumption 
polluting appreciations of Aristotelian method in general, and of Aristotelian 
method in ethics in particular. It has been felt that Aristotle's phainomena, across 
different contexts, need inoculation to shield them against semantic infection.17 
A successful frontal assault on (I) will dissipate the need to accomodate for 
such diverging senses of phainomena as 'common beliefs' (ethics) and 'observed 
facts' (natural science).18 For such an assault will bring out that, economically, 
there will be only one meaning, and, to spill a couple of beans, this will not be 
'common beliefs'. So I do not feel the need to take up the gauntlet, although 
some version of the challenge will come to play a backgrounded part at a later 
stage in this chapter. 
1 4
 Phainomena is the neuter plural present participle of the Greek verb phamesthm It is usually rendered 
'to appear' and assumed to have the same protean semantics as its English equivalent - which has been 
made so much of in the heyday of analytical philosophy See Barnes (1981), ρ 491nl The participle is 
nowadays standardly translated 'appearances' Nussbaum (1986), eh 8, Irwin (1988), ρ 30 
1 5
 Owen (1961), pp 114-8 'Observed facts' is Ross' translation The ambiguity, so Owen notes (p 115), 
goes back to the Meteorologica commentary of the peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias 
« Owen (1961), pp 114-5 italics mine 
" Nussbaum (1986), pp 240-1 
18
 Owen (1961), ρ 114, Nussbaum (1986), ρ 243, speaks of endoxa 'substituting' plunnomena, Barnes 
(1981), ρ 490 says that "elsewhere", without specifying where that is, the two terms "are used to 
desginate the same class of items, and here too they doubtless have the same reference" (italics mine), 
Irwin (1988), ρ 30, states blandly that "[i]n this case the appearances \]>hamomena\ are commonly-
accepted beliefs (endoxa)" 
15 
Two final asides on strategy. First, the assault can be conducted in a 
more formal way, by leaving the central terms untranslated - at the obvious 
expense of wearisome transliteration. Secondly, I shall forbear all benefits 
which may accrue to my account in virtue of a developmental, or genetic 
approach to Aristotle's works.19 
3. (I) suggests a natural course of interpretation. Prying deeper into endoxa 
yields more clarity about phainotnena. Since the former constitute the raw 
material of dialectical reasoning, one turns to the Topics,10 Aristotle's 'manual' 
or compendium of dialectic. Its aim is to find a way of engendering a capacity 
to construct arguments about every proposed problem 'from endoxa1 (Jap 
100al8-21).21 The term endoxa, then, urgently needs elucidation: 
Ta endoxa are the things which are believed [ta dokounta] by either all, or most, or the wise [tots 
sophois], and by all, most, or the most familiar \gnorimcn] and endoxot of those [Le. the wise]. 
(Top 100Ь21-3).н 
Whether this is, hair-splith'ngly, supposed to be a definition in the strict 
sense may be left an open question.23 To one side, there is the humdrum formal 
point that it smacks of circularity (which, perhaps, may be washed away by 
taking gnôrimoi as an explicative gloss on endoxos (Top ІОІаІЗ; 104al0)). To the 
other, strict definitions seem to exceed the Topics' ambitions; not more than a 
working knowledge adequate to purposes of identification is programrnatically 
envisaged (Top 101al8-24; Ь5-10; cf. 105al0-9). 
Nothing hangs on a decision between these alternatives. The description 
yields extensional criteria determinate enough to brand Socrates' argument an 
endoxon. Yet the Topics, coming to the aid of (Q, merely confirm what (Q 
claims on internal grounds. It is at this point that the troubles begin to assert 
themselves for the new orthodoxy. (Henceforth I shall appropriate the 
scholastic notation SOR to symbolise 'Socrates' argumenf.) 
In the first place, inclusion of SOR in the reference of endoxa throws doubt 
on the translation we started with. Obviously, 'common beliefs' or 'common 
1 9
 For such an approach, see Irwin (1988), according to whom Aristotle's initial 'low' opinion of dialectic 
while writing the Topics was superseded by a conception of 'strong' dialectic, capable of establishing 
first principles 
2 0
 Barnes (1981), ρ 498, saying that the Topics "sliould [italics mine] enable us to determine exactly what ta 
endoxa consist in" 
2 1
 Cf Rh 1354al-6 In the peroration of the Sophistia elenchi, commonly considered an appendix to the 
Topics, Anslotle reformulates this aim with slight modifications, dialectic fosters a capacity enabling one 
to reason "about what is proposed [pen Uni problêthentos] from the most endoxic [premises] obtaining lek 
ton huparkhontôn has emtoxotatôn]" (SE Ша37-8, Тор 101Ь5-10) 
2 2
 For this formulation (and variations on il) see also Top 101all-3, 104a8-ll, 105a35-b3 For reasons 
which will become clear presently, I have left the term endoxot untranslated 
2 3
 Later in the text (101al0-3) Aristotle appears to call it a horos, which, it is true, is one of the standard 
designations for definition in the Го/нсч itself Top 101b22, 3,139a24, books Ζ and Η passim This seems to 
provide us with ample internal grounds to construe the characterisation retroactively as a definition 
Another, more original, sense of horos is 'boundary' or 'limit' See PA 639al3 and the comments ad loc of 
Balme (1972), ρ 70, and Kullmann (1974), pp 103-6 
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conceptions' are misnomers in so far as the term endoxa is concerned.24 The 
characterisation as it stands perfectly allows for counterintuitive and 
uncommon beliefs to be endoxa. 
So one might argue that SOR is not endoxon, precisely because it 
contradicts the phairtomena, which are ex hypothesi common beliefs. For instance, 
Aristotle condemns the attempt to cram the plurality of styles of friendship into 
one definition as "forcing the phainomena", which has the unwelcome 
consequence of stating paradoxa (ЕЕ 1236b22-3). The term paradoxos is glossed, 
much as we know it from Hume,25 as 'contrary to the beliefs of the many* 
(enantion tais ton pollón doxais) (Top 104all-2; b24-5); paradoxic positions 
sustained by well-known philosophers, such as the Eleatic 'what is is one', are 
the stuff of dialectical theseis (Top 104b24-8; Ph ІвЗаІ-З).26 
SOR satisfies these criteria, and it might be contended27 that Socrates' 
reputation as a philosopher suffices to subject it to dialectical scrutiny. This 
might explain why it is not included among the phainomena-endoxa. However, 
the discussion of a thesis does not properly belong to an inquiry conducted in 
the context of some particular discipline (EN 1095b31-1096a2; Ph 185a5-7; 14-8; 
DC 306all-5), but to ('logical') dialectic (Ph 185a2-3; DC 298b20). 
Further, if it is merely Socrates' celebrity which compels examination of 
his views on ethical matters, they might still be endoxa. We should not forget 
that Aristotle conceives of Socrates mainly as a moral philosopher (Met 987M-2; 
1078M7-8; PA 642a28-30). The 'wise' figuring in the description of endoxa need 
not be those who have sophia in the sense of 'first philosophy' as familiar from 
the Metaphysics; they may be the experts, the most outstanding and accute 
representatives of their disciplines, whether these be crafts or sciences. 
'Wisdom' in this sense is what Aristotle calls the 'excellence of arf (arete 
tekhnês) (£N1141a9-10; Top 104al4-5; 33-7).28 
Aristotle says that if not all endoxa, then most or the most important or 
authoritative (kuriôtata) of them must be shown to be true (EN 1145M-6). 
According to (Q SOR is among the latter; eventually, it is 'leff ,29 that is to say, it 
24
 And, as a consequence, so is 'ethics of common sense' as a possible description of Aristotelian ethics, at 
least insofar as it is derived from this construe! of endoxa, see Barnes (1981), ρ 5Ü3 As Barnes points out 
(referring to Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethtcs), it is on such a construal of endoxa that the ascription of an 
ethics of common sense to Aristotle ultimately relies In some form or other, this view continues to have 
its adherents, see Rawls (1971), ρ 51n26 See also Irwin (1988), ρ 8; 36, especially 494n42 
» See e g Treatise, I 21,1 314 
2 6
 The other type of thesis Anstotle mentions are reasoned positions, buttressing paradoxic conclusions, 
favoured by sophists Such positions, Anstotle says, "even if no one actually believes them, could be 
believed through their being argued for [dia to logan ekhem]" {Top 104b24-8) 
2 7
 And it has been so argued by Bumet (1900), ad ¡oc 
28
 See also 1142al2-3 with al7, from this passage it emerges that this sort of wisdom does not only apply 
to arts, but (perhaps in an extended sense) also to sciences like mathematics and geometry Furthermore, 
the passage brings out clearly the difference between being 'wise' with respect to a certain discipline and 
being a 'first philosopher' the first use of sophoi is qualified, the second not The best 'first philosophers' 
may, on this account, be called wise men both paronymously, in virtue of their practising this science, 
and because of the high level of their so practising But this does not make any 'first philosopher' a wise 
man in the sense of Aristotle's characterisation of endoxa 
29
 Kätalerpem (EN 1145b6-7,1146a7), LSI list as one sense 'to leave undisputed', or 'to admit, to allow the 
truth' of a doctrine 
17 
survives dialectical scrutiny (although not uninterpreted); and, so it is said, 
from its introduction on Aristotle goes through considerable pains to exonerate 
it - to such an extent that it virtually determines the course of his analysis.30 
Ex hypothesi, then, if SOR is an endoxon, then it is a phainomenon; yet it is 
not found in the initial set of endoxa-pliainomena. So (I), or the part of (I) under 
attack, fails. Phainomena and endoxa are not co-extensive. 
This anomaly is, I believe, the price for Sidgwickian bias. On (I), the 
questionable routine of construing endoxa 'common beliefs' spreads to 
phainomena; and so it is consistent not to admit SOR to the initial set of 
phainomena (or legomena). But, once this is admitted, it should be pointed out 
that the latter can only be a subset of endoxa. Therefore, the second leg of the 
argument, or (C), tackles the first, or (I). The argument as it stands shatters 
because it begs the central question. Endoxa are not, at least not essentially or 
necessarily, common beliefs. 
4. Let us now set our heads on restoration. For a start, we should carefully 
attend to the phrasing of Aristotle's reproduction of SOR and its subsequent 
rebuke. We divide the passage in two parts; the separation is effected by 
isolating the remark on SOR's contradiction of the phainomena, in the following 
way: 
part (1): Now someone could be perplexed as to m what way someone who behaves akratically 
believes'1 rightly [pôs hupolambanonta orthôs]. That he should behave so when he has 
understanding [eptstamenon], some say it is impossible; for it would be upsetting - so Socrates 
thought - that if understanding was m a man something else could master it and 'drag it about 
like a slave'. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view m question [holôs], holding that 
there is no such thing as akrasia; no one, he said, acts against what he believes 
[hupolambanonta] best - people act so only by reason of ignorance [di' agnoimi\. (EN 1145b21-7)32 
It is this argument which, as is usually translated, 'plainly conflicts with' 
or 'plainly contradicts' the phainomena (amphisbêtei tots phainomenois enargôs) (EN 
1145b27-8), 
30
 This interpretation needlessly conjures up its own problems of justification if it is true that Aristotle is 
"anxious" (the term is Owen's, (1961), ρ 115) to uphold the element of ignorance in Sor, then what 
prompts this anxiety? For if all that Aristotle aims at is internal coherence of beliefs, the motivation for 
inquiring into and thus presupposing a part played by ignorance is, at any rate in terms of this 
interpretation, severely underdelermined This is why the phrase dedeigmenon an eie hikantte (1145b7) is 
usually, on what I have labelled the Orthodox' interpretation, taken to refer to the achievement of mere 
coherence, see Irwin (1988), ρ 49-50 
3
' I shall render the terms hupolambtmein and hiqmlêpsts, used by Aristotle to refer to the genene concept 
under which doxa is subsumed as one of its species, 'to believe' and 'belief' respectively The speaes doxa 
and its corresponding verbs, dokein and doxazein, receive the same treatment Unless otherwise noted, 
'belief' and 'believe' replace the specific notions I think this interpretative translation is justified by the 
fact that in most relevant contexts we may substitute the speaes for its genus If there is a danger of 
confusion, I shall indicate this 
32
 This is, in essentials, the Revised Oxford Translation I have taken the liberty to adapt the terminology 
somewhat to the translations I prefer For reasons to be expounded more elaborately below in the text, I 
think this translation is inaccurate (as practically all translations I consulted are) in a rather illuminating 
way 
18 
part (2): and it is necessary to inquire about the affection \peri to pathos], if it [occurs] on 
account of ignorance, what mode of ignorance comes mto being \ginetai]. For it is evident 
[phaneron] that he who behaves akrahcally [ho akrateuomenos] does not mean [auk otetat]33 [to do 
so] before getting m the affection [pin en tat pathei genesthat]. (EN 1145b28-31) 
That SOR is at loggerheads with common belief is twice commemorated 
only in the section of the Protagoras whence the slave-comparison is drawn (Prot 
352b2-c2; d4-e4). That this is 'plainly7 the case is new. 
Several features of this text cry out for rescue from exegetical repression, 
and the first of them concerns the adverb 'plainly' (enargôs). Up to now I have 
tacitly assumed that it qualifies the main verb. But this translation, venerable as 
its pedigree may be, is not the only, and not even the most likely alternative. 
For the adverb may modify phainomenois rather than amphisbêtein.3* On this 
account SOR 'contradicts what plainly appears', and does not 'plainly 
contradict what appears'.35 
Of course, if one takes phainomena as 'common beliefs', this 
interpretation appears inescapable. Admittedly, the adjective enargôs may 
apply to linguistic items, meaning something like 'clear7 or 'distinct/, and it 
may be argued Aristotle is gesturing toward something like 'clearly 
formulated' common beliefs.36 But such a consumai is controverted by the 
elaborate operations of disambiguation performed during the discussion of the 
perplexity about the exact way in which the akratic are said to act knowingly 
(EN 1145Ы2-3; 21-2; 1146b8-9; 114/Ы8).37 On this count, the adverbial modifier 
cannot but submit to a natural attraction to the main verb. 
3 3
 Or 'deliberately chooses' (see 1146M3-4 with 1151a4-6 and 1148al7), provisionally assuming this to be 
an adequate rendering of prohaireisthai 
3 4
 Owen (1961), ρ 114, construes "plainly in conflict with the phmnomena", as against Ross' "the view 
plainly contradicts the observed facts" The Revised Oxford Translation has, more plausibly, "the plain 
phenomena" Barnes (1981), ρ 491nl, who is right to take enargôs with fois phainomenois, unfortunately 
does not comment on the consequences for his interpretation He refers to Plato's Phtlebus 20cl and to 
Protr fr 9 (Ross) The adverb enargôs pnncipally means 'visibly', 'manifestly', or 'palpably' LSJ signal 
several instances of the corresponding adjective ('visible', 'palpable', 'in bodily shape') m connection 
with phainestiiai from Homer's Iliad, referring to the gods appearing in their own form 
35
 Sec Ph 253b29-30, lian esfi fois phanerms amphisbêtem I take ban to modify fois ptianerois, see EN 
1101a23, 1181al3, Top 155b37, GA 747Ы0-1, RA 1372a23-i, DC 306al6-7 See also Ph 254a8 madietai fois 
phanerots ho amphisbêtôn 
36
 Anstotle himself uses the term in this way EN 1097b23, Top 105al9 (reading, with some M5S, 
enargesteron), APr 68b36, and, interestingly, DA 418b23, where the enargeia of logos is juxtaposed to 
phmnomena, which may very well convey that the latter have this quality of themselves 
37
 The opona raised is not, as is often thought, about the possibility of akrasia (pas modifying the whole 
clause), it rather asks for a specification of the cognitive state involved in it (pas modifying hupolambanôn 
orthôs), see Hardie (1981), pp 266-8, 405, Broadie (1991), ρ 309nl, and references This is what motivates 
Aristotle's use of hupolambanein in the formulation of the opona, for it is the verb corresponding to his 
genene term of art for cognitive states in general, hupolêpsis, the species of which are understanding 
(episteme), belief (doxa), practical wisdom (phronêsis), and their contranes [DA 427b24-6) It is clear that 
these 'contranes', among which ignorance (agmna) must in some way figure, are preemptively excluded 
by the very terms in which the apona is couched Anstotle neatly treats of the 'positive' species of 
hupolêpsts in the same order as presented m the DA passage episteme 1145b22, doxa Ь34, phronêsis 
1146a4 The use of hupolambanonta at b26 presumably is an abbreviation of hupolambononta orthôs See 
also Top 119a38-b4 These, then, may be taken to ask for a suitable interpretation of the ('Pickwickian') 
term eidos of the common belief 
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There is ample circumstantial evidence for the claim that the adverb 
standardly goes with the sense-modality of vision. First, we employ the Greek 
equivalent of the sceptical 'looks' locution, phainetai, when something which we 
do not perceive clearly (enargôs) 'looks' like, for instance, a man (DA 428al2-
5).38 Further, while composing, the tragedian is counselled to 'place before the 
eyes' (pro animatoti tithesthai) the scenes from which the plot is concocted. 
Visualising the actions will make him see them as vividly (enargestata horôn) as 
if he would himself partake of them.39 In a Stanislawskyan effort of 
impersonation he may even evoke in himself the repertoire of moods of his 
characters (Poet 1455a22-34).40 Finally, Anaxagoras, when asked by a layman 
what sort of person he considered truly happy, is reported to have briskly 
rebuffed his interrogator: "None of whom you think; he would appear \phaneië\ 
a strange fellow to you" (££ 1215b6-8). The many (hoi polloi), or as they are still 
called by the time of Sidgwick's Methods and Bradley's Ethical Studies, 'the 
vulgar', allocate the title according to external goods like wealth, these being 
the only goods perceived by them (aisthanomenoi) (EN 1179al3-6). And wealth, 
it should be recorded, is one of the 'manifest and evident/ goods (enargan ti kat 
phanerôn) dismissed as candidates for the summum bonunt (EN 1095a22-3).41 
Other features to be saved more directly concern SOR. Let us briefly 
recall (Q. If phainomena are Observed facts', then it makes no sense to query the 
'mode of ignorance'. For if SOR contradicts the observed facts, then also does 
that part of SOR which has it that one acts wrongly 'in (sic) ignorance'. And 
since Aristotle ultimately allows for a certain type of ignorance in the account 
of akrasia, phainomena must be common beliefs. This jump to conclusions, 
together with the construe it foists on the text, is far from mandatory. Instead 
we need to ask whether SOR, taken in its entirety, is really 'left standing'. For it 
is not the case that it gets through the dialectical skirmishing in one piece. 
What follows is meant to be not so much an argument refuting the 
newly orthodox interpretation in a direct confrontation, but rather an 
interpretative counter-proposal - to repair for the destructive drift of the 
chapter so far. I shall impose two constraints on i i First, I assume that the fact 
that Aristotle reproduces SOR in his own technical idiolect is significant In 
other words, we should respect the distinctions it reflects. Secondly, I shall 
endorse the assumption that the two instances of phainomena we have 
encountered (EN 1145b3; b28) should be given the same sense, on pain of 
'inconsistency'.42 Although there is a spot of dogmatism here, this limited 
version of the challenge of the preservation of semantic unity which we already 
38
 For this passage see Schofield (1992), pp 258-60 This does not detract from the possibility of enargôs 
modifying phainomena, since not every instance of the verb phamestlun expresses the scepticism of this 
locution 
3» See also RA 1410b33-5 
40
 We shall return to visualisation in another context 
41
 Thus the collocation of ta phamomena enargôs (f-.N 1145b28) with phaneron (1145b31) may be significant 
42
 Owen (1961), pp 114-5 Owen remarks that Ross' translation is at least "consistent and superior" to 
interpretations (he mentions those of Heliodorus and Gauthier-Jolif) which in the first context take the 
term to refer to endoxa and in the second to "the unquestionable facts" 
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referred to, if it can be achieved throughout the same context, would seem to be 
preferable to saddle Aristotle with ambiguity. 
5. 'Akrasia' vacillates between the permanence of a disposition (herís)43 and 
the transience of an affection (pathos).** In general, commentators on our 
passage betray no qualms in ignoring this distinction. Yet the reference to 
akrasia as an affection (lauta ta pathë) at 1145b5 flies in the face of Aristotle's 
habitual punctiliousness in such matters. Since there has been only talk of 
dispositions up to that point (1145a25; 33; bl),45 two questions conjointly urge 
themselves upon us. The first concerns the way to account for this sudden 
switch, the second regards the antecedent of the demonstrative pronoun tauta.*6 
I now interpose an outline of my interpretive proposal, to give the 
reader the opportunity to get used to it 
Syntactically, the most plausible antecedent for the demonstrative is 
phainomena. If ta endoxa peri tauta ta pathë referentially, but not synonymously, 
equals ta endoxa peri ta phainomena, then an alternative interpretation looms up. 
SOR, though an endoxon, is not, strictly speaking, an endoxon about the pathê-
phainomena, namely akrasia in its objectively accessible manifestations in moral 
life. On the contrary, the argument even 'contradicts' them. If so, phainomena 
cannot possibly be identical with endoxa, let alone with 'common beliefs'. They 
are, quite literally, things which 'show themselves', and akrasia only shows 
itself when it occurs (Met 1022Ы8-9). The phrase ta endoxa peri tauta ta pathê, I 
claim, contains a succinct and highly compressed methodological injunction: 
the endoxa must be anchored in the phainomena, in this case, the affections. This 
is the marrow of Aristotle's assessment of SOR. 
Yet it needs to be asked whether there is an argument authorising us to 
substitute, so to say, one form of substitutability for another. There is such an 
argument and we might study it in the course of countering an objection. For is 
it not the case that a belief implying the denial of a certain phenomenon is still 
a belief about that phenomenon? In Aristotle's case, I argue, this objection is 
hopelessly off target, but, it should be noted, the peculiar way it miscarries is 
symptomatic of a failure to see just how dialectical the passage in question is. 
The Topics, again, may be invoked to warm us up. 
6. The Topics does not, as is sometimes suggested,47 give us a way to acquire 
or establish first principles. Its objectives are of a farmore modest nature.4* It 
431 render hexts 'disposition', since the usual translation 'state' is potentially confusing in this connection. 
« Hens EN 1145Ы, 1101M2-8 with 1145b8-10, 1146al4, 1147al4, 1148b5-6, 19, 1151a28, Ь29, 1152a35 
Pathos- 1145b29,30,1147Ы6,114ЙЬ6 
4 5
 At аЗЗ we find diathesis, a term used by Anstotle to refer to settled dispositions (EN 1107M6, 30, 
1108a24,bll) Cf Cat 8al3, b26-9, 
4 6
 One possibility is to read the phrase in opposition with ηη ton alien (1145b3), but that would be merely 
shifting the problem, for if we have to understand epi ton alien \patlwn] the difficulty is reintroduced 
what motivates fftis switch to pathê? 
" Irwin (1988), ρ 37 
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rather enables us to have discourse about them and to purge this discourse of 
incoherence. When Aristotle, in Top A 2, justifies his project in terms of its 
usefulness, we should therefore guard ourselves against confusing usefulness 
with what it is useful to. 
The functions of dialectic are basically heuristic and propaedeutic.49 In 
the first place, its so-called 'gymnastic' function (pros gumnasian) is to facilitate 
extempore reasoning on whatever is thrown up as a matter for debate; 
secondly, dialectic is useful to 'encounters' (pros tas enteuxeis), enabling one to 
redirect or modify the statements of the beliefs of the many, meeting them on 
their own ground; thirdly, it is useful 
to the philosophical sciences [pros tas kata phtlosophtan eptstêmas], because, when we are capable 
of going through the perplexities with a view to both sides of a subject [dtaporêsai pros 
amphotera], we shall more easily spot what is true and fake in each particular case. (Top 101a34-
6) 
Dialectic, then, fortifying us against the contingencies of impromptu or 
unrehearsed disputation, makes all these things easier (raion).50 Another 
function of dialectic is appended to these three, almost, as it appears, as an 
afterthought Indeed, there is some controversy, nearly as old as commentary 
tradition on Aristotle itself, about the place of this fourth function. The text 
expounding it runs as follows: 
furthermore, with a view to [pros] the fust principles m the sphere of each particular science 
\pen hekastên eptstêmên]. FOT from the principles appropriate to a given \prothetheisan] science it 
is impossible to say anything about them [pen autan], since the principles are prior to 
everything eke - but it is necessary to go through them [pen autan] by way of the endoxa about 
each [pen hekasta]. This is peculiar or most appropriate [idion ê tnalista otketon] of dialectic; for, 
being capable of examining [exetashkê],5i it has a road towards the principles of all sciences. 
(Top 101а36-Ь4) 
What troubles one is to find Aristotle saying, first, that dialectic is useful 
in three ways (Top 101a26), and, secondly, that the unheralded fourth way is 
what is most distinctive of i t 5 2 The solution, I submit, depends on how one 
« See Smith (1997), pp 53-4 
4
' Aristotle sees himself as a codifier of a practice which has been in existence for considerable time, but 
which is, so to speak, in need of institutionalisahon or regimentation to make it teachable This explains 
his justifying remarks on the utility of his project There is not much of a tradition to build on and most 
of the results have come about by labour and toil (tribêi) (SE 184M-3) For tnbêi, in juxtaposition with 
empana and tedine see Plato, Phil 55e6, Phaedr 260e5, 270b5-6 It is important to realize that Aristotle 
wants to transmit a tekhnê, not merely its products, as is the case with Gorgias' "quick but unartful 
[atedmos] teaching", which consisted of the leanmng by heart of texts in which the arguments of the 
opponents were thought to be included (SE 183b36-184a3) 
»Solmsen (1968), ρ 53-ί 
51
 The term exetashki carries, of course, strong reminiscences of Socrates' version of dialectic displayed in 
the Platonic dialogues For exetazem see E£ 1215a6, EN 1095a28 in two related uses Also Met 1091al9-22, 
where the division of disciplines precludes the examination of certain views 
52
 In his commentary, (1891) 29 18-3012, Alexander ot Aphrodisias solves the problem by drawing this 
fourth use into the scope of the third, or 'philosophical' one Brunschwig (1967), pp 116-7 treats it as "un 
point 4 non prévu dans le programme annoncé plus haut (101a26-8)" I owe both references to Irwin 
(1988), ρ 492η35, who complies with ancient authority 
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construes the introductory pros of this fourth function (a36). Since the preceding 
three functions listed are likewise introduced by this pronoun ([khrêsimos] pros), 
one is lulled, by the cadence of enumeration, into giving this last one equal 
metric weight Yet what is understood by this pros need not be khrêsimos. 
It may also attach itself to diaporêsai, or 'going through the perplexities', 
which also takes this pronoun, but in a different, 'directional', sense (а35).я 
There are, then, three functions of dialectic, incorporating one 'philosophical' 
use - 'diaporising'. Diaporising makes it easier to spot the truth in whatever 
issue, generally, when inspecting arguments dispersing in both directions {pros 
amphotera),5* and, more specifically, when travelling 'to first principles' (pros ta 
pròto) of whatever science.55 Ethics, it should be registered, is no less a 
'philosophical' discipline than, say, natural philosophy (Pol 1282Ы8-20; 22-3; cf. 
EN 1152Ы-2; ЕЕ 1216b35-9). 
It will not come as a surprise that it is the second 'diaporetic' function 
which concerns us here. Aristotle explains dialectic's part in matters of 
principle by ite capacity to bypass the impending danger of begging the 
principal question of a given special discipline. A geometer, qua geometer, 
cannot sustain argument 'abouf (perì) the first principles of his science, but 
only 'from' (ek) them; and this goes, Aristotle stresses, for all sciences (APo 
77b3-6). The explanatory remark, then, pulls dialectic into the orbit of a given 
special discipline. For the principles of a special science can be deduced within 
the confines of another, superior science or of dialectic proper (Ph 185a2-3), and 
in these cases there would be no risk of petitio principii. 
'This', Aristotle adds, 'is peculiar or most appropriate' to dialectic.56 But 
does this rather uncommunicative phrase mean that (1) dialectic, as opposed to 
other methods, is a way to principles,57 or that (2) this, in contrast with its other 
'uses', is its proper function, or that (3) dialectic is examinative of, peculiarly, 
endoxa (cf. Top 100al8-21), or that (4) dialectic, again in relation to other 
methods, has a road to principles of all disciplines? 
For reasons partly relegated to a footnote, partly deferred to the next 
sections I opt for (4).58 Dialectic is universally applicable in the translation and 
explicitation of first principles, and in this respect it is second to none. Yet it 
falls short of providing a way of establishing them, and this, we shall presently 
see, becomes especially clear in the case of the ethical first principle par 
excellence, well-being (eudaimonia). 
53
 In other, related contexts, we find the pronoun ept in the same place Top 145Ы8, there are also strong 
(metaphorical) suggestions of 'proceeding' or 'going forward' at Met 995a27-b4 In the case of 'a road 
towards' first principles, we also find ept (APo 84b23-4, Ph 184al6-8, EN 1095a31-3) 
» As in Met В 
5 5
 Thus dtelthein (b2) echoes diaporêsai 
K
 Verderuus (1968), ρ 23, suggests to render è mabita at line b2 'or at any rate', on the ground that oikeios 
is weaker than idion For additional evidence compare Ross (1936), ρ 462, on Ph 185al0-l 
» See Brunschwig (1967), ρ 117 
5 8
 First, going through the (available) endoxa is an integral ingredient of Aristotle's actual scientific 
practice, a point to which our main text testifies (FN 1145b2-6) Secondly, it is in line with the ambitions 
of dialectic progammatically declared, as we have seen, both in the exordium and the peroration of the 
Topics and the Sophisha elenchi Thirdly, the professed 'immateriality' of dialectic renders it, like rhetoric, 
universally applicable (APo 77a31-2, ÄE 170a33-9, Rh 1354al-3,1355b8-10,1356a32-4) 
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The extensional Topics criteria for endoxicality considered in a previous 
section (Top 100Б21-3) do not provide us with a rationale for leaving 
unexamined the beliefs concerning well-being cherished by certain classes of 
people, for instance 'the many' (hoi polloi) (EN 1095a28-9; ЕЕ 1214b28-1215a2). 
On the contrary, by these criteria the beliefs of the many have examina uve 
credentials no less recommending than those of Socrates.59 In the case of ethics, 
then, there creeps indeterminacy into the method at its most fundamental 
juncture. This problem will occupy us from the next chapter on. Let us now 
return to our principal text 
7. Aristotle talks about 'adequate proof (dedeigmenon hikanôs): it is 
adequate proof if we achieve the remission of tensions between the endoxa (EN 
1145b6-7).60 A brief excursus on the adverbial modifier of degree hikanôs will 
take us straight to the heart of the matter. 
Aristotle more than once stresses the close affinities between the 
ontological foibles of, literally, the 'subject-matter' of an inquiry (hê hupokeimenê 
hulê) and the degree of 'precision' (akribeia), or scientific rigour of exposition it 
can cope with (EN 1094Ы1-27; 1098a26-M; 1103b34-1104a5). The contingency 
of human toil and tinkering notoriously defies the straitjacket of mathematical 
demonstration (EN 1094b25-7): 
We should also remember what has been said before, and not in like manner look for precision 
[aknbetan] in all things, but in each kind of thing according to the underlying matter [kata ten 
hupokamenên hulên] and to such an extent as [ept tosouton eph' hoson] is appropriate to the 
inquiry [oikeion têt methodêt]. For a carpenter and a geometer look for the right angle m 
different ways; the former as much as it [i.e. the right angle] is useful with a view to his work 
[pros to ergon], the latter [inquires] what it is [h estin] and what sort of thing it is; for he is a 
spectator of truth. In the same way it should also be done m other matters, that subordinate 
matters do not outgrow the actual works. And the explanation [ten aihan] should not be 
demanded m all cases alike, but m some cases proving the 'that' [to hoti] well is adequate 
[hikanon], just as [it is the case] abo about the principles [pert tas arkhas]; the 'that' is primary 
[proton] and a principle [arkhê]. Some principles are studied by induction [epagoge], others by 
perception [atsthesei], again others by a kind of habituation [ethtsmm tint],*1 that is, different 
[principles] in different ways [kat allai d' alios]. (EN 1098a26-b4) 
*> Barnes (1981), ρ 504, distinguishes between hoi polloi and hoi pletsten (to be found in the 
characterisation found in the Topics), it is the beliefs peculiar to the many, "the vulgar herd", which are to 
be omitted This merely reintroduces the same problem at another level For how does Barnes account 
for the fact that an endoxic proposition is a proposition which is not contrary to the 'beliefs of the many' 
(me enantion tais ton pollón (farms) (Top 104а8Л2)7 
6 0
 Ad hikanôs this term means something like 'enough', or 'sufficiently' ("we will have done enough 
showing", Nussbaum (1986), ρ 240, or "we shall have offered a sufficient proof of the matter", Barnes 
(1995), ρ 23) It may, however, also mean 'adequately', 'fittingly' Below it will become clear why I 
prefer, with e g Irwin (1988), ρ 30, 'adequately' 
61
 The text does not talk about ethismos proper, but about etlusmos Hs Recent analysis of an ambiguity 
inhabiting the indefinite pronoun tis presents us with a choice between two ronstruals, a 'subsumptive' 
(in virtue of which 'a kind of habituation' would be a proper rendition) and an 'alienating' one, 
etherealising, so to say, 'the real thing' (captured in a translation like 'habituation of a kind'), see 
Burnyeat (1996), pp 94-6 With our eyes on certain aspects of the neighbouring carpentry analogy we 
may construe - as I think we should - (is as a kind of habituation, namely, that kind which bears a 
decisive structural resemblance, short of assimilation, to that involved in learning carpentry 
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'Adequate proof in ethics, then, is 'rightly proving the that' - a 
redescnpbon hardly less arcane than the one we set out to clarify. 'The that', as 
opposed to 'the because' (to dihoti), refers to something's being the case, in 
contrast with the explanation (aitia) sought for it (APo 89b23-35). In ethics, 'the 
that' has a peculiar importance: 
Presumably, then, we should begm from things which are familiar to us [apo ton hêmin 
gnônmdn]. That is why it is necessary [dtho dei] that he who is going to listen adequately about 
[ton akousomenon htkands peri] things noble and just and political m general has been brought up 
nobly by means of habits. For the 'that' is a principle [arkhô] and if this sufficiently appears 
¡phamotto] [to someone], he will not need the 'because' [tou dihoti] m addition. (EN 1095b3-7) 
Since its 'subject-matter' is unsympathetic to explanations, these are not 
to be expected in ethical inquiry.62 More than that they would infringe on the 
constraint of adequacy, which grounds method in the ontological properties of 
the moral. Practical resourcefulness, not explanation yielded by contemplating 
the formal cause (ti estiri),63 is apposite, or 'appropriate' to ethics.64 
In natural philosophy, when, for instance, conducting an investigation 
into place (topos) in Physics A, the removal of endoxic inconsistencies seems 
vouched for by the explanatory definition at which the enquiry aims: 
One ought to try to conduct the inquiry m such a way that the what it is [to H esttrt] will be 
rendered, so that both the things one is perplexed about are solved [ta aporoumena luesthai] and 
the thmgs which are believed to belong [ta dokounta huparkhem] to place will belong - and 
furthermore, the cause of the difficulty and of the perplexities about it will be evident,-65 for in 
this way one would give the best proof [an kalltsta deiknuotto]. (Ph 211a7-ll) 
The striking similarities notwithstanding, there is one substantial 
difference with the akrasia programme. Whereas the latter aspires to 'adequate' 
proof, the former sets ite sights on the 'besf proof: an explanatory statement of 
the essence. In this respect, ethics methodically differs from natural philosophy. 
It is in these terms that an obvious solution offers itself for the 
occurrence of the term phusikôs in the following sentence (in Ross' translation): 
62
 Kullmann (1974), 222-4, paraphrases Aristotle's intention thus "Еэ kommt darauf an, das [hêmm 
gnonmon] zum [haplôs gnônmon] zu machen, wenn das 'daß' genügend zur Erscheinung kommt und 
absolut kenntlich wird, ist die Aristotelische Aufgabe gelost Es bedarf der Begründungen dann nicht 
mehr Die Ethikvorlesung braucht das [dihoti] nicht zu behandeln " By contrast, Hardie (1980), ρ 34, and 
Bumyeat (1980), ρ 71, 74, seem to construe the text as promising a 'reasoned understanding' (Bumyeat), 
or 'the reason' In my opinion, Bumyeat underestimates the similarities between both passages, the point 
of which obviously consists in stressing the principal role of 'the that' 
6 3
 The ft «¡ft ê poton tt question posed by the geometer aims at gaining knowledge of the essence of the 
object, which is by Aristotle identified with the formal cause, knowing the essence is knowing the 
explanation (to dia ft, to dihoti) by a correct arrangement of the middle term in a demonstration {APo 
90al5-21,31-2,93a4) 
*> On the very same grounds, contemplation of (FN 1097all, 1098a31) or precision (exaknboun) with 
regard to Platonic forms is more 'appropriate' to another branch of philosophical inquiry (alles 
philosophies oikeioteron), and Aristotle 'empirically' (pftametat) buttresses this distribution of competence 
by referring to the actually obtaining practices of the several disciplines (£N 1096b30-5, 1097а8Л4, £E 
1217Ы6-25) 
«Cf EN1154a22-6 
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Again, we may also [fan] view the cause [ten attian] as follows with reference to the facts of 
human nature ¡phusikos]. (EN1147a24-5) 
Miles Burnyeat, arguing that kai governs the whole sentence, 
reconstrues: "we may also give an explanation of the phenomenon we have 
been endeavoring, with some difficulty, to describe."66 This is a salutary 
msight, although, I suspect gained from a perspective rather different from the 
one argued for here.67 Explaining akrasia does not properly belong to ethical 
inquiry, but to natural philosophy. The term phusikôs, therefore, marks a 
transgression - which is, however, not illegitimate. For since the politikos is 
concerned with human virtue, which is a virtue of the soul, he needs to have 
some knowledge of the human soul, in so far as such knowledge will benefit his 
practical purposes (EN 1102a5-26). Akrasia, too, with its peculiar blend of 
knowledge and ignorance, is a specifically human affection (EN 1147b3-5; DA 
433a9-12), so that it is of concern to the politikos.69 But properly speaking, the 
explanation belongs to another inquiry (EN 1155b8-10).69 
'Adequate proof in ethics, then, must be given about first principles, 
and 'the that' is some such principle (proton, cf. Top 101a36-b4). 'The tluit', 
Aristotle continues (EN 10983-4), is studied in its appropriate way,70 and not 
every such way is amenable to interdisciplinary transplantation. The 
distinctiveness of dialectic consists in its wide-ranging scope: because endoxa 
about 'the that', established in its own local manner, are its vehicle, it is not 
bound to any particular discipline. In essentials, then, Aristotle, at EN 1145b2-7, 
only repeats what he has said in the methodological asides from book A. 
Let us now move from method to substance, or 'subject-matter' and pick 
out one way of principle-acquisition (epagô gè) to bring home the point that SOR 
is not about akrasia. 
8. It is a hupothesis ('assumption' or 'supposition') of Aristotelian natural 
philosophy, secured by an empirical survey of cases (epagoge) (Pit 185al2-4; 
« Burnyeat (1980), ρ 85 
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 Burnyeat cannot have this point of view because he argues, in the course of a discussion of EN 1095b6-
7 on the contrast between 'the that' and 'the because', that "[t]hese lectures [ι e the Ntcomachean Efftics] 
are no doubt designed to give him [ι e. Aristotle's student] a reasoned understanding of 'the because' 
which explains and justifies 'the that' which he already has or can easily get hold of " Burnyeat (1980), ρ 
71 This is what is not to be expected Butcf EN1152a34 
M
 The dissolution of ignorance and epistemic regeneration, because they are not peculiar to akrasia, 
belong to the province of natural philosophy (EN 1147b6-9) 
•»SeealsoEN1102M7 pephukos 
7 0
 See EN 1098b3-4 Some commentators treat the phrase fail allai A' alios (b4) as an 'open-ended 
extension', see Burnyeat (1980), ρ 88-9n4, and references there See also Dirlmeier ad loc Others treat 
the hst as exhaustive, on this interpretation fan must be epexegetic (Grant, Stewart, Gauthier-Jolif, ad loc ) 
I believe that the list is exhaustive, and that the phrase fail allai d' alios is recapitulatory Rather than 
pointing outward to other, not mentioned items, it is supposed to make the point that certain things, or 
types of things, have their peculiar ways For instance, of various skills and practices every particular one 
has its own end (EN 1097a20), or different people have thetr mon conception of well-being (FN 1095a23) It 
is therefore significant that dialectic is not mentioned as a way of coming by principles 
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193аЗ-9; 254а24-7; cf. GA 788Ы7-20; ЕЕ 1218Ь37-1219а6), that, since at least 
some natural beings are seen to be in motion, nature is a principle of movement 
(Ph 200M2-3; 253b2-6; 254a30-bl).71 As already noted, a practitioner of a special 
discipline is reduced to silence by someone annihilating its principles (anairein 
tas arkhas) (Ph 185al-2; 253b2-6; GA 748al0-l; cf. DC 303а20-3).я 
The terms hupotliesis and arkhê sometimes stand in for each other (ЕЕ 
1235b25; 30-1). In Aristotelian idiom it is also possible, perhaps somewhat 
pleonastically, to 'hypothesise principles'. For instance, those experienced with 
the bearing of natural phenomena are better able to 'hypothesise principles', 
resulting in 'appropriate' accounts (oikeiot logoi), than those who, without 
looking about them, relish in long-winded argument (GC 316a6-14; ЕЕ 1218a8-
9; 1227a8-9; b23-5; b28-30; 1235b25-31; EN 1151al6-9). 
More germane to our purposes, the verb corresponding to hupotliesis, 
hupotithenai, sometimes retains its sense despite the amputation of its prefix. So 
when Aristotle, in the Posterior Analytics, analyses the notion of demonstrative 
science, he lists as one of its parts "what it posits [tithetai\ to exist", being "the 
genus of which it studies the essential attributes". Yet he sees no reason why 
some of the sciences should not ignore "positing [hupotithesthai] that the genus 
exists, when it is evident [plmneron] that it does (for it is not likewise clear that 
number exists and that cold and hot do)" (APo 76Ы1-22). Similarly, it is 
'ridiculous' to set about proving that nature exists: this would be proving the 
evident by the non-evident (phanera dia ton aphanon detknunai). It would be like 
the attempt of a person blind from birth to prove the existence of colours by 
argument (Ph 193a3-9). 
The Eleatic philosophers, although they are not blind, act as if they were 
(GC 325al4-5). Despite avowals to the contrary effect, they do not inquire into 
nature at all. Upholding the position, with a dogged faith in the self-sufficiency 
of argument, that everything is one and unmoved, and, by implication, 
generally (holôs) (DC 298bl5) denying all becoming and decaying, the Eleabcs 
(among whom Parmenides, who is, ironically, the author of a treatise Peri 
phuseôs) are not, actually, theorising 'about nature' (peri phuseôs) (Ph 184b25-
185al; 253b2-6; DC 293a29-30; 298Ы4-20; GC 325a2-23). They do away with the 
'posited genus' of the discipline. 
The Eleabcs' trampling on principle is due to a failure to adopt the 
'appropriate' method of principle-acquisition (Ph 254a30-bl; GC 325ЭІ4-5).73 
Interestingly, Parmenides' theories gain in plausibility as soon as he is 'forced 
7 1
 The term hupothesis should not be thought to convey a merely conventional conditionally Their self-
evident truth makes proof not only superfluous, but impossible Whether the undemonstrable hupothesas 
are strictly existential propositions ('that there are Fs') (APo 72al8-24, 76a31-6, b3-22) or whether they, 
more generally, cover factual statements, is a problem which cannot be discussed here, see Barnes (1993), 
ρ 100 
7 2
 That this is generally the case emerges from repeated assurances that this holds in other cases as well 
(homoiòs de km ept ton allòri) (Ph 253M, GA 748al0-l) Cf £N 1145b2-3, and Nussbaum's comments on 
hasper qn ton alian, Nussbaum (1986), ρ 478nl 
7 3
 The contrary, 'Herachtean', view that everything is in motion is less subversive (hêtton para tin 
methodori), since "nature was laid down [etethë] to be a principle in natural beings, of motion and rest 
alike, yet motion is natural" (Ph 253b6-9) For para tên methadon, see Top 101a5-17,162b7-ll, SF 171Ы1-2, 
Ь34-172а13 
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to follow the рШпотепа' (Met 986b31).74 A relaxation of his fixation on 
argument in favour of the self-recommending deliverances of perception leads 
him to 'lay down', or to assume (hthêsi), more realistically, a plurality of 
principles.75 'Looking' guides his thought, as opposed to that of Melissus, 
towards true natural philosophy.76 
By the same token, it is in this strong, or 'principal', sense of 'abouf that 
SOR is not about the phainomena (which would lead him to posit the existence of 
akrasia) and so it is doomed to gainsay the reality of the underlying fact, 'the 
thai about which the endoxa want remisson of reciprocal tensions. But it is 
important to see how SOR's violation comes about Let us first tackle part (1) of 
the passage quoted above (EN 1145b23-7), Aristotle's paraphrasis of SOR. 
Socrates overstates his case by conducting a sweeping charge at too high 
a level of generality (holôs) (EN 1145b25; MM 1200b25). Aristotle's 
reformulation of SOR shows that he takes it as a sacrifice of akrasia on the altar 
of vice (kakia, mokhthêria), in particular, intemperance (akolasia) 
. This reduction is prepared by the reduction of the epistemic types covered by 
the generic hupolambanein to one of its species, understanding (episteme) (EN 
1145b21; 2Ó).77 For the Socratic assumptions that virtue is understanding (EN 
1116b4-5; ЕЕ 1216b2-8) and that understanding cannot be ousted by other type 
mental states entail that moral error must be due to ignorance (di'agnoian) (EN 
1145b26-7). For Socrates, therefore, akratic action actually is intemperate action. 
Even before the methodological programme is sketched Aristotle says 
that akrasia and vice (specifically) differ (EN 1145al5-7; 35-b2). Since the object 
of akrasia and intemperance, bodily pleasure, is common ground between 
them (EN Ш8а28-Ь8; 1146M9-23; 1148a4-8; 1149a21-2; ИбОаС-И),78 they are 
distinguishable only as motivational properties of the subject (EN 1146b22-4; 
1148al6-7; 1150a23-7; 1151a20-6; 1152a4-6).79 What is more, it is evident 
(plianeron) that akratic and vicious action differ, because the latter is caused by 
deliberate choice (prohairesis), the former by affection (EN 1151a5-7).M 
™ See also Met 984b9-ll, Ph 188b29-30, PA 642al8-20 
75 Ph 188a20-2, GC 318b6-7,330Ы4-5 
7 6
 For blepem see Pol 1232a24 The contrast with Xenophanes is illuminating, Aristotle rebukes him for 
concentrating his gaze (apoblepem) onto the heavens in formulating his position. For 'myopic' apoblepan 
see DA 404b7,408M For the proper direction of looking· Rh 139бЬ6, Top 159b29 
7 7
 See notes 33 and 39 
7
' This is one of the sources of the endoxic promiscuity surrounding predications of intemperance and 
akrasia (EN 1145Ы6-7, 1148al3-5, U51b32-1152a6) Note, however, that such predications are still 
oriented to the phainomena, and are therefore listed in the initial collection of endoxa 
79
 Aristotle twice poses a rhetorical question which presupposes a tempering effect of deliberate choice 
on appetite, implying that akratic appetite is strong (EN 1148al7-22, 1150a27-31) This is confirmed, 
inversely, by the praiseworthiness of enkrateia or self-control we would not praise someone controlling a 
weak apetite (EN 1145b8-9,1146a9-16,1151a27-8, b28-32) (It is not necessary that every case of akrasia 
involves strong appetite, that some cases do suffices to establish it as a distinct category ) And since 
appetite involves, like all affections, bodily modification, they can be read off persons (EN 1147Ы1-8, 
1128Ы4-5, DA 403a3-M9, Sens 436a7-10, Pol 134CU34-5) 
8 0
 The intemperate acts in virtue of deliberate choice, "holding that one always ought to pursue the 
present object of pleasure", whereas the akratic does not act on account of such a choice, but just pursues 
it (EN 1146b22-4, cf Ш0Ь28-33,1114a31-6, Ь5) 
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On our interpretive proposal, these observable features are converted 
into a 'hypothesis' or principle (EN 1145al5; 1146al4) to the effect that akrasia 
is something sui generis, a state of character (ethos) to be kept apart from vice. 
An overdue reliance on theoretical assumptions, then, may, in natural 
philosophy as much as in ethics, lead to an annihilation of the principle of the 
inquiry (arkhê tes skepseôs) (EN 1146M4; 1145al5; cf. Ph 253a22).81 Hence, since it 
overlooks the phainomena, SOR is not, at least not in its entirety, an endoxon 
'abouf these.82 Thus it violates the principle of the inquiry and, consequently it 
is not an 'appropriate account7 (oikeios logos). 
Now to see what happens in the text we should take for a starting-point 
previously 'laid down' as a constraint upon interprétation, the fact that 
Aristotle recasts SOR in his own technical idiom,83 thus binding his treatment of 
akrasia to an analytical apparatus already in use. The relevant distinctions 
derive from his discussion of involuntary action in book Γ 1, where it is said 
that action caused by (one type of) ignorance (di' agnoian) is involuntary (EN 
1110M8-lllla21).M 
The phrase 'through ignorance' is dissected according to the structure of 
the practical syllogism, yielding two interpretations which may be mapped on 
the di'agnoian of SOR. The source of error may be pinpointed either in the 
universal major premise, typically cast in prescriptive form (dei(n)) and 
representing deliberate choice (hê en têt prohairesei agnoia) (EN 1110b31-3; 
1150a20; 24-S).85 Or in the particular minor premise concerning the concrete 
circumstances of the action (EN ІНОЬЗІ-llllal). In terms of an example of 
Aristotle's: the major 'one ought to taste everything sweet' expresses 
prohairetic ignorance; the minor 'this here is sweet', as I shall call it, situational 
ignorance (EN 1147a29-31; cf. 1142a20-3). 
On (I), the phainomenon-endoxon contradicted most 'plainly7 by SOR is the 
one stating that the akratic acte 'in knowledge' (eidôs), but 'through affection' 
(dia pathos) (EN 1145Ы2-3). By Aristotle's own distinctions ignorance and 
affection mutually exclude one another as proximate causes of action. If one 
acts 'through affection' (e.g. anger, drunkenness), this means that one does not 
act 'through', but 'in ignorance' (agnoôn) (EN 1110b24-7).«« 
Yet by these same distinctions, not only SOR, but also the endoxon is at 
odds with Aristotle's theory. For if acting 'through affection' entails acting 'in 
ignorance', eidos requires justification (EN 1110b27). The fact, however, that SOR 
comes to the fore in 'diaporising' about a suitable interpretation of a crucial 
« Cf ££ 1235b24-5,30-1 
и Which is not to say that one or some of its premises are not endoxa We should not forget that Aristotle 
is diaporising not about akrasia, but about the type of knowledge it involves 
8 3
 The Protagoras has amathia (357e2,4,358c2), taking on an instrumental dative case (357el) 
M
 Compare his strategy at Ph 185a20-186a3, where the Eleatics are refuted m terms of Aristotle's own 
conceptual apparatus See Irwin (1988), pp 67-70 
·*1 concur with the interpretation of pro/ieiresis pioneered by Cooper (1975), pp 46-50 
** Compare Owen's reproduction of Aristotle's reproduction of SOR it has 'in ignorance' In the same 
vein, the participles eidos and hiipolambanôn are also indicative of the non-causal part of the relevant 
epistemic type involved in akrasia (EN 1110b27,1145Ы2, 21,1146b9,1147M7-8, cf 1145b23,1147M5-6) 
Whereas the intemperate person 'is led' by deliberate choice (£N 1146b22, 1150al9-21), the akratic is 
guided by appetite (EN 1147b34-5,1150a25-7,1110al5-7) 
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term of that endoxon, refashioned in Aristotelian usage (eidôs hupolambanôti), 
shows that Aristotle takes the causal story it tells for granted. And I claim that 
this distribution of dialectical pressure is nothing but the implicit 
acknowledgement, or 'laying down', of the phainomena. A decision about the 
assignment of proximate cause of akratic action has already been taken and that 
it has been taken is shown by the fact that Aristotle starts diaporising about 'in 
knowledge', not about 'through affection'. 
Having driven a wedge between phainomena and endoxa, we are obliged 
to conclude that SOR may contradict this endoxon, but that it does so by courtesy 
of the letter's incorporation of the observable cause. SOR is absent from the 
initial doxographical subset not because it directly contradicts (one of) its 
elements; but rather because it contradicts what the elements of that subset do 
not contradict, the phainomena. Hence SOR fails where the endoxon succeeds, i.e. 
in respecting the principle of the inquiry, and it does so because it has not 
adopted the appropriate method of principle-acquisition. 
11. But even if we grant that affection, not ignorance, is the proximate cause 
of the action, the Socratic reduction might work, and work by Aristotelian 
principles. Dismantling such a possible objection by a further appeal to 
empirical evidence is the point of part (2) of our text 
The drunk is responsible for the ignorance he induces in self-intoxication 
(EN 1113b32-3). Since habitual drunkenness87 is itself a form of intemperance 
(EN 1114a27-8; ЕЕ 1231al9-22), the affection which makes the drunk pursue a 
bodily pleasure (say, sexual intercourse), in ignorance, may itself be caused by 
prohairetic ignorance - although at one remove. And because the akratic's 
condition resembles that of the inebriated, that is, he likewise is, as Aristotle 
labels his condition, 'in affection' (en tot pathei) (EN 1147all-8; Ь6-9; 16), akratic 
pursuit of pleasure, although (proximately) caused by affection, might, in the 
final analysis, result from intemperate ignorance. So akrasia is ultimately 
reduced to intemperance on Aristotle's premises. 
Yet for this objection to work, the affection must be deliberately or 
premeditatingly (prin) chosen, and this, Aristotle maintains, evidently 
(phaneron) does not (and presumably cannot) happen (EN 1145b30-l).** On 
Aristotle's dichotomous analysis of 'through ignorance', then, the causative 
ignorance can only concern the minor, particular premise (EN ШОЬЗІ-ll l lal). 
That is why Aristotle implores us to ask what mode (tropos) or premise 
expressing89 ignorance comes into being (ginetai).'90 Yet even if it were conceded 
8 7
 The Revised Oxford Translation renders oinophlugta 'alcoholism' This translation is potentially 
misleading because of the fact that addiction is quite compatible with an awareness that regular drinking 
may lead to depravity In Aristotle's terms, therefore, alcoholism may have characteristics of akrasia 
rather than intemperance 
8 8
 The wording of the last remark confirms that Aristotle construes SOR in terms of prohairetic ignorance, 
for otomai (EN 1145b30) functions as a stand-in for prohatretbthai throughout the discussion of akrasia (EN 
1146b22-4,1148al3-7,1151b34-1152a6) 
w
 The term tropos refers to the mode of the premises (EN 1146b35-l 147al, a8, cf 1152al5-6) of the 
practical syllogism, m terms of which the analysis is conducted 
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that this mode of ignorance accompanies (or precedes) the onset of the affection 
(and, eventually, it is conceded (EN 1147b9-17)), SOR would still fail to establish 
the reduction. 
The question querying the mode of ignorance, then, is designed to be, 
and is, rhetorically fatal to SOR, while admitting both its premise stating that 
understanding cannot be vanquished and a scope for situational ignorance, a 
concomitant of the affection, to play a part in the description of akrasia. The 
parrying of this Socratic objection, designed to bring out the inconclusiveness 
of the evident fact that the action has an affective cause, I take to be the gist of 
part (2). 
If this interpretation holds, then SOR cannot conflict with, generalisingly, 
the phainomena. On (I), it may contradict a subset of them. But SOR certainly does 
not conflict with the common practice of indiscriminately predicating 
intemperance and akrasia of the same subject (EN 1145M5-7). The Socranc 
objector might contend that this endoxon simply reflects the fact that both terms 
are actually two possible designations for one and the same thing, namely 
intemperance. 
Thus the phainomena pertain to the motivational features of persons; they 
show up an affective cause, and further that this cause, in its turn, is not 
prohairetically caused. My counter-suggestion, then, is that the expression 
tithenai ta phainomena does not at all refer to assembling or presenting a 
doxography on a certain subject but to 'laying down' or assuming the facts 
which, mediated by a hypothesis, define the parameters of the diaporetic quest 
for endoxic coherence. Thus the twofold collocation of phainomena with pathos 
(EN 1145b3-5; 28-9) seems to me farmore significant than the single 
juxtaposition with endoxa.91 
12. To defend, on Aristotle's behalf, an empirically oriented conception of a 
description of ethical life is not part of the task I set myself. Of course, as a 
translation of phainomena Observed facts', conjures up, somewhat 
prochronistically, the Baconian protocol. But throwing away the baby with the 
bath-water is an altogether different matter. The direction into which Ross' 
translation points is, I believe, the right one; the evidence for 'a loose notion' of 
phainomena, or 'appearances' (thus exploiting a parallelism in the semantics of 
'appear words'), 'inviting and receiving further subdivisions' into perceptual 
data and common beliefs is too thin.92 
Aristotle is not anxious to uphold SOR in its entirety, but in the part 
germane to the suitable interpretation of 'knowledge' (cf. Ph 185al4-20), the 
assumption that the sway of understanding is absolute and cannot be flouted 
9 0
 This clause should be read dynamically (ginetai), despite the fact that exegesis standardly construes it 
statically, ci DA 434al4, ЕЕ 1223b33, 5 
9 1
 See the Appenda for an analysis of a related passage from the Eudemmn Ethics (1235ЫЗ-8) 
9 2
 Nussbaum (1986), pp 244-5, Irwin (1988), ρ 30 Nussbaum may be right m refusing to project the 
distinction between uninterpreted and interpreted data into Greek philosophy, but the absence of such a 
distinction does not automatically mean that Aristotle does not conceive all his data as uninterpreted 
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by any mental state whatsoever. This belief, apparently, is no monopoly of 
Socrates, although he might be its author or most eloquent and appealing 
spokesman (EN 1145b22-3; 31-3). It survives the dialectical treatment because it 
concerns the irrelevant premise of the practical syllogism (EN 1146b24-6). Yet it 
is the only part of SOR which, at the end of the ride, is 'left standing'. And it is 
left standing, it should be noted, because it "actually seems to happen 
[sumbainein]" (EN 1147M4-5; cf. MA 701a8-9).» 
Commentators generally attach too much importance to SOR as a whole, 
without seeing that it can have that importance only by methodological 
trespassing. In a way, then, these commentators themselves break out of the 
chains with which the treatment is fettered to its principles. 
I am aware of the fact that my proposal, pointing backwards in the 
direction of Ross' largely discredited interpretation, our point of departure, is 
hopelessly lacking in fashionability. Some may call it dull, or conservative. Yet 
I tend to think that Ross, in this case, points out to us a better route to 
Aristotle's method in ethical inquiry than many others do. We should not, 
however, settle for an easy answer and too readily acquiesce in the thought that 
we have put certain things right again regarding Aristotle's Method of Ethics. 
What we have done is nothing but restoring to its rightful place a certain part 
of one, and I claim, an ancillary, method of ethics. The "immediate object" of 
ethics, 'to invert Sidgwick's phrase', is 'not Knowledge but Practice' (EN 
1095a5-6; 1103b26-9; 1179a35-b2). 
93
 Sumbmnonta is by Anstotle used in the same way as yhamomena in contexts where this latter verb has 
its vendicai sense, as is rightly observed by Irwin (1988), ρ 490nl0 See Meteor 346a6-8, 365a34-7, Sens 
438M2, 439a29, Resp 470b8-9, GA 742al7-9, 750a21-3, 760b28, 765a26-9, 788M7-20 I disagree with 
Charles (1984), ρ 124, who reads a coincidental stumbling upon the truth into the term sumbainein The 
'mild irony' he notices in Aristotle's remark is certainly there, but it suspends itself more on the fact that 
what Socrates tries to establish does in fact happen, but that this need not be established at the expense of 
the phamomena - but is rather evinced by them 
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2 
Exclusions 
1. The argument contrived in the last chapter was prophylactic. It was 
designed to combat at its nidus an infection which, when allowed to spread to 
other texts, may eat into the bone of practical philosophy as Aristotle conceives 
of it The practical thrust of the project however, is jeopardised if the nidus of 
infection is allowed to continue to exist For once it is admitted that, in ethical 
inquiry, phainomena are common beliefs, some important motivational and 
developmental aspects of Aristotle's are bound to be obliterated. 
We argued that the 'intersubstitutability thesis', or (I), prejudices to a 
distorted view of Aristotelian ethics. In the programmatic methodological 
passage from the Nicomachean Ethics from which (Γ) is distilled (EN 1145b2-7) it 
assigns a shared reference to two terminological struts supporting Aristotelian 
method, endoxa and phainomena. These should in fact be kept apart Whereas the 
former are beliefs of some kind (whether 'common' or not), the latter point to 
what these beliefs are about rather than the beliefs themselves. If we efface this 
distinction we render the term phainomena, or 'appearances', systematically 
ambiguous: it refers to observed data in one context and (common) beliefs in 
another.1 
If (I) holds, it is detrimental to Ross' construal of phainomena ('observed 
facts'). Now I do not entirely brush aside the criticism levelled at Observed 
facts' as a translation; there is an implicit attempt here to forge the continuity of 
Aristotle's ethical programme with, for instance, biological inquiry, calling to 
mind empiricism of the Baconian confession. Yet Aristotle stresses that there is 
continuity of method across different disciplines: 
Most [principles] of a particular discipline are peculiar [idtat\ to it. That is why [dtho] it belongs 
to experience [empanas] to deliver the principles about a particular thing, I mean for instance 
astronomical experience m astronomical science (for after the phainomena had been grasped 
adequately [hikanôs] this was the way the astronomical demonstrations were found), and the 
same goes for any other craft or science whatsoever. (APr 46al7-22) 
In the main, I think Ross' intuition is right to say the least, it has the 
advantage that it is comparatively economic. In view of the facts that the 
integrity of Aristotle's phainomena threatens to crumble in the face of (I), and 
ι Owen (1961) 
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that (I) conveniently fits in with more modern, 'commonsense' conceptions of 
doing ethics, it has been deemed necessary to preserve both (I) and the 
univocity of the phainomena. Lacking a Greek forerunner of the Baconian 
elimination of 'idols' fencing in a sanctuary for theory-free data, we supposedly 
are authorised to inflate the pftainomena up to catch-all proportions - to "a loose 
and inclusive notion of 'experience'" - so as to have it soak up communal belief 
as well.2 Unity and continuity are restored, but in a stratum where generality is 
hardly distinguishable from vacuousness. 
If there are good grounds for rejecting (I), as I think there are, we can 
save ourselves the trouble of screwing up the level of generality while groping 
for unity and continuity. Quite the reverse, if we remain where we were, we 
can impose a fairly clear extensional interpretation on the phainomena. They are, 
across different contexts, facts; yet this is not to say that they are directly 
observable, nor, for that matter, that 'facts' is what the term means. This is not a 
mere quibble. My purposes in keeping endoxa and phainomena distinct are quite 
specific, and they will gradually materialise as the thread of the argument is 
spun across this and the next couple of chapters. 
2. Ethics, for Aristotle, is practical. What is that supposed to mean? The 
Nicomachean Ethics? way of answering this question proceeds in terms of final 
causation.3 The famous endoxon which opens the inquiry (the renown of which 
nowadays accrues to it chiefly because of 'Anscombe's fallacy') assigns a 
specific teleology to every art, inquiry, action, and choice - that is, to every 
activity which is distinctly human (EN 1094al-2). Practical philosophy, being 
one of those activities, finds its fulfilment (telos) 'not in knowledge but in 
action' (EN 1095a5-6), not in 'truth' but in 'deed' (Met 993b20-l). This 
distribution of priority between gnosis and praxis draws in its wake 
consequences for ethical method which may not be wholly obvious, but which 
are, for that matter, certainly not negligible. 
We do not embark on Aristotle's ethical project in order 'to know what 
virtue is' (ti esti), but 'to become good men', for otherwise the inquiry would be 
nugatory (EN 1103b27-9). By remarks as these Aristotle dissociates himself 
from Socrates, who did see ethics' fulfilment in knowledge: for which reason he 
could consistently maintain, to Aristotle's judgement, that knowing what 
justice is and being just come together (ЕЕ 1216b2-8). Aristotle, who does not 
share these presuppositions, rejoins that "we do not wish [boulometha] to know 
what... justice is, but to be just" (££ 1216b21-3). Adequate description of moral 
phenomena, in the appropriate mode, falls short of the fulfilment of practical 
inquiry; argument only meets with the desired response if its recipients satisfy 
certain further conditions (EN 1179a33-b31). One of these requirements is that 
'we', Aristotle's intended audience, are informed by an overall wish (boulêsis) to 
2 Nussbaum (1986), ρ 244 
3
 Cf Met 1025Ь21-4 for another criterion 
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become virtuous, expressing a motivation to subject to regimentation the 
process which is one's life.4 
Much has been made of the fact that at first sight, Aristotle does not 
allow for an intrinsic theoretical interest in moral life;5 accordingly, he is 
sometimes censured for reducing truth to a mere function of action.6 The "too 
narrowly pragmatic" character of the doctrine results from a conflation on 
Aristotle's part of methodology and psychology, i.e. "our motives for pursuing 
it": "His doctrine is about the logical structure of an inquiry directed to finding 
out how such a creature as man in such a world as this can best organize his 
life. He is not talking about motives but about methods". Therefore, there is, on 
this account, ample room for the inquiry to be of "theoretical interest to the 
student and gratify his desire for knowledge and clear thinking".7 Actually, 
however, Aristotle is talking about both method and motives; not because he 
conflates them, but because, in the ideal case, they act in cahoots. 
Apparently, practical philosophy extends beyond its theoretical 
manifestations. Of course, we might, to put it in a strained way, 'subjectivise' 
the teleological framework of ethics. It is our motives, whoever we are, 
wherever of whenever we live, which determine whether an engagement with 
the Nicomachean Ethics fulfils its ends. We may wish to become even more 
knowledgeable than we undoubtedly already are; and reading it through, or 
learning it by heart may fleetingly quench our tantalising thirst for knowledge -
yet we have failed to do practical philosophy by Aristotelian standards. 
The lion's share of the project, then, is devolved upon the agent For the 
inquiry to be practical there must be a match between the content of its 
propositions and its motivational efficacy. Yet for Aristotle motive forces are 
efficacious in layers of our characters into which the arguments of ethical 
inquiry cannot penetrate. If it is a necessary condition, then, that we be driven 
by a wish to become good, it is by no means a sufficient condition. 
With those who live 'according to affection' (faifa pathos) the knowledge 
ethical inquiry generates will not come to fruition in action; it is left fallow or 
'unprofitable'. This makes certain persons 'inappropriate' subjects for ethical 
inquiry (EN 1095a8-9). The young, inexperienced as they, perforce, are in 
practical affairs, will not have an adequate grasp of ethical argument (EN 
1095a2-3). This seems to go for persons living the affective life in general; they 
would "neither listen to nor understand dissuading argument" (EN 1179b26-8). 
A consideration like this would do to make them an unsuited audience. Yet 
Aristotle tacks another ground to the purely epistemic one: 
further, since he is a follower of his affections [tots pathesin akoloubkos], he will listen to no 
purpose [mataiôs] and unprofitably, because the end is not knowledge but action. It makes no 
difference whether he is young in respect of age [tên hêhkian] or youthful in character [to ethos]; 
for the defect is not dependent on tune, but [occurs] on account of living according to affection 
4
 Although my account is in important respects similar to that of Irwin (1978), it differs from it in some 
crucial respects 
' Broadie (1991), ρ 3-4 
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[to kata pathos zon] and pursuing each particular thing. For the knowledge will be fruitless to 
such persons, like [it is] for the akratic; whereas for those who forge their desires and act 
according to reason [tots kata logon tas orexas poioumenois km prattousin] it would be very useful 
to know about these things. (EN 1095a4-ll) 
The akratic presents a piteous limiting case, since he does seem to have 
the required cognitive competence and a (sincere) wish for the good (EN 
1102Ы4-6; 1151al5-26; ЕЕ 1223b32-3; cf. Rh 1369a3-4). All these traite fit 
Aristotle's portrayal of the akratic. Yet when it comes to the crunch, the 
akratic's reason proposes, but his appetite disposes. 
In this chapter, I shall try to lay bare the interdependencies obtaining 
between method and motives, which, in turn, are conditional upon the practical 
teleology of ethical inquiry. These relations come out clearest at the beginning 
of the inquiry, where the specification of his first principle par excellence 
(eudaimonia) is prefaced by some important methodological preliminaries. 
Awaiting the dialectical departure for this paramount human good, we are 
given some instructions which evince a direct involvement of the audience in 
the enterprise. It is these instructions which I shall examine in what follows. 
Instead of taking them as just one more sign of Aristotelian ethical elitism, I 
propose to place them in a more favourable light I construe them in terms of an 
estimate of the chance that an engagement in ethical inquiry will achieve its 
self-imposed goal. In this way, we can read them as pointers to Aristotle's ideas 
on developmental moral psychology. 
An explicit concern with the beneficiaries is one of the features 
distinguishing the Nicomaciiean from the Eudemian Ethics. This is not to say that 
such a concern is wholly absent from the latter. Quite the reverse, I should say, 
it is there all right - but it requires a keen eye to pin it down. 
3. Of course, one can treat moral propositions as free-floating shreds of 
discourse, as has in fact been done by many philosophers in this century. The 
audience or readership composes by self-selection; it may or may not recognise 
its views in the doctrine propounded. This does not seem to be Aristotle's way, 
at least not where the first principle of his ethic, well-being (eudaimonia), is at 
stake. I shall for the moment apply myself to some clues from the Eudemian 
Ethics: 
Thus it would be superfluous [penergon] to consider all beliefs [doras] which some [groups of] 
people have about it [Le. eudaimonia] [pen au f ft] (for [gar] many things appear [phainetai] to 
children and the ill and the mentally deranged, about which [pen han] nobody of sound 
judgement would go through perplexities [diaporêseien]; for they are not m need of argument, 
but the ones [are m need] of a time of life m which they change, the others of medical or 
political correction; for medical treatment is correction no less than flogging is), m a manner 
similar to these [beliefs] neither should the [beliefs] of the many [be considered]; {for if they do 
not speak about practically all things and above all about [pen episkepteon memos]}9 for it is 
8
 These lines (1215al-2) suffeT from several corruptions At al I read ei me with the MSS, instead of the 
widely acclaimed eikèi Furthermore, there is a lacuna after pen at 1215a2 Several emendations have been 
attempted (for a concise overview of which see Barnes (1981), ρ 505), most of them (including the one 
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absurd to present argument to those who aie not in need of argument but of affection 
\pathous]; since there are perplexities [aportai] appropriate [oikaai] to each particular inquiry, it 
is clear that this is abo the case with the best and highest life. It is right, therefore, to examine 
[exetazan] these; for the refutations of those who dispute [a position] are proof of the views 
opposing them. (ЕЕ 1214Ь28-1215а7; cf. EN 1095a28-30) 
At first sight, these exclusions are rather bemusing. According to one 
scholar, "Aristotle means to exclude opinions peculiar to those groups: 
evidently, a child or a madman might happen to share a view held by hoi 
sophoi." But even then, "Aristotle's reason for his exclusions is odd (...) [I]n 
assembling [ta endoxa] we are collectors, not missionaries; our task is to amass 
data, not to change minds. And the fact that argument will not alter an infant's 
opinion is no reason for excluding that opinion" from the set of endoxa on the 
subject initially garnered.9 This verdict is rash. Aristotle's reasons become more 
comprehensible if we relinquish the supposition that it is our sole task to 
describe morality. 
Let us first note that the excluded groups seem to fall into two 
categories: children, the physically and mentally ill on the one hand, and the 
bulk of people, or 'the many7 (hoi pollai), on the other. Since I intend to discuss 
the first category in more detail in the following chapters I will confine myself, 
in this section, to shifting the explanatory burden to its proper place. 
Several tacit assumptions favour the uneasiness prompting the 
comments quoted above. In the first place, it is taken for granted that the 
compass of this aside ranges over endoxa in general. Such evidence as the lack 
of generalising operators ('as in [all] other cases') found in other 
methodological passages, although merely circumstantial, may arouse 
suspicion as to whether this assumption has a secure basis. I claim that it has 
not Secondly, there is (Г). 
By an obvious extension of (I), to the effect that 'appearing' (phainetai) 
(1214b29) stands in for 'having belief(s)' (doxas ekhein) (1214b28), an essential 
explanatory link in the first category exclusions is dissolved. By contrast, by 
extending our interpretive hypothesis in an analogous manner, i.e. by 
divorcing the expressions cited, the inflection phainetai, stemming from the verb 
(pliainesthai) of which phainomena is a participle, can be elevated from a merely 
epexegetic to a genuinely explanatory level. In this way, the origin of the 
explanans is pushed further back, straight into the first gwr-clause. The extended 
(I)'s obliteration of this distinction in contexts such as that under scrutiny is the 
contagion I intended to forestall by last chapter's argument 
The true reason for the exclusion of the beliefs of children and physically 
or mentally ill persons, then, is to be sought in the fact that the proposed 
remedies, but not argument, may bear on what phainetai to them. Nobody in his 
full wits would be perplexed by such things (cf. Met 1010b3-9). Translations of 
these do not yield endoxa about first principles secured by other means, and 
proposed by Dodds m the OCT) are, I believe, too drastic I prefer to leave the text unemended and to 
reconstruct the whole picture of Aristotle's ground to exclude the views of the many by glueing together 
the shrapnels with occasional remarks dispersed throughout the extant wntings 
» Barnes (1981), ρ 5W&n31, italics in original 
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these endoxa, it should be recalled, are the vehicles for 'diaporising' about 
phainomena (peri han). A like pattern of explanation, albeit in a puckered form, is 
found elsewhere: the art of dialectic constructs its arguments 'from things in 
need of argumenf, not 'from haphazard things' (ex hôn etukhen)10, "for," as 
Aristotle adds parenthetically, "there appear \phametai gar] certain things even 
to crazy people [fois paralêrousin]" (RJi 1356b35-7). Apparently, the word 
phainetai is in itself thought to be explanatory; otherwise Aristotle would have 
recurred to remedies, all the more since he is, in the Riietoric, more than in any 
other treatise of his, concerned with persuasion.11 
Clearly, Aristotle transfers predicates from persons to propositions with 
a facility we are prone to find objectionable. And this brings us to the other 
assumption. Of course, a madman's belief is not by the sole fact of its 
provenance untrue, irrational, or worthless in whatever other way. A delirious 
lunatic rambling together a coherent moral theory is, in our world, a more 
probable state of affairs than, to use a hackneyed example, a chimpansee typing 
the collected works of Shakespeare in a finite amount of time. It is, however, by 
no means sure that this is what Aristotle is hinting a t 
Indeed, in one of his more caustic moods he claims that a madman's 
beliefs, in certain spheres, are more reliable than the tenets of a certain school of 
philosophers (GC 325a20-5). Yet irony, or even sarcasm, do not in any sense 
detract from the substance of the claim that insanity rather specifically affects 
beliefs about 'the noble' (to kalon) - which is one of Aristotle's ways to describe 
the intentional object of wish (boulêsis) (Met 1072a27-8). Similarly, the beliefs of 
children are not in themselves useless, but only those which are conditional 
upon experience (empeiria). As is well-known, gathering experience takes time, 
and this is what children do not have on their side (EN 1142all-9; cf. ІІОЗаІб-
7). 
Hence the exclusionary grounds do not coincide with the bad prospects 
of persuasion. But this is not to say that these prospects are wholly irrelevant. 
On the contrary, I shall, in the sequel, elaborately argue that they are not 
Moreover, if the foregoing is correct, we need to account for the switch from an 
objective interpretation of phainomena to the more subjective sense of phainetai. 
This, too, must be postponed. In this chapter I shall be concerned with the other 
main category expelled from ethical class. 
4. It is hard to ward off the impression that a belief can be too common to 
qualify for examination. A common sense philosopher like Sidgwick is not 
sympathetic to a too inclusive interpretation of 'common'; Rawls betrays a 
similar bent when he half-heartedly brackets the 'educated' of the '(educated) 
10
 Where these 'things' are endoxa This is clear from 1356b33-4 The proposition ex frequently refers to the 
premises of argument, in the Topics it is said that dialectical syllogisms are 'from endoxa" (fop 100a20, 30, 
Ь24-5, lOldlO, SE 165b3-4,183a38, APo 74Ы5-26, 81Ы9-20) 
11
 To be sure, at Top 105a3-7 there is no trace of phamesthai, but that is, as I shall argue in chapter 4, 
because the terms ho logon deomenos and ho noun ekhôn (104a5-6) presuppose reliable phainomena 
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person' whose sense of justice is to be described.12 Aristotle too, so it seems, 
unflinchingly censors the beliefs of hoi polloi, the 'vulgar herd', as one 
commentator has it1 3 In the Topics, Aristotle seems less unfavourably disposed 
towards putting on the agenda the views of hoi polloi (Top 100b21-3; cf. 104all-
2; 104Ы-7). On the extensional endoxical test of that treatise Aristotle's 
tolerance of the beliefs of the many seems consistent within the confínes of 
dialectic. This could lead us to the conclusion that a dialectical treatment of an 
ethical topic differs from an ethical treatment of that topic availing itself of 
dialectical means. So why, in ethics, are we to omit the beliefs of the many, 
which, by Topics standards at least compare quite well with the views of, say, 
Socrates or Eudoxus? 
On the interpretation encountered in the last section we are discouraged 
to bother about beliefs peculiar to the excluded classes of people. To show that 
this cannot be right it would be helpful if, for a start, we were able to identify 
such a belief. 
The lower classes, according to Aristotle, entertain the belief that the 
highest good is pleasure (hêdonê) and it soon transpires that it does not deserve 
serious attention (EN 1095Ы6; 1096al0).14 This is remarkable; for Aristotle does 
not sentence it by labelling it 'unreasonable' (alogôs) (EN 1095al5-6; 21), and 
only shortly before, in the passage parallel to our Eudemian text, he has stated 
that we should examine only beliefs which are 'especially prevalent", i.e. 
'thought to have some reason' (EN 1095a28-30).15 Why, then, does he, 
eventually, dismiss it? 
When Aristotle demurs at what we may call, in a phrase I owe to 
Bernard Williams, 'Government House Hedonism',16 we can descry a 
rudimentary answer. Pedagogically, some people claim, it is justifiable to 
preach the baseness of pleasure to the vulgar, who are prone to being enslaved 
by it, in order to deceive them, for their own benefit, from an extreme into a 
moderate, and therefore acceptable, measure of indulgence (EN 1172a30-33). To 
such a policy of protreptic equilibration Aristotle opposes a rather more fine-
grained psychological observation: 
For arguments about things concerned with affections and actions are less convincing than 
facts [fôn ergon]; when, then, they discord with the perceptual facts [tots kata tên aisthêstn],17 
since they are thought slightly of the additionally destroy what is true; for he who denuncíales 
'2 Rawls (1971), ρ 50 
•э Barnes (1981), ρ 504 Barnes draws a distinction between hot polloi, the 'vulgar herd', and hot pletstm, 
'most men', but it is questionable whether these can be as easily distinguished on the extensional entena 
as Barnes suggests, see EN 1152a25-7 
« For aphasthô, 1096al0, see 1155b8 
151 take ê at a30 epexegetically, a belief which is prevalent is not necessarily identified by its incidence, as 
a commonsense belief is not necessanly (rather necessanly not) indexed by its 'commonness" 
16
 Williams (1985), ρ 108 "For Sidgwick the distinction [between theory and practice] determined two 
classes of people, one of them a class of theonsts who could responsibly handle the utilitarian 
justification of non-utilitanan dispositions, the other a class who unreflechvely deployed those 
dispositions This outlook, which accords well with the important colonialist connections of 
utilitarianism, may be called 'Government House utilitarianism' " 
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pleasure, if he is seen [ophtheis] once aiming at it, inclining towards it is thought as if it were all 
of such a kind; for drawing distinctions is not of the many. (EN 1172a34-b3) 
Evidently, actions speak louder than words (cf. EN 1173a5-13). In 
practical inquiry, conduct and the facts of life (ek ton ergon kai toil biou) decide 
about truth (EN 1179al7-22). The authority there is to the vulgar view accrues 
to it in virtue of its basis in the perception (ЕЕ 1215a35-bl) of actual 
(biographical) lives led (ek ton biôri), namely the sybaritic lives of luxury led by 
proverbial examples like Sardanapallus, or in general by those in high places 
(EN 1095Ы5; 21-2; ЕЕ 1216al6-9). However, it is one thing to define eudaimonia 
as 'pleasure', but quite another to plot onto this protean term, by one's own 
deeds, an interpretation which narrows it down to that type of pleasure which, 
because of its universal incidence, is the only one known (gnôrimous) to broad 
segments of people (EN 1153b33-1154al; cf. 1176Ы9-24; 1179Ы5-6).18 
It is, then, not pleasure tout court the many crave, but rather one kind of 
pleasure. Aristotle says that the vulgar "take on a slavish appearance 
[andrapodôdeis phainontat], choosing \prohairoumenoi] a life of pieces of cattle" 
(EN 1095M9-20; 1118a24-6; b21).19 So on closer investigation it turns out that the 
view's alleged reasonableness, in the form of a (basically) correct orientation 
towards the way of life of idols, melts away in the face of its biased 
extrapolation to actual behaviour.20 For it is the pursuit of bodily pleasure (he 
sômatikê hêdonê) which gives the many a 'slavish' or 'animal-like' appearance -
and which brushes aside any remaining doubts about what they mean by 
'pleasure'. 
The bodily pleasures, i.e. those involved in eating, drinking, and sexual 
intercourse, are connected with the sense of touch, the most widespread 
perceptual faculty and therefore to be found in all animals alike.21 The 
pleasures giving meaning to such a life are not the peculiar province of human 
beings, but are experienced by non-human animals as well (EN 1118a24-6; b2-4; 
ЕЕ 1215b35-6). So we indulge in them because of our animal nature. 
It is easy to see why the identification of eudaimonia with bodily pleasure 
fails. Well-being is desirable for its own sake, and only for its own sake, 
whereas bodily pleasure is not (EN 1097a34-b6). Even a slave partakes of the 
bodily pleasures, but not of well-being (EN 1177a6-9). Some things producing 
pleasure are desirable for their own sake, other things are, as Aristotle calls it, 
'necessary' (anankaia), which is to say, desirable for the sake of something other 
(EN 1147b23-31; ШбЬг-З).22 Just as it is a common mistake to identify good 
fortune, another prerequisite of well-being, with well-being itself (EN 1099b7-8; 
1153b21-4; ЕЕ 1214b24-5; cf. Pol 1331b39-1332al; 25-7) so it is tempting to 
1 8
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identify a pleasure which is an indispensable or even necessary condition (otik 
aneu oukh hoion te) to it with one which is a constituent of it (EN 1153bl4-1154al; 
££ 1214Ы4-5; 26). 
The conjunction of particles (men oun) introducing our text (1214b28), the 
opening lines of ££ A 3, establishes a link with the immediately preceding 
chapter, E£ A 2, in which Aristotle traces a major source of dispute 
(amphisbêtêsis) concerning well-being to just this type of confusion (££ 1214M1-
27). The injunction not to examine all beliefs, then, can be explained by 
reference to the fact that these beliefs, in some way or other, are all imbued 
with the confusion which is the theme on which the foregoing chapter closes. 
Although I claim that all excluded groups are prone to the same error, I shall 
restrict the focus of this chapter to the case of hoi polloi. 
5. Bodily pleasure, the pursuit of which is supervised by the virtue of 
temperance (sôphrosunê), is just the type of pleasure which, to excessive 
proportions, dominates the lives leading persons debased by intemperance 
(akolasia) (EN 1118a23-6; bl-4; 1148a4-7; 1150a9-ll). The intemperate^ penchant 
for pleasure is indelibly inscribed in his psychology by a deeply rooted 
conviction (to pepeisthai), which, on Aristotle's epistemology, a necessary 
condition for belief (doxa) (DA 428al9-24; EN 1151al3). As the etymology of 
sôphrosunê makes clear, temperance 'preserves' (sôizein) such right belief 
concerning the principle of action (to orthodoxein peri ton arkhôn) (EN 1140Ы1-3; 
И5ІЭІ5-6).23 Hence it is plausible to assume that the corresponding vice 
induces in the subject an erroneous belief about well-being - which happens to 
be a belief suspiciously similar to that of the many, namely that 'pleasure' is the 
good to be identified with well-being. 
What distinguishes the intemperate from the vulgar is the degree of 
gratification: the gluttonous stuff themselves to the brims of surfeit (EN 
1118M8-20). Everyone enjoys eating, but the intemperate leave most men 
behind in rate, intensity, and extent of their avidity (EN 1118b26-7; 1154al5-8; 
E£ 1231a28-32). On the other hand, Aristotle does not say that the vulgar 
pursue bodily pleasure up to the point of prodigality; he rather suggests that 
they err in supposing it is the only kind of pleasure (££ 1215b30-36). What is 
more, they actually manage to abstain from excessive indulgence from fear of 
punishment (EN 1179M0-6). 
Except for these differences, it is certainly not the case, then, that a belief, 
revealed and expressed in public behaviour, with an intentional content to the 
effect that 'eudaimonia is pleasure', specified as bodily pleasure, is peculiar to the 
vulgar. Although, as we have seen, base pleasure does not impair the whole 
stock of beliefs, regardless of intentional object, it does affect, and decisively 
affect, those covering the principles of action (EN 1140ЫЗ-20). And this exactly 
happens to be the predicament of the many: they err 'on account of pleasure' 
(dia tên hêdonên), for 'not being [good], it appears (phainetai) to be a good thing' 
и Cf ЕЕ 1227а8-П, Ь23-5, 28-36 For the etymology of sôphrosunê, see Plato's Cratylus (411e+412al) 
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(EN 1113аЗЗ-М). Hence the right principle 'appears' (ou phainetai) neither to the 
intemperate nor to the many (EN 1140M1-20; 1144a31-6; 1151al9-20). 
To put the gist of the argument counterfactually, if Aristotle's chief 
interest were directed at the contents of the belief, and if the psychological 
condition of its subject merely counted as a pointer to these contents, he would 
have equally good reasons to blacklist the beliefs of the intemperate - especially 
in matters concerning the best life. The fact that he does not do this is, I submit, 
to be construed as evidence for the fact that his ambitions extend beyond mere 
description of the relevant beliefs and the establishment of coherence among 
them. 
6. Another difference between the many and the intemperate concerns the 
motivational efficacy guiding their actions and omissions. Whereas the former 
live 'by affection' (EN 1179ЫЗ; 27-8), intemperance is a reasoned disposition 
(EN 1151a6-7).24 In recent times, however, attention has been drawn to the fact 
that Aristotle reports the vulgar to deliberately choose (prohairoumenoi) a Ufe like 
that of cattle (EN 1095Ы4-22). It is argued hesitatingly, or circumspectly, that 
the use of this term imports incoherence into this position.25 One cannot, in a 
coherent way, deliberately choose to forfeit deliberate choice. 
The argument is carried one stage further by the claim that this friction 
can be dialectically exploited. For the position of the many implicitly assigns 
practical reason a part which its contents deny, namely in the very act of 
pondering or reflecting on the best life.26 Internal inconsistency is construed as 
an invitation to rational persuasion, since there must be some underlying or 
'real' belief providing a lead for it to appeal to. 
As regards the first stage of the argument, the following comments 
suggest themselves. Even if we grant its proponents the technical sense of 
prohaireisthai, the argument needs an interpretation of 'incoherence'. The 
capacity for deliberation may, in a Macheathian way,27 fade away under the 
regime of appetite, so that man seems not bound, in virtue of practical reason, 
to a fixed level in 'the great chain of being' (EN 1119b9-10; 1147al4-7). The 
imputation of logical incoherence, then, neglects the possibility of psychological 
changes over time. Still, it is questionable whether we should grant even that 
much; whether Aristotle, at this early stage of the inquiry, means to harness the 
verb in the full technical armour it is to receive a few books further. It can have 
a more colloquial sense as well, when, for instance, used in opposition with 'to 
avoid' (plieugein) (EN 1172a25). I can see no good reason why one would not 
2< EN 1146b22-3,1148a6-7„ 17-22,1149b31-1150al,19-22, Ь29-30, 1151al3-4, 20-5; 1152a4-6 
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deliberately choose to avoid certain things. And neither would, I guess, 
Aristotle, considering its central rôle in temperance.28 
Nevertheless, let us grant that there is this self-defeating aspect to the 
position and go on to the second stage of the argument We would then face the 
question as to whether the presupposed equation of practical reason and open-
mindedness, gained by, to put it in pompous jargon, reflective self-
transcendence, has any foundation in Aristotle's thoughts about the matter. 
There are many forms and manifestations of practical intelligence. A 
sophisticated practical intellect is by no means incompatible with all sorts of 
blind spots for the se//-regarding implications of one's moral standpoints. 
Clearly, it cannot be a coincidence that Aristotle, in one and the same 
clause, states that the vulgar, since they live by affection (pathei zôntes), pursue 
their own (or the appropriate) pleasure and the things through which these will be 
(di' han esontai) (EN 1179ЫЗ-4); and, only a few sentences further, observes that 
the kata pathos zôn neither listens to nor understands arguments dissuading him 
from indulgence in these pleasures (EN 1179b26-9). Apparently, living 
according to affection does not, as such, debar a person from deliberation. But 
this is something altogether different from saying that the deliberations and the 
actions issuing from it express or are motivated by a reflected conception of the 
good life.29 This is not what Aristotle means by 'to live according to the 
deliberate choice of one's own' (zên kata ten hautou prohairesiri) (ЕЕ 1214b7). 
About many other things judging rightly [to krinai kalos] is not easy, but mostly so about what 
all believe to be easiest, and to know m the power of every man - namely what of the things m 
living is choiceworthy [haireton] and would, having got hold of it, would give a person a 
consummated appetite [epithumian]. (ЕЕ 1215Ы5-8) 
'Appetite' is the crucial term here. It shows that those who are not 
endowed with the power 'to judge rightly7 (a notion which will resurface again 
later in the chapter) cannot even frame the question adequately. For we have 
seen that it is a long-term wish (boulêsis), not short-term appetite, we should 
bring with us to ethical inquiry. A life which is nothing but a concatenated 
consummation of bodily appetite can hardly be called a reflected life; yet it is 
the inevitable outcome of the democratic arrogation of judgement Condoning 
the type of incoherence diagnosed, then, may be as likely as not a symptom of 
imperviousness to rational persuasion. 
This seems to be exactly Aristotle's view of the matter, as is shown by his 
solution of the aporia about the akratic's supposed moral inferiority to the 
intemperate (EN 1146a31-b2). Since he is convinced (pepeismenos) of what he 
deliberately chooses to reach out for, the intemperate is superior to the akratíc. 
The former's being convinced purportedly makes him 'more easily to cure' 
(euiatoteros) by rational persuasion than the akratic, who acts on account of 
unreflective appetite. This argument however, assumes that convictions, and 
28
 In this sense, the term may simply stand in for the standard opposite, 'to pursue' (dwkan) (EN 
1179ЫЗ-4). 
» Burnyeat (1980), ρ SÌA,90n20 
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therefore beliefs, about the ends of action are instilled by argument. But it is 
moral dispositions, not verbal instructions, which govern the principles of 
action (EN 1151al5-9; ЕЕ 1227bl2-1228a4). And the conative factor pertaining 
to the principles of action is wish (boulêsis), not deliberate choice (EN Hllb26-7; 
1113al5-6; b3-4). The second part of the argument then, fails if it pretends to be 
faithful to Aristotle's ideas on these matters. For Aristotle, the capacity for 
rational agency is not in itself an index of pliability by rational argument 
We can approach the matter from a terminological angle, and so return 
to our point of departure, the Eudemian digression on method. Aristotle opens 
the Eudemian treatment of temperance by disambiguating the Greek term for 
'intemperate', akolastos, a derivation of the verb kolazein ('to chastise', 'to 
correcf, or 'to punish'). An akolastos, according to Aristotle, is either someone 
who "has not yet been corrected or cured [me kekolasmenos pò med' iatreumenos]", 
but who is capable (dunatos) of being corrected or cured; or it is someone who is 
simply incapable of being so corrected or 'incurable by correction' (aniatos dia 
kolaseôs).30. Needless to say, what is still in need of being tempered or subdued 
is appetite (epithumia), there being a necessary link between pleasure and 
appetite (££ 1230b21-2). 
So we can call by the same name both a child which is naturally 
susceptible of correction, but has not as yet received i t and an incorrigible but 
calculating hedonist, according to a 'weak' and a 'strong' interpretation of the 
privative а- (ЕЕ 1230a37-b8). While talking, in our methodological text (££ 
1214b32-4), about 'medical or political correction' (kolasis iatrikê ê politikê), 
Aristotle patently has an eye on those plagued by 'weak' intemperance. 
The akolastos in the strong sense, who, from a settled disposition, 
deliberately chooses to squander his life in the pursuit of excesses of bodily 
pleasure is beyond the point of no return and incapable of change for the better 
(EN 1114al9-21; 1150al9-22; b29-32; cf. 1105a32-3). This is presumably the 
reason why Aristotle agrees with those proposing to banish the incurably 
intemperate (EN 1180a4-10). By contrast, Aristotle does sight a means of 
converting the vulgar. Dissuading argument is ineffectual when it comes to 
'assailing ears that are fortified against it', to put it in Barnardo's words (EN 
1179b26-9). Yet the vulgar are not given up as easy as that, there still being a 
chance that they yield to correction (kolasis) and punishment - the fear of which, 
as we have already noted, makes them refrain. 
Of course, this apparatus perfectly dovetails with that of our 
methodological passage. Apparently, Aristotle is there talking about the beliefs 
of 'weakly7 akolastoi. Although, then, he has equally good, or even better 
reasons to exclude the beliefs of the 'strongly' intemperate, there is not the 
slightest allusion to these. I claim that this omission is significant he does not 
30
 Aristotle talks about hot dustatot kat aniatot, literally 'hard to cure and incurable', but dustatos may mean 
'incurable' as well, and LSJ S V list 'implacable' as a translation when applied to persone On the other 
hand, he may want to give room to exceptions, as he does at EN Т179Ы6-8, we should not forget that 
Aristotle implores us to take the propositions making up ethical argument as generalisations, and that 
our capacity to take them thus is a condition for being part of the audience in the first place (£N 1094Ы1-
1095a2) Not every vice is incurable compare EN 1165Ы7-20 with 1121ЫО-5 
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exclude them because he is not interested in beliefs as such. What Aristotle is 
saying is exactly that the purpose of ethical inquiry is persuasion, in the sense 
of exhortation to action or restraint (EN 1172b3-7; U79b26-9); and since it is, he 
does not need to mention groups who are not going to change their minds in 
whatever way.31 Yet those who are not going to be convinced by argument, but 
are susceptible to other means, can be referred to these means - which is the 
very thing we witness Aristotle doing. 
However 'odd' Aristotle's reason for the repudiation of certain beliefs 
may sound to us, it does, all the same, seem to be an essential part of his true 
reason. I propose, then, that we suppress our discomfort and take his 
explanations seriously - that is as explanations. What is so peculiar about it is 
that it suggests that the dialectical examination of beliefs about the good life is 
not just an abstract examination of propositions eased away from the 
psychology they inhabit If it were our task "to amass data, not to change 
minds", and if this were the sole task of ethical inquiry, the retort that "the fact 
that argument will not alter an infant's opinion is no reason for excluding" may 
seem justified. In all likelihood, however, it seems to be the case that on 
Aristotle's conception of ethics it is not our sole task. On the other hand, it is 
not our task to change minds either. For one thing, they do not need, as we shall 
see, to be changed. For another, if it were the task of ethical inquiry to change 
minds, why refer the as yet unchanged minds to means other than ethical 
inquiry? 
7. Our findings appear to be corroborated by another passage from the 
Eudemian Ethics. A little further on in book A we are warned against an error 
we should be, after what has been said so far, no longer susceptible to: 
We must try to look for conviction [ten pistin] about all these things by means of accounts [dia 
ton logon], using the phainomena as testimonies and examples [marturois km paradeigmasí] (for it 
is best when all people [pantos anthropous] manifestly agree with what will be said, but if not, 
then, at any rate,32 in some sense, which is just what they will do when they are redirected 
[metabibazomenot]; for each has something appropriate [otketon tí] toward the truth), from which 
[accounts] [ex hon] it is necessary to prove, m some way, about them [pen autan]; for from 
thmgs stated truly [ek ton alêthôs legomenôn] but not clearly [mê saphôs], [what is stated] clearly 
will be as we proceed, continually putting [metalambanousin] what is more familiar [ta 
gnônmôtera] in the place of thmgs which are customarily stated [ton eiôthotôn legesthaí] m a 
confused way [sunkekhumenos]. (ЕЕ 1216Ь26-35) 
First a note on the translation. I have taken the liberty to tinker with 
punctuation. Since I believe the ex han of 1. b31 requires the logoi of 11. b26-7 for 
31
 The akratic occipies an intermediate position Aristotle calls the akralic both curable (vitos) and 
persuadable (eumetapeiMos) {EN 1150b32,1151al4), he is persuadable, because he already commands the 
principle (EN 1151b25-6), yet persuasion does not achieve the desired reproduction in action From the 
point of view of rational persuasion, then, it would be superfluous to examine his beliefs, from a practical 
point of view, however, rational persuasion will remain ineffectual That is why he is unsuited as a 
subject for ethical inquiry (EN 1095a6-9) 
3 2
 Reading, with the MSS, pantos instead of pantos 
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an antecedent we should bracket the remark on universal agreement and 
degrade it to a clarificatory interjection.33 The logoi (deliberately rendered by 
the non-committal 'accounts') must be endoxa (cf. Top 101M),34 as emerges from 
the immediately following note on substitution of confused or vague by distinct 
or clear phrasing.35 On this account, then, it turns out that endoxa are not just 
legomena (which was the part of (I) conceded), but alêthôs legomena, things 'truly' 
yet not 'clearly7 stated. If this holds, then, of course, in this text as well the 
phainomena cannot possibly denote the same items as legomena (= endoxa) (the 
part of (Γ) rejected), since it would boil down to the claim that we must 'use 
common beliefs as testimonies and examples for common beliefs'. (Γ) forces us 
to venture out of the calm reigning in the eye of a vicious vortex. 
These and the ensuing comments, taking up the entire chapter (ЕЕ A 6), 
are clearly nothing but a restatement of the admonition to beware of the 'Eleatic 
mistake' (familiar from the last chapter): the commitment to the omnipotence of 
argument As a check on the indeterminacy of logoi we should look beyond 
discursive ways of establishing first principles to the phainomena, re-emerging 
here as 'testimonies and examples'.36 
It is important to keep in mind that, in the course of ЕЕ A, Aristotle is 
continually and painstakingly alerting us to blurring 'appropriate' accounts 
(oikeioi logoi) from 'inappropriate' (allotrioi) ones (ЕЕ 1214al2-4; 1215a4; 
1216b35-1217al7; 1218b22-4; cf. Top 162b7-ll; APo 74b21-6 ). The admonition to 
heed the phainomena should protect us from being taken in by sophistic or 
captious arguments: for once a premise is accepted, it is quite easy to deduce 
the 'thought-fettering' conclusions either forcing people to subscribe to it in 
default of true conviction or giving rise to perplexities which, the premise 
unveiled, rum out to be insubstantial (Ph 185a9-12; Met 995a29-33; 1012al8-20; 
EN 1146a25-7; ЕЕ 1217al34). 
8. At first sight, its parenthetical incorporation of what we might call 
Aristotle's version of the 'ecumenical tesf37 seems to permeate the passage 
quoted in the last section with more generosity to the views of the vulgar - that 
is to say, assuming (not implausibly) that this category is comprised by the 
3 3
 Some justification for such an intervention can be found in the similar parenthesising at ££ 1214b29-34 
34
 The term endoxos does not occur in the Etidemum Ethics, instead we often find doxa, which is sometimes 
used interchangeably with logos (ЕЕ 1217b2,16,18) That an endoxon can, but need not, have the structure 
of an argument is clear from our discussion of Socrates' position on akrasia (EN 1145b23-8) 
3 5
 I therefore disagree with Barnes (1981), pp 494-5, who distinguishes 'the Method of [fndoxa]' from 
'enquiries [dia logon]', referring to ЕЕ 1216b26-8 The opposition in the text under consideration is rather 
that between logoi and phainomena, cf 1217al2-3 tots dut ton logon-tots phatnomenois Aristotle here 
succinctly repeats the doctrine of the Topics, analysed in the preceding chapter, that we must penetrate to 
first principles by means of endoxa (t£ 1225M8-9,1245a26-9) 
34
 Cf ЕЕ 1219a40, where fa dokounta are 'testimonies' This is no conclusive evidence for (I) of course 
these may be treated as teshmoies when they are properly related to the phainomena In general, 
phainomena and logoi may servo as testimony for each other DC 270b4-5 See DC 279a33, GC 335a9-10, 
Meteor 359al9, ЗбОаЗЗ-4, PA 410a29, PA 666a22, GA 721b28, 725b4, 727a33, Met 982b22,1069a25,1087b2-
3, EN 1103b2-3,1104al3-4,1154b7-8, Pol 1323Ь2Л4,1334a5-é, 1340b5-7 
37
 Schneewind (1977), ρ 193 The so-called"ecumenical test' is the demand that a theory meet with the 
assent of those competent to judge it, by generating the conclusions they already endorse. 
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designation 'all human beings' (anthropoi). Therefore, in some way 'all human 
beings' manage to capture the truth in their professed views. In the Rhetoric, 
Aristotle assigns the spotting of truth and what resembles it to the same power 
and observes, in the same optimistic vein as in our text, that human beings (hoi 
anthropoi), because they have a natural aptitude for truth, in most cases hit upon 
it This is the reason why someone who has a nose for endoxa at the same time 
has an eye for the truth (Rh ІЗЗЗаІа-в).38 To get them to agree, then, we only 
need to purge their beliefs from obscurities and infelicities. 
This might account for the deep dialectical hue of the passage. More 
specifically, its phrasing is tinged in the idiom of the second function of 
dialectic, regarding so-called 'encounters': 
[dialectic is useful] with a view to encounters [enteuxeis], smce having inventoried the beheb of 
the many [fas ton pollón doxas], we shall have intercourse with them from opinions not foreign 
[allotrwn], but appropriate [otketcn] to them, redirecting [metabibazontes] what they appear to us 
to state incorrectly. (Top 101a30-4; cf. Rh 1355a24-9) 
Although the notion itself does not come to the fore in full regalia in the 
Eudemian text, it is fairly certain that entêtais is what Aristotle must have in 
mind there. There are various competing opinions on what enteuxis is;391 shall 
align myself with those who see in it a therapeutic form of dialectical 
confrontation.40 
Now we have already seen that we cannot expect to turn the many over 
by argument, and this is precisely the means by which our text implores us to 
seek conviction (dia logon). The views of the many, the reformulation of which 
has a central place in the Topics account, are, as we know, not there to be 
reformulated; to rectify beliefs which should be left out in the first place is, to 
put it mildly, confusing. Obviously, this is one more piece of evidence for the 
thesis that a dialectical treatment of an ethical topic is something fundamentally 
other than an ethical treatment of that topic by dialectical means. One of the 
ways this distinction finds expression is in a shift in the central enteuctic 
concept of 'redirecting' (metabibazein). 
What seems to be at stake in the technique of redirection is the 
modification of statements of beliefs.41 We are reformulating these beliefs, as our 
text shows, in order to procure the assent from the subjects of which the beliefs 
are predicated. Several constraints rest on such a procedure. For one thing, as 
noted, it must be supported by a sincere therapeutic intention; for another, 
3» But cf DA 427a29-b2 
39
 Solmsen (1968), ρ 56, refers to encounters as "debates or discussions with outsiders" which are met 
"on their own ground", Moraux (1968), ρ 290, connects them with the peirastic function of dialectic, 
exposing an interlocutor "qui croît savoir", De Pater (1965), ρ 81, 102, 233, sees in this function of 
dialectic "une technique de discussions pour nos rencontres, journalières", it is "au service de l'existence 
humaine de chaque jour" and tries to persuade the many of what is the case from what is known or 
familiar to them 
« Brunschwig (1967), ρ 116, Smith (1997), pp 51-2,140 
*
l
 Bames (1981), ρ 507 rightly takes metabibazomawi at £E 1216b30 to 'anticipate' metalambanoustn at ЬЗЭ-
4, if this would not be the case, then, as Bames says, the remark is trivial, since it would amount to the 
statement that if human beings disagree with us, they will agree after their beliefs have been changed 
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within the confines of a special discipline proper redirecting takes place from 
the principles of that discipline. As Aristotle puts it by his favourite geometry 
analogy, the geometer changes minds 'geometrically', the dialectician 
'dialecticalh/ - not 'contentiously' or 'eristically' (eristikôs) (Top 161a33-7). 
One type of contentious argument is that which, despite its formal 
validity, seems to be constructed according to the canons of the relevant 
discipline but in fact is not (171Ы1-2): it is only phainomenos kata to pragma 
(171b20-l), not really so. One test for contentiousness is transferability: if an 
argument is not eristic, it is not applicable in the context of the practice of 
another science (cf. APr 46al7). As expounded in the last chapter, a geometer 
qua geometer has no point in arguing with those rejecting, either consciously or 
unwittingly, the principles of geometry; a proper geometrical argument must 
remain, quite literally, within the premises of geometry (172a4-6).42 In this case 
falsity does not consist in the lack of consistency or substantial truth; the 
argument may even establish the thesis thrown up for dispute (SE 171M6-7). 
The argument is not kata ten oikeian methadon (Top 162b8). 
And this, the argument of the last chapter showed, is why we should 
conduct dialectical inquiry in a special discipline under the auspices of the 
phainomena. Since we must redirect in an ethical way, we should not fritter time 
and energy while discussing perplexities which do not properly belong to the 
matter in hand (ЕЕ 1215a3-4; EN 1155b3-9): a geometer must resort to 'logical' 
dialectic to counter someone who is cancelling the principles of geometry, or 
who raises perplexities which depart from inappropriate assumptions (Ph 
185al-3; 14-9). Since a survey of the phainomena leads us to the appropriate 
principles, these constitute the final court of appeal in ethical redirection. It 
goes without saying, then, that redirecting beliefs in a special discipline like 
ethics as a means of obtaining consent of its beneficiaries presupposes, on their 
part, both the acceptance and an adequate grasp of its first principles, and 
therefore of the phainomena. 
The rest of ££ A 6 proceeds by amplification of this single most 
important lesson. It remains to be seen how Aristotle defines the scope of 'all 
human beings', given the rarefying effect of the reference of the many to 
another than the formulaic mode of encounter. It is as if, by the time we get to 
these remarks, Aristotle's intended audience has been thinned out in such a 
way that he feels himself up to speaking, in an unqualified and unencumbered 
fashion, about the phainomena again - as opposed to what phainetai to certain 
kinds of people. 
9. If bare rational agency, that is, in Aristotle's terms, agency on wish and 
deliberate choice, is the distinguishing mark of a fully-fledged human being, 
then the intemperate are, and the many are not, fully-fledged human beings. 
For the latter live and act 'according to affection' (kata pathos) (EN 1179ЫЗ; 27-
8), the former 'according to deliberate choice' (kata prohairesin) (EN 1151a6-7). 
« Ph 185al-3; 14-7; 253b2-6. 
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On this count, Aristotle betrays by the phrase 'all human beings' a solicitude 
for the imprimatur of the morally corrupt which is hard to reconcile with both 
the deplorable state of their conception of the good life and the refractoriness 
which comes with it 
What is more, rational agency is precisely what sets the intemperate 
apart from the akratic.43 So if rational agency does make the difference, the 
intemperate seems to be more of a human being than the akratic in spite of the 
former's moral inferiority (EN 1150a30-l; 1151a24-5). In spite, too, of the 
praiseworthiness of the rational (and, paradoxically, specifically human) part of 
the akratic's soul (EN 1102Ы4-6). Not to mention the fact that the principle of 
action, 'the best parf is preserved in the akratic: he has a wish (boulêsis) with 
the right intentional object (EN 1151a25-6; ЕЕ 1223b32-3). 
Two possibilities open up. If, at this juncture, we join those who pin the 
adage that 'a bad plan is still a plan' on Aristotle, we cannot, on pain of 
incoherence on our part but blame Aristotle for incoherence on his.44 The 
intemperate partakes of humanity in virtue of an instrumental conception of 
rational agency. The other possibility is that, in the light of what has been said 
before about the predilections of the vulgar, the term anthropos is used in a 
pregnantly evaluative, or straightforwardly moral sense.45 That this must be so 
is borne out by the following considerations. 
In the first place, intemperance may be a reasoned disposition; yet 
Aristotle ascribes it to us not in so far as we are human beings, but qua animals 
(EN 1118Ы-4). Further, a human being's nature is fulfilled in the exercise of 
reason (Pol 1334Ы5); yet a human being is also by nature a zôion politikon, a 
'political animal' (EN 1097Ы1; Pol 1253al-3). If we assume, in the Arendtian 
style, the fundamental character of speech within the polis, it becomes clear why 
the intemperate are to be expelled: a closed mind does not share in the 
exchange of values defining a community (Pol ІІБЗа^ІЯ).46 
Thirdly, what, actually, does it mean for an intemperate person to be a 
rational agent? Action according to deliberate choice is conditional upon wish 
(DA 433a23-5). A wish, according to Aristotle, may be a general desire 
expressing a conception of the good life as a whole,47 or a more particular 
desire (EN WWoTl-A),*» which may conflict with rival wishes (Met 1048a21-2).49 
The intemperate has a wish, not an appetitive desire (epithumia), to be 
intemperate (EN 1114all-2; 1119b31-3). Yet in the particular circumstances of 
action he 'is led' (agetcti) by appetite to pick out certain things instead of others 
(EN П19а2-3).х The notion of 'leading^ (agein) I take to be a shorthand 
reference to efficient causation of actual behaviour: the akratic's appetite 'leads' 
4 3
 See section 2. 
« Nussbaum (1995), ρ 117 
« Cf ЕЕ 1216М-2,12Э2Ы8-9, Ph 203al-2 
« Arendt (1958), ρ 27 
« Anscombe (1965), 14β 
« Charles (1984), pp 151-3 
» Broadie (1991), ρ 122η42 
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him (EN 1147a34-5; Ш0а15-8; 1151Ы0-2; ЕЕ 1224а2) and the akratic is 
elsewhere reported to 'act while having appetite' (eptthumôn) (EN 1111ЫЗ-4). 
Both devices, the passive voice of agein and the present participle, are 
fused in Aristotle's claim that the intemperate "is led deliberately choosing 
[agetai prohatroutnenos], thinking that one always ought to pursue the pleasant 
thing which is present" (EN 1146b22-3). The intenhonality of the choice, 
captured in a universal, is most likely to be construed, m the terms of 
contractanarusm, as a devolubon of actual efficient causal sovereignty to 
appetite. In the words of one commentator, the intemperate differs from the 
natural slave, and therefore, from the vulgar (EN 1095Ы9-20; ЕЕ 1215b34-5) "in 
that his reason assents to the neglect of reason in his life."51 The intemperate, 
then, acts 'prohairehcally' by proxy. 
This means, however, that he fails to satisfy a vital condition for 
humanity. For in his famous 'human function argument7 (to ergon tou anthropou) 
Aristotle stipulates that the human life is a life of actuality (energeta) of the soul 
in conformity with the decrees of reason, spread over an entire life. If the 
intemperate decides to spend a life of rational dormancy instead of agency, he 
waives what is specifically human to a human life. And since 'one swallow 
does not make a spring', it may by rights be doubted whether this single 
decision, however momentous, can compensate for a life spent in the stultifying 
pursuit of occasional pleasure (EN 1098a3-20; cf. 1095b31-1096a2). 
Finally, if we do equip (as we have just argued we should not) the 
vulgar with the power of deliberate choice, we might frame the question of 
humanity in the vein of the Camus of Le Mythe de Sisyphe; whether "la vie vaut 
ou ne vaut pas la peine d'être vécue". A life deliberately centered round bodily 
pleasure is simply not worth the while of being lived by someone who "is not 
entirely slavish" (ЕЕ 1215Ь24-1216а2; EN 1095Ы9-20). On the other hand, the 
concession would not matter that much; for the fact that the intemperate 
deliberately enthrone appetite does not seem to make them any the less 
'slavish' or 'animal-like', given the possibility to forfeit the power of 
deliberation (EN 1118a25; b3-4; 21). 
Bare rational agency, then, is not a sufficient condition for humanity. 
Since it can be recruited to dubious purposes, it seems that wish, having 'the 
(apparent) good' (to (phatnomenon) agathon) for an intentional object (ЕЕ 
1235b25-6) and triggering the deliberative process issuing m choice (EN 
1139a31-3), is the more fundamental property. Of course, the argument also 
extends over wishes: not every wish is an expression of someone's humanity. 
The intemperate's wish to become intemperate, which appears to its subject as 
something good, can hardly be considered thus. Such a wish is a subversion 
rather than a manifestation of nature (ЕЕ 1227al8-31). 
10. Yet there is a very important sense in which practical reason does play a 
part m someone's application for ethical inquiry. Of course, we do not enter 
я Irwin (1988), ρ 611nl8 
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into the debate as empty vessels. At the outset of the chapter we saw that we 
should come to the inquiry informed by a wish to become virtuous (ЕЕ 
1216b21-5). The engagement in ethical inquiry in general, and in the dialectical 
search for well-being in particular, may be considered part of its enactment 
The most important part, however, is the practical conversion of the body of 
doctrine by the agent himself: 
So it is well said that from doing just things the just man comes into being, from temperate 
things the temperate man; from not doing these things nobody would even have a prospect of 
becoming good. But the many do not do these things, but, taking refuge m words [ton logon],12 
they think they are philosophising and will become good m this way, domg something similar 
to those who are ill, who listen [akououst] carefully to their doctors, but do nothing of the 
things prescribed. Just as the latter will not have a good bodily condition when so treated, the 
former will not have a good psychic condition when so philosophising. (EN 1105b9-18) 
Prerequisites for a successful engagement are a readiness and a capacity 
to listen (akonein) in such a way as to process the information and convert it into 
action (EN 1094bl9-1095all) - features which we have seen to be notoriously 
absent from the psychology of the vulgar (EN 1179b26-9). Such a mode of 
receptivity, then, requires not only a pre-existing wish to become good, but also 
the perception that listening to ethical inquiry is a step, but not more than that, 
towards the fulfilment of such a wish. The inquiry, then, must be already be 
perceived, not as to telos, or the fulfilment itself, which is the domain of wish, 
but as something pros to telos, as something 'towards' this fulfilment which is 
the domain of deliberate choice (EN llllb26-7). In this reflexive way, then, 
doing ethics manifests practical reason. 
This sort of 'listening' is called, in a passage already quoted in the last 
chapter, 'adequate listening'. It is worth while to re-embed it in its immediate 
contextual habitat 
Presumably, then, we should begin from things which are familiar to us [apo ton hêmin 
gnônmôn].5* That is why it is necessary [diho dei] that he who is going to listen adequately about 
[ton akousomenon hikanôs peri] things noble and just and political m general has been brought up 
nobly by means of habits [tots ethesi êkhthai kalôs]. For the 'that' is a principle [arkhé] and if this 
sufficiently appears [phmnmto] [to someone], he will not need the 'because' [tou dihoti] m 
addition; a person of such a character [ho totoutos] has or could easily get principles. To whom 
neither [mêdeteron]5* of these [alternatives] is present, let him hear the words of Hesiod; "Far 
best is he who knows all things himself/ Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right/ But 
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 Since the contrast is here between deeds and discourse I have rendered logos 'words', see EN 1179a20-
2 
M
 The opposition between 'what is known to us' (to gnonmon hemm) and 'what is known by natur" (to 
gnônmon pltusei) is a standard ingredient of Aristotelian method The 'road' towards first principles, be 
they of a prepositional nature or not, leads from things known to us to things known by nature, or 
'unconditionally' (P/i Ша10-23, FN 1095b2-4, Met 1029b3-12) What is known unconditionally "is not 
what is known to all, but what is known to those who are well disposed toward thinking, just as what is 
unconditionally healthy is what is healthy to those are in a good bodily condition" (Top 142a9-ll, Efc 
1235b33-T236a2) 
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 The mideteron at 1095b8 does not have the couple to hoh-to dihoh (b6-7) for an antecedent, but, as 
traditionally assumed, the possession or easy procurement of starting-points (b7-8), cf Burnyeat (1980), 
ρ 71 
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he who neither knows, nor lays to heart [akouôn en thumôi batlêtai]/ Another's wisdom, is a 
useless wight." (EN 1095b3-13) 
Aristotle's quotation of Hesiod's words on which this digression 
terminates is more than a fatuous embellishment55 It looks like a last resort of 
discourse. Since the passage is replete with interesting clues, I suggest we do 
not procrastinate, but rush ahead. 
11. Aristotle postulates a noble56 upbringing by means of habits as a 
necessary condition (diho dei)57 for 'listening adequately' to ethical discourse. It 
emerges, later on, that the inculcation of habits from childhood on is a sine qua 
non for the right patterns of response. Aristotle concurs with the Plato of the 
Republic and the Laws when he says that 'the right paideid conditions persons to 
enjoy and to be pained properly (EN 1104b9-13; WlalQ-b).5* These days, 
Aristotelian scholarship has largely jettisoned the view that 'habituation' 
(ethismos), the process responsible, so to say, for responsiveness, is some sort of 
robotic drill.59 To my conviction, however, exegesis has too one-sidedly laid 
bare, with surgical precision, the epistemic nerve of the problem. Since 'a 
certain habituation' (ethismos tis) is the proper way to obtain 'the that', the 
problem is perceived to lie in how ethical conditioning awakens knowledge of 
principles. 
Without wanting to condescend as to the importance of all recent 
discussions on the subject,60 I believe Aristotle thinks it is obvious that ethical 
conditioning generates some sort of knowledge: "what is habitual [to stinêthes] 
is known \gnorimon]" (Met 995a3).61 Since the route to principles departs from 
'what is known to us', it seems equally obvious that we must be habituated in 
the proper way. Now there are two things I want to stress. 
First, although the passage just quoted is part of a digression (EN 
1095Ы4), I let it begin earlier than most commentators do, to wit, with the 
remark about which beliefs to examine and which not (EN 1095a28-30). For 
what I take Aristotle to mean when he says that it is 'to no purpose' or 
'fruitless' (mataioteron) to examine all beliefs, but 'adequate' (hikanôs) to 
examine a subset, is the negative of what we found he tries to make clear in the 
Eudemian text excluding certain beliefs. It is the beliefs of his audience which are 
to be examined, and since this audience has the wish to become good, there 
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 As Bumyeat (1980), ρ 71, notes, albeit for quite different reasons 
5 6
 Commentators usually render the adverb in the phrase êkhihai hilos 'good' 1 submit that fíalos in this 
context cames its full ethical connotation of 'nobly' This reading not only establishes a neat correlation 
with the immediately following ftalôn, but is also confirmed by other passages (EN 1104Ы1, 1179b25, 
1180a8,15) 
5 7
 Anstotle more than once formulates his demand of a certain educational background in these terms, 
see Met 995al2, EN 1104M1,1179b34, Pol 1334Ь25-6 See also FN 1180al5 
5 8
 Pautan is usually rendered 'education' or 'acculturation' The pepauieiimenos is, according to Gauthier-
Jolif li 1, ρ 15, "l'homme cultivé" 
59
 See Hardie (1980), pp 104-114, Bumyeat (1980), Sorabji (1980b), Sherman (1989), eh 5., Broadie (1991), 
pp 103-110 
60
 Among which the article of Bumyeat (1980) stands out 
41
 Reading gnorimon instead of the comparative gnônmôteron at Met 995a3 
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must be more than just a chance of their carrying the inquiry to its teleologica] 
conclusion - in the realm of action, that іэ. 
The opposition mataioteron-hikanôs also ties together Aristotle's remarks 
on the attitude of the audience. On the one hand, as we have just seen, Aristotle 
talks about 'listening adequately' (akouein hikanôs) only a few lines further (EN 
1095b4-6); on the other, he claims only shortly before that the 'follower of the 
affections' will 'listen to no purpose' (akouein mataiôs) to ethical argument, 
because the end is action, not knowledge (EN 1095a4-6). We recall the parallel 
Eudemian text, where Aristotle states that it is 'superfluous or 'useless' 
(periergon) (ЕЕ 1214b29) to examine certain beliefs. Both mataiôs and periergon 
figure prominently in Aristotle's vocabulary on final causation and teleologjcal 
explanation.62 
The use of this nomenclature is not pointless. Quite the reverse, it points 
beyond a mere grasp of doctrine to a horizon beckoning its implementation. To 
make ethics work, Aristotle presses for an exact fit between the contente of 
beliefs about its first principle, the endoxa, and the motivational features of their 
subjects. The beliefs should be more or less faithful reflections of the 
motivational features; yet not any such feature will do, but only that which is 
concerned with the (apparent) good, viz. wish; and not any odd wish, but a 
rightly conditioned one; and, in addition, it must be a wish which can be 
counted upon to be causally efficacious. The akratic, as we noted, satisfies all 
the relevant conditions except one: the last 
Aristotle says that such beliefs depend on a noble upbringing, causing 
'the thaf, or the principle, to appear (phainoito) to us sufficiently. But I contend 
that he, by deploying the notion of 'listening adequately', and therefore, by 
excluding the akratic from those who are capable of such listening, also makes 
an important claim about the interconnections between 'what appears', the 
relevant motivational property or wish, and belief. I claim that the 'having' of 
principles, in this connection, must be construed not in barely epistemic terms. 
Rather, the epistemic content is conatively preconditioned, and that is why a 
good upbringing must be presupposed. This accounts for the moral character of 
the subject (toioutos), and moral character accounts for the fact that something 
appears as good (EN 1114a31-b3). I shall argue that it is the intentionality of the 
subject's wish which supplies the phainomena for the endoxa germane to the 
inquiry. 
But before the argument hurls us from methodology onto the thin ice of 
the philosophy of action it seems wise to prevent if from gaining momentum. 
We shall not, that is to say, not yet, make use of concepts to be analysed in later 
chapters. 
The fact that the starting-point of the dialectical inquiry is necessarily to 
be found in endoxa lands us with the second point For it remains to explain 
why the inquiry can draw on the assumption that such non-propositional 
42
 Cf the formula (and connected expressions) hi pillisi!, outhen potei maten, which may be rendered 
'nature does nothing pointlessly' For maten, see e g • DA 434a31, DC 271аЗЗ, 291МЗ-4, РА 658а10, GA 
741Ь5, 788Ь206, Pol 1253а9, 1256Ь21 For penergon РА 691ЬЗ-4; 694al5; GA 739Ы9-20 For both GA 
744Ы Also heneka tou ('for the sake of something') DA 415Ы5-6; PA 641M2, 645a25, Ph 198b29,199a4 
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knowledge transmogrifies into articulate beliefs. First however, some 
preliminary words on paideia are called for. 
12. In the proem of De partibtis animalium Aristotle distinguishes 'general' 
and 'special' paideia (peri hekaston pragma) (ЕЕ 1217a8; EN 1094b28-1095a2): 
In the sphere of every study and inquiry, humble and honourable alike, there appear to be two 
modes of state [tropen tés haceos], of which it is right to call the one understanding [eptstêmên], 
the other, roughly, a certain pmdeta. For it is of hrm who is suitably*3 pepaideumenos to have the 
capacity to judge [hinein], with a keen eye for the butt [eustokhôs], what the speaker [ho iegôn] 
renders rightly or not rightly. For we thmk both that such kind of person is generally [holes] 
pepiudeumenos and that to be pepaideumenos is the be capable of domg what we have just said. 
But we consider this kind of person, bemg one m number, to have judgement, so to say, on all 
things, but another about a certain separated matter [pert tinos phusebs aphonsmenes]. (PA 639al-
12) 
The person who is generally pepaideumenos has the capacity to judge the 
arguments proffered by some other person (PA 639a5-6cf. EN 1143al3-5; 
1181al8); what degree of explanatory rigour to expect in what discipline (EN 
1095a23-7; Met 995a8-14); and when to ask for a proof and when not (Met 
1006a5-8). Commentators project such remarks about the generally 
pepaideumenos onto the specialist colleague, as, for example, when it is said that 
although Aristotle does not say so, "the discipline forming an educated 
person's view of other disciplines is dialectic."64 In point of fact, this is only 
part of the story of the specially pepaideumenos' curriculum. 
I do not wish to dispute the conspicuous affinities of general paideia with 
dialectic. What I do want to dispute is that one form of special paideia, i.e. 
ethical paideia, is exhaustively described as a dialectical capacity. It is incumbent 
on the supporters of the aforementioned interpretation to show how the 
dialectician learns which dialectical problems to discuss and which not; for 
Aristotle's criteria for 'dialecticity' seem to presuppose a morality (Top 105a3-7). 
It is unlikely that dialectic, single-handedly, can condition someone's 
evaluative responses: "argument and teaching do not have force in all matters, 
but the soul of the hearer [tou akroatou] must have been cultivated beforehand 
by habits [fots ethest\ for noble joy and hatred, like earth which is to nourish the 
seed" (EN 1179b23-6). This, however, is not to deny that dialectic has some part 
to play in the cultivation of the audience of ethical inquiry. 
It is also tempting to equate paideia with experience (emperna). It requires 
paideia to 'receive' or 'accepf (apodekhesthai) the legomena (endoxa) on ethical 
topics in the appropriate way, by testing them against the facts of life - which is 
why the young are disqualified for ethical inquiry (EN 1094b22-1095a4; 
ΰ
 1 take kûia tropon with pepaideumenos, contrary to most translations 
M
 Irwin (1988), ρ 28, Aubenque (1966), pp 282-9, to whom Irwm refers, does say that "la culture générale 
[italics mine] comode exactement avec la théorie de la dialectique qu'il développe longuement dans les 
Topiques" (p 286) 
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1179al7-22).œ The core of ethical paideia, then, is the hexis brought about by the 
ethical way to get hold of its first principle, or 'the that'; that is to say, a 'certain 
habituation' (ethismos fis) (EN 1098Ы-4; ШоЬг-в).66 Since in each discipline, 
experience with the phainomena is responsible for principle-acquistion (APr 
46a 17-22), since the ethical way of acquiring them is habituation, and since 
being habituated nobly is a requirement for being a recipient of its doctrine, 
ethical paideia seems equivalent to ethical emperna. 
But then again, even experienced persons, thoroughly versed in practical 
affairs, are hoodwinked by arguments 'foreign' to ethical inquiry; and if the 
equation held, Aristotle would not impute such a liability to a lack of special 
paideia, characterised as 'the capacity to discriminate (hinein) between accounts 
appropriate and foreign to the matter' (ЕЕ 1217a2-10).67 The ability to identify 
eristic arguments, one faculty to be cultivated by the Topics (and therefore 
already belonging to dialectic) (Top 101al8-24; cf. ЕЕ 1218Ь22-4), together with 
a grasp of the phainomena, seem interdependent ingredients of ethical paideia. 
Ethical paideia, then, is not just the capacity to reason instilled by a course on 
dialectic, or experience with the facts of moral life, or proper responsiveness; it 
is a cocktail of these three. 
13. Dialectic has several branches, corresponding to the subject-matter of its 
problems (problênmta) and propositions (protaseis):6* there is 'logical', 'physical', 
and 'ethical' (Top 105Ы9-29). Ethical dialectic is not to be confused with ethical 
inquiry; for once one, in selecting propositions for argumente, stumbles upon 
the principles of ethics, one has transgressed the boundary separating the two 
(Rh 1358a23-6). 
The problems characteristic for ethical dialectic are, of course, of 
practical import. One type concerns itself with what is choiceworthy: it asks, for 
instance, whether pleasure is an object of choice (haireton) or not (Top 104b7). 
Yet there are restrictions. Ignoring the intricate complexities surrounding the 
problem of commensurability, ethical dialectic only treats of perplexing 
problems, that is, problems in which the options represent the horns of a 
dilemma holding captive a person of sound judgement (Top 104a5-8): "nobody 
is perplexed as to whether well-being is more an object of choice than riches" 
6 5 1 construe fôn legomenôn as referring not to the argument extending over the whole of the Ntcomachean 
Ethics, but to the 'common beliefs' The same threefold division of premises, conclusions, and legomena is 
found at £N 1098b9-10, where foi aleuta and tm pseiula are to be read as ft alèOia/pseuda ligqmenôi 
respectively (as in the Revised Oxford ТгапЫгіогі) 
66
 Recent analysis of an ambiguity inhabiting the indefinite pronoun fis presents us with a choice 
between two senses, a 'subsumptive' (in virtue of which 'a kind of habituation' would be a proper 
rendition) and an 'alienating' one, ethereahsing, so to say, 'the real thing' (captured in a translation like 
'habituation of a kind'), see Bumyeat (19%), pp 94-6 With an eye on certain aspects of the neighbouring 
carpentry analogy we may construe - as I think we should - fis as a kind of habituation, namely, that 
kind which bears a decisive structural resemblance, short of assimilation, to that involved in learning 
carpentry Verbal instruction is, on this analysis, not exluded from the process 
6 7
 The verb krinem is frequently rendered 'to judge' In this context, its original sense, 'to discriminate' 
can be retained without many problems, see Sorabji (1992), ρ 199, (1993), ρ 35 In other contexts, 
however, retention of the original sense is strained, so that I prefer to adopt the common rendition 
6 8
 For these two terms, see ch 7, section 2 
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(Top 116a4-7). Therefore, anybody instructed in ethical dialectic is supposed to 
know that well-being and riches are too obviously disparate and cannot 
possibly be identical. 
Wealth, lying clearly discernible on the surface of moral life, is, as we 
saw in the last chapter, one of the things 'manifest and evident7. It is 
perceptually accessible to the many, who beatify persons solely by dint of their 
equipment of external goods (EN 1095a22-3; 1179al3-6). Yet wealth, as an 
external good, is instrumental to, not an ingredient in, well-being (Top 117al-2; 
EN 1096a6-7; 1097a25-8; 1099аЗЗ-Ь2; ЕЕ 1215a25-32;69 Pol 1256a35-7). Someone 
who identifies it with eudiamonia, therefore, confounds conditions with 
essentials, and we have observed that beliefs instantiating this type of 
confusion are to be left unexamined in ethical inquiry. Debating the question 
whether pleasure is to be chosen or not presumably sharpens one's mind to the 
distinction between what is to be chosen for its own sake and what for the sake 
of another thing, which plays such a fundamental part in the determination of 
the human good (Top 116a29-39). It therefore makes us more vigilant against 
the aforementioned type of confusion. 
Ethical dialectic, then, informs the aspirant student of ethics about 
fundamental distinctions concerning its first principles. It provides a 
propedeutic kind of instruction developing the required analytical acumen. 
Nevertheless, at this level as well there lurks the danger of ratiocination 
liberating itself from the facts of moral life. If not checked and balanced by the 
other components of ethical paideia, ethical dialectic seems to prepare just for 
what paideia is supposed to forestall: the Eleatic mistake. The following lines 
from the Topics leave ample room for such interplay: 
A dialectical problem is a consideration pertaining to choosing and avoiding [suntcinon pros 
hairesm km phugên] or to truth and knowledge, either itself or as a help to [has sunergon pros] 
some other thing of such a kind, about which people have no beliefs or [about which] the many 
have beliefs contrary to the wise, or the wise to the many, or each of both groups to 
themselves. For some problems it is useful [khrêsimon] to know with a view to [pros] choosing 
or avoiding, for instance, whether pleasure is to be chosen or not; other only with a view to 
knowing [pros to eidenai motion], for instance, whether the universe is eternal or not. (Top 104Ы-
8) 
Ethical dialectic helps us in engrafting and formulating our deepest 
moral convictions; it inventories and assorts the prevailing beliefs on morals; it 
develops a sensitivity to the plurality of perspectives and values obtaining in a 
society. It seems to foster the open-mindedness enlivening the moral traffic of 
the polis. What is more, the dialectical problems translating perplexities are 
geared to action. They represent, in a very real sense, practical and deliberative 
dilemmas (cf. Top 145Ы6-20). There is no reason to suppose that the following 
observation, from the preamble to the EN К discussion of pleasure, does not 
range over ethical dialectic: 
6 91 see no good reason for Walter's excision of the clause all' spoudazomenan at 1 a27 
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Those arguments which are true seem to be most useful [khrêstmôtatoi] not only to knowing 
[pros to eidenai], but also to life [pros ton bton]; for smce they are m harmony with the facts they 
are believed \pisteuontai], that is why [diho] they impel those who understand [tous sumentas] 
them to live according to them. (EN 1172b3-7) 
Moral education preliminary to ethical inquiry, then, feeds on a fabric of 
mutually reinforcing strands: (operant) conditioning, dialectical exploration 
and assessment of values, and the behaviour occurring in the interstices and 
accounting for the collection of practical experience. One of the obvious benefits 
of such a concerted propaedeutic is that it nurtures and solidifies our powers 
for reflection and self-examination, not to mention our potential for 'listening 
adequately'. 
14. Before I close this chapter I want to insert a piece of speculation on the 
reasons for the presence of the quotation from Hesiod. The vulgar, it was noted, 
neither 'listen to' (akouseie) nor 'understand' (suneiê) argument dissuading from 
gratification (EN 1179b26-8).70 What Aristotle means is usually understanding 
the utterances of another, although he (if he is the author of Metaphysics K) 
somewhere remarks that Heraclitus did not understand the implications of his 
belief denying the principle of non-contradiction (Met 106234-5). The 
corresponding faculty, sunesis, is what enables the pepaideumenos or empetros to 
'judge arguments rightly* (foi/ôs/orfftôs hinein) and to 'receive' (apodekhesthai) 
them in the proper mode (PA 639a5-6; Met 995al2-3; 1005b3; EN 1094b22-7; 
1143al3-5; 1181al8-20; b6-12; APo 71al3).71 
In the Metaphysics Aristotle makes 'listening' (akroasis) dependent on 
habit (ethos). We demand to be spoken to in a way we have become accustomed 
to (eiôthamen).72 To illustrate the force of habit Aristotle adduces the laws, the 
mythical and infantile parts of which have greater efficacy than 'knowing about 
them' (Met 994b32-995a6). Thus Aristotle opposes habit and knowledge, and 
ascribes a greater 'force (iskhus, iskhitein) to the former.73 Normally, 'force' refers 
to something like motivational force (EN 1179b4-7; 23-6), as when it is said that 
'knowing itself (auto to eidenai) has little or no force at all with respect to the 
possession of the virtues (EN 1105b2-3; cf. 1180al8-22).74 
701 render both sumenai and epistasthai 'to understand' (following Bumyeat (1981)), with the proviso that 
in the latter case the scientific mode is meant 
71
 Anstotle reports usage to treat sumenai as synonymous with manihanem (EN 1143al7-8) and seems to 
comply with it (DA 432a7-9) 
71
 Met 99bb32-995al has gar eôthamen houtôs axioumen legesethat, compare £E 1216b34 fôn eiôthotôn 
legesthai, see also Rh 1356b37-1357al 
73
 At the same time, however, the habitual is 'more familiar' (gnônmôteron) It seems wise, then, not 
prematurely to pile up the familiar with what is known 
74
 Bumyeat (1981), ρ 104, shows that eidenai can be taken as equivalent to gignoskein Both he and Barnes 
(1993), ρ 82, draw on Lyons, Structural Semantics - an шія/ysis of part of the vocabulary of Plato, Oxford, 
1963, holding that both terms are convertible in Plato's texts The undefined gignôskein is tacitly treated as 
synonymous with eidenai in the Posterior Analytics and, since in this treatise the whole concept of 
'knowledge' is central and since it may therefore be assumed that Anstotle is particularly fastidious in 
drawing the required distinctions in this context, we can extrapolate the synonymity to other works 
57 
Some people make their 'reception' dependent on the testimony of a 
poet as authority (Met 995a7-8). Aristotle sneers at the bulk of apaideutôi who in 
his days still esteem the poetic style (adopted by, for instance, Gorgias) 
deriving from the poets (Rh 1404a24-9). To be sure, the subject in the Rhetoric is 
literary style; but this does not alter the fact that most uneducated people are 
only prepared to give ear to logos only when clad in the swollen archaicisms of 
a fossil poetic diction. 
In any event, the justification for the quotation of Hesiod's lines might be 
the following. If the apaideutos cannot receive the arguments appropriate to 
ethical inquiry because he does not have the corresponding habits, he may, in 
an ultimate attempt, be set on the right course indirectly. He may be counselled 
to take to heart Hesiod's words which, in more congenial vein, tell him that 
taking to heart the words of the wise is a way to get hold of 'the that' (EN 
1143Ы1-4). In other words, if Aristotle complies with citing a poet, and a 
venerable one, for a witness, he does so to meet the apaideutos on his own 
ground. A reference to an accepted authority, as it were, serves to bestow 
authority upon an authority. This is what I meant, a few sections ago, with 'a 
last resort of discourse'. It is 'enteuctic' catering to bad taste in a last attempt to 
inflame. 
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3 
Reputability 
1. "Whatever our original motive," it has been argued,1 "for taking part 
[i.e. in the ethical inquiry expounded in the Nicomachean Ethics], once we do, we 
accept the inquiry on its own terms, which includes accepting its purpose". 
Although this goes some way in the right direction, it stops short of the vital 
point. On the verge of concluding his Democracy and Education, John Dewey 
writes: "A narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the failure to 
recognize that all the aims and values which are desirable in education are 
themselves moral. Discipline, natural development, culture, social efficiency, 
are moral traits - marks of a person who is a worthy member of that society 
which it is the business of education to further."2 In the last chapter we saw that 
we come to ethical inquiry with a wish to become good, and that the 
engagement in the inquiry contributes to its fulfilment 
The phrase 'whatever our original motive', and in particular the 
pronoun 'whatever7, incorporates a concession to an attitude which is 
characteristic of modern tourism. It still betrays remnants of what I coin, rather 
sumptuously, 'the assumption of motivational modularity'.3 
Motivational modularity is the (distinctively modern) phenomenon 
which makes it seem possible to choose from a repertoire of equally valid 
reasons for doing something. This entails that it denies the Aristotelian 
distinction between essential and (co)incidental connections obtaining between 
those reasons and what they are reasons for. On this assumption, then, it is 
equally legitimate and possible to choose from the options of reading the 
Nicomachean Ethics for the gratification of intellectual curiosity, to make the 
corresponding impression, to kill time, to find consolation - or to become a 
good human being, provided the latter is not a privileged reason. We cannot 
but subscribe to motivational modularity. I only claim that there is a constraint 
upon interpretation to the effect that, in terms vaguely reminiscent of Pascal's 
wager, it is a good strategy to read Aristotle's ethics as if he himself did not 
endorse. 
We might perhaps illustrate this by an (imperfect) pictorial analogy. 
Pictures may move us in either of two ways, corresponding to a crude 
' Broadie (1991), ρ 5 
2 Dewey (1966), ρ 359 
3
 In the previous chapter muc_h the same was captured by the unlovely phrase 'subjechvizing' the 
teleologica! framework 
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distinction of two senses of 'move'. There is the 'aesthetic' sense (which I 
assume to be intuitively familiar) and a more profane, 'corporeal' sense. 
Gazing, di sotto in su, at Veronese's Triumph ofMordecai, spread on the ceiling of 
San Sebastiano, we cannot help shrinking from the hooves of the sharply 
foreshortened horses threatening to crush us. The canvass, as it were, draws us 
into it, devours us, and makes us, willy-nilly, part of the scene it depicts. This 
effect is of a psychological, but also of a more than psychological nature. It 
moves us, but it does so only from an appropriate angle, describing, ideally, 
that part of the church's ground-plan perpendicularly below the apex of the 
perspectival skeleton. 
Similarly, Aristotle's words are supposed to galvanise to action, not, at 
least not primarily, by delegating their motivational efficacy to the 
capriciousness of literary style, as Adam Smith held,4 but to a pre-established 
position of the entire recipient Our actions, which we bring forth like offspring 
(EN 1113Ы8-9), are ours in the sense that we, the progenitors, are entire human 
beings, not free-soaring minds (EN 1112b31-2; 1139b5). In other words, to go to 
the lectures on ethics already is a moral action. And we go there in our psycho­
physical entirety, not only with our minds, not only armoured with a firmly 
entrenched wish to become good, but with our more corporeal urges bridled 
(EN 1095al0-l). 
2. Writing about ethics is tricky business, and perhaps all the more so 
when it is thought not to be. At any rate, the complaint that it no longer is is, in 
variegated guises, as old as the discipline itself; yet the tides of civilisation 
seem to press upon us the need to reiterate it time and again. In his beautiful 
Autobiography, Collingwood, to mention an eloquent example, thus summarises 
the 'realisf stance towards the nature of moral philosophy: "Moral philosophy 
is only the theory of moral action: it can't therefore make any difference to the 
practice of moral action. People can act just as morally without it as with i t I 
stand here as a moral philosopher; I will try to tell you what acting morally is, 
but don't expect me to tell you how to do i t " 5 
The position inveighed against by Collingwood rests on two patently 
unwarranted assumptions. First, there is the meanwhile rather dull point that 
there is no 'point of view of the universe' (to resort, once again, to Sidgwick) 
inhabited by moral philosophers angelically registering 'this mortal coil'. It is, 
however, often ignored that there are two cutting-edges to this knife. For 
equally no Archimedean coign of vantage is populated by moral philosophers 
disseminating strings of words so dainty and delicate as not to impinge, in 
whichever way, upon the world. 'Telling how to do it' is only one way in 
which theory may make a difference. 
Aristotelian ethics is not troubled by allergic reaction to practical 
persuasion marking introverted positions such as that described by 
Collingwood. Yet it is the estimate of the chance of success by direct practical 
1
 The Икоту of Moral Sentimenti, vu IVA; 6. 
' Collingwood (1982), ρ 48. 
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persuasion which is one of the features eliciting the verdict of elitism on the 
part of modern commentators. But of course this judgement inasmuch as it 
obliquely vindicates much of contemporary moral philosophy, is sublimely 
myopic. 
To resort again, to the art of painting. Elitism can function like, say, the 
pigment of Veronese's picture; it is there, on the surface, for all to see, but it is 
supposed to conduct our gaze beyond, or through, it A term like 'educated' in 
Rawls' "(educated) person" is really there,·* but its curious status of vehicle for 
opposite contents gives it a treacherous potential for self-concealment No less 
than 'the many', 'children', 'the diseased', and 'the mentally retarded' it 
represents, as Dewey's words make abundantly clear, a moral category. (We 
may paraliptically pass over the moral philosophy which is so overburdened 
by technicalities that it is, by itself, as accessible as a cricket match by and for 
the members of a club in colonial times and places.)7 Yet the peculiar way it 
does so gives the other variety of elitism the moral benefit of the doubt for two 
closely related reasons. 
In the first place, there is an intrinsic moral difference between the 
deliberate exclusion by explicit reference on the one hand, and by oblique 
reference or straightforward neglect on the other. Transparency is, as I conceive 
of it, an inherent constraint on moral discourse. Secondly, and consequentially, 
Aristotle's overt ethical elitism8, as against that implicit in contemporary moral 
philosophy as a more or less autistic institution (which covers much more than 
its theoretical outpourings, be they ever so liberal in spirit), forces him to 
produce an argument9 
It is this argument which we have, with considerable effort, identified in 
the last chapter and which is, by and large, the subject of this chapter and the 
next The argument is simple. Since ethics is practical, it should motivate; only 
subjects with the required motivational groundwork can reasonably be 
expected to profit by the inquiry; those who lack such a foundation are 
excluded. 
Lack of clarity effectively veils the cruelty of egalitarianism. Operating 
with demands of rationality, impartiality, and neutrality, in short, intelligence, 
it is undemocratically self-selective. Once a Russian master was asked what he 
thought of the 'common belief that chess is a sport for wets. The master 
answered that chess, on the contrary, is the cruellest of sports, and that this is so 
because of its totalitarian character. If you loose a game of chess, it is difficult to 
varnish over the inexorable fact that you are simply more stupid than your 
opponent 
«Seech 2section4 
7
 The comparison is based on the perceived affinity of (Government House) utilitarianism with 
colonialism See Smart & Williams (1973), ρ 138, Williams (1985), pp 108-110 
8
 Which has put off such modern scholars as Gregory Vlastos, see Rorty (1980), ρ 6 
' By contrast, there being no apparent need to argue for omissions from the agenda does not entail, by 
any kind of inference, that the decision not to do so is not a moral, or, for that matter, a morally 
reprehensible decision Neither does it mean that the decision is consistent with the contents of the 
theory, despite its compatibility with the institution or practice 
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Or, to transcend the boundaries set to such clearly demarcated 
institutions, suppose you are a logician and your partner is not What unites the 
both of you is the common project of saving a marriage dishevelled by 
miscommunication. Since you are fed up with the tu quoque tactics poisoning all 
discussion, you insist on playing the game by the rules of classical logic, which 
you suppose to be universally valid like, say, the rules of chess. Your partner 
cannot play by these rules and, what is more, does not accept them as such. 
Perhaps it is about time to see that your claims to disputational objectivity 
imperil wedlock as much as your partner's non-compliance. Maybe you should 
ask yourself 'Wait a moment, how is rationality allocated here?'. Intelligence 
may not in itself be something moral - but the effects of its celebration certainly 
are. 
However implausible, repulsive, or idiosyncratic Aristotle's argument 
may sound to our modern ears, one must admit its consistency within the 
overall teleologica! framework of Aristotelian practical philosophy.10 For its 
specific telos requires the power to incite: it is of its prerequisites that, in 
Aristotle's terms, its words fall on soil which is worked so as to be able to soak 
them up. Thus when he says that it is superfluous to examine the beliefs of 
certain classes of people, he should be taken to point to the estimate of the 
chance to make ethics work - with those very people. We must, therefore, 
penetrate, through the endoxical coating of conventional morality to what 
really, and literally, moves them. 
In this and the next chapters I shall take further some points broached in 
the last chapter. We shall busy ourselves with the relations between the wish to 
become good persons and the beliefs of Aristotle's audience - beliefs which are, 
necessarily, endoxa. In this chapter I argue that instruction in ethical dialectic, 
by aiming at a convergence of reputable beliefs and wishes, prepares the 
aspirant student for ethical inquiry. The next chapter will introduce the 
analysis of the second pillar of ethical paideia. I shall concentrate on relatively 
neglected aspects of Aristotelian motivational theory. What I shall try to do is to 
extract the importance of the imagination from Aristotle's ideas on conation. 
The third strut, experience, which will be treated in the last three chapters, will 
be seen to effect a synthesis between moral endoxa, the imagination involved in 
conation, and conation itself. All factors combine to make the prospective 
student of 'political science', or ethics, master appetite. 
3. As with most Aristotelian terms of art, there barely is anything 
resembling consensus on sense and reference of ta endoxa. In the exegetical 
tradition we may in the main distinguish two currents. The one, poured forth 
from a Prior Analytics passage (70a3-5), eddies around the notion of probability 
(eikos). It has been pointed out, however, that the evidence yielded by this 
passage is too thin to jump to conclusions about any intrinsic tie binding both 
10
 I hesitate to call it 'philosophy', it is a designation I do not think Aristotle would have approved of in 
the case of his ethics, be it in his sense of the term or in ours 
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concepts.11 The other current reads into the term strong connotations of 
'plausibility'.12 
Then there is the customary estuary through which both cúrrente 
discharge in the sea of synthesis. The most influential exponent of which is Le 
Blond, who compiles into ta endoxa the best of both worlds: the notion is a 
blend of 'probabilité intrinsique' or Objective' (in short 'probable') and 
'probabilité extrinsique' or 'subjective' ('plausible).13 As has been rightly 
remarked, neither 'plausible' nor 'probable' (deriving, probably, from Boethius' 
probabile in his Topics translation) nor their confluence will do for a translation 
of the term.14 Both probability and plausibility, it is true, may be descried in 
endoxa, but as merely accidental accretions. This is one of the reasons why 
modern commentators generally stick to translations like 'accepted' or 'received 
opinions' - or, less plausibly, 'common beliefs'. 
Even these are not adequate translations. Though displaying the 
etymological kinship with doxa in its sense of 'belief or Opinion', they sacrifice 
to oblivion other, but not less respectable, lineage. For doxa may also mean 
'reputation', and there is a common adjective, endoxos, well-attested in extant 
Greek (rhetorical) writings from about Aristotle's time, which means something 
like held in esteem or honour', 'of high repute'.15 In approximately the same 
sense it is found in Aristotle (EN 1122b31-2; 1127a21; Rh 1368a21; 24). 
Accordingly, it is suggested to render the term 'the reputable things'.16 This 
translation, in tum, has been criticised on the ground that what is reputable (de 
iure), as opposed to what is reputed (de facto), carries implications of desert 
lacking in its purported co-referentials phainomena and legomena.17 We are glad 
to find that controversy is still rampant 
I am in sympathy with 'reputable things' as a literal translation. 
However, 'reputable beliefs' seems to me most eligible on the grounds that it 
renders transparent its double semantic lineage. Additionally, it has the 
advantage of giving us a firmer grasp of the outspokenly evaluative slant there 
is to the term, which is too readily elided in treatments of dialectic in general 
and of the term ta endoxa in particular. It is this aspect of reputable beliefs I 
intend to concentrate on in this chapter. 
The force of this component is not exhausted when reputable beliefs are 
said to be the views 'to be approved of (quite literally, probabilia). Truth is only 
one way in which a belief may recommend itself. This means that in an ethical 
inquiry which aims at making people good the reputability of a belief can be a 
severe hindrance - that is, by failing to be suitably related to a fundamental 
" Evans (1977), ρ 78 
1 2
 For references see Barnes (1981), ρ 498nl4 
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 Le Blond (1939), pp 10-1 connecting the probable with 'le bon sens' and the plausible with 'le sens 
commun' 
"Barnes (1981),ρ 498 
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 LSJ s ν Barnes (1981), ρ 499, gives a nice example from a speech by Demosthenes ( Ш 66 - x68) 
« Barnes (1981), pp 499-500 
1 7
 Irwin (1988), ρ 492n42 The ¡le iure/de facto distinction is Brunschwig's, (1967), pp 113-4 Since we have 
rejected, in the first chapter, that part of the 'intersubstitutability thesis' equating fihamomena and endoxa, 
we need not worry about this As far as its other part is concerned {legomena=endoTa), I am not so sure 
whether ¡egomena an evaluative component is lacking 
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wish, expressed in such a belief. Notoriously spreading to the subject of which 
it is predicated, the reputabihty of a belief may endanger Aristotle's project 
because it invites the lip-service which emblazons our public, but only our 
public, personae. As a consequence, the profession of such a belief has an 
inherent danger of assimilating to the apophthegmatic embroidery covering the 
walls of cheap hotel rooms. 
This need not be a matter of dissimulation. The borderline between what 
we believe we wish and what we wish to believe is not as clearly registered in 
our minds as we might wish, or, for that matter, believe. This will become clear 
from the last three chapters. On the other hand, reputabihty also has a more 
benign side. It might charge a proposition with a certain electrifying 
allurement I claim that the reputabihty of moral beliefs, with which the 
aspirant student of ethics becomes acquainted in the course of ethical dialectic, 
works together with the other elements of ethical paideia to generate the wish to 
become a good person. We must therefore investigate the dialectical 
contribution to the wish to become a good person. 
4. I shall approach the matter obliquely, by girding it in ever-diminishing 
orbits. In ordinary Greek usage, the privative of endoxos is adoxos: 'without 
doxd, 'inglorious', 'obscure', or 'ignoble' (Rh 1384b31). There is the substantive 
adoxia, 'ill-repute', found in Aristotle's definitions and discussions of shame, 
both m the Nicomachean Ethics (EN 1128Ы2) and in the Rlietortc (Rh 1383M3; 
1384b22). A corresponding verb, adoxein, occurs in the discussion of the 
'politicai' variety of courage (££ 1230a24), that is, not the true virtue, but of all 
simulacra the one most akin to i t What causes the possessors of this 
(semi)virtue to endure hardships in battle so as to ward off prospective damage 
to their reputations is a sense of shame (aidôs). 
The same lexical opposition recurs in contexts concerning dialectical 
technique (especially Top 159a38-b35).18 This vouches for the inference that, if 
the proposition ρ 'one ought to treat one's friends well' is endoxon, its contraries 
(ta enantia),19 the propositions p
c
i 'one ought to treat one's friends badly' and pa 
'one ought to treat one's enemies well', are adoxa. Aristotle actually treats the 
first proposition as endoxically equivalent to the negations of p
c
i and pa, 
respectively p
c
i 'it is not the case that one ought to treat one's friends badly' 
and pa 'it is not the case that one ought to treat one's enemies well' (Top 
104a20-7). 
There is, then, a terttum quid; for treating one's fnends well is obviously 
not equivalent to not treating one's fnends badly. At first sight, the endoxical 
system is closed under implication: the weaker form entailed by this procedure 
is implied by the original statement But what about the other proposition 
yielded7 
ι» Ίσρ 159al9, SF 172M0,18,1 Ла14, 26,174Ы7 
1 9
 Not its contradictory' 
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Elsewhere in the Topics, in a passage to do with contrariety, we find the 
same propositions. Obviously, treating one's friends well is not contrary to 
treating one's enemies badly (Top НЗаІ-З).20 By the same token, treating one's 
friends badly is not contrary to treating one's enemies well. Aristotle explains 
the resulting non-contrariety thus: "for both these things are to be avoided 
\pheukta] and of the same character [tou autou êthous]" (Top 113a4-5). If only one 
term is exchanged, the result inevitably is a contrariety which in turn is 
'explained' by a corresponding contrariety of character, and, accordingly, the 
appropriate evaluations (Top 113al0-l). Not surprisingly, the various maxims 
are distributed among good and bad characters (Top 113al3-4). 
Objects of avoidance are not contrary to each other, Aristotle says, unless 
formulated 'according to excess or defect7 (Top 113a5-8). This is in line with the 
so-called 'doctrine of the mean' familiar from the Ethics: generally, in matters of 
character, there are, roughly, three types of dispositions, the virtuous middle 
state, flanked by deviations, namely, vicious excess and deficiency (EÍV 
1108bll-1109al9). Relations of contrariety, the strongest of which being that 
between the two extremities, connect these dispositions (EN 1108b32-5). So the 
'unless'-clause is meant to rule out the possibility that both propositions 
denoting objects of avoidance refer to things which it is of contrary characters 
to believe or do (cf. EN 1173a5-13). Consequently, such propositions would be 
contrary. 
If we take together ρ and p
c
i, we find that what makes the obligations (or 
wishes) they represent conflict is true in all possible worlds. On the other hand, 
ρ and pa are contrary only relative to contingent features of a moral world 
sufficiently like that of Aristotle's. So in a Christian morality, for instance, this 
operation of conversion does not yield a reliable medium for reputability. For 
Aristotle, on the contrary, they seem to be more than just weakly compatible, if 
'weakly compatible' is glossed as something like 'not representing conflicting 
demands'. The channels through wich reputability of propositions is 
transmitted do not collapse with rules of inference. What is more, Aristotle is 
aware of this; for why should he otherwise invoke character as providing the 
explanatory background for contrariety? 
The analysis of the endoxical flow or of how reputability spreads, then, 
presupposes a morality. This poses serious questions about the value of 
dialectic applied to ethical inquiry. If reputability is apportioned according to 
the canons of a pre-existing morality, how far can it be trusted in establishing 
first principles in that field? The answer is that it cannot But then again, it need 
not For as we saw, in the first chapter, dialectic is not supposed to cope with 
such a task. Ethical dialectic teaches us to specify and analyse the non-
propositional principles engrafted in our psychology by other means. To be 
able to tell the endoxic from the non-endoxic, then, one must even before one 
comes to Aristotle's inquiry, be able to tell a sound character from an unsound 
one. 
2 0
 I pass over the question whether, if friends and foes are, ontologically spoken, substances, how they 
can be susceptible of contrariety (Cat 3b24-32) Perhaps these terms are treated by Aristotle as 
substantiations from the category of quality, which does admit of this relation (Cot 10M2-25) 
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This is exactly what sets apart Eudoxus' hedonist position, to the effect 
that pleasure is the good, from the vulgar one (EN 1172a9-15; 1174all): 
The words were trusted [episteuonto] more because of the excellence of his character [dia ten tou 
êthous aretên] than because of themselves [di' hautous]; for he was thought [edokei\ to be an 
outstandingly temperate [dtapherontôs sôphrôn] man; he was thought to say these things not as a 
friend of pleasure [has philos tes hêdonês], but that it was so accordmg to the truth [kat' 
aiethaan]. (EN1172M5-8) 
This sentence can be construed in several ways. It may be taken to be a 
criticism of the argument. This construal, however, passes over in silence the 
facts that Aristotle sustains the bulk of it and that he even espouses some 
version of Eudoxus' second premise in the exordium of the Nicomachean Ethics 
(EN 1094al-3), but not only there.21 I think the remark should be read rather 
differently, in the following way. 
Eudoxus' 'excellence' or 'virtue of character' makes his belief satisfy one 
of the Topics criteria for endoxa. He may be considered wise in 'matters of 
morals' (EN 1141al2), like Socrates.22 On the other hand, we can distinguish 
two ways in which Eudoxus' character is brought to bear on his beliefs in a 
way relevant to ethical inquiry. First, the virtuous (i.e. temperate) conduct of 
his life does service as a constraint on the interpretation of his argument Since, 
as noted, actions speak louder than words, the position that the human good is 
pleasure need not be rejected (as befalls the position of the vulgar, who make 
themselves appear 'completely slavish' by their actions), that is, when the right 
type of pleasure can be extracted from behaviour. This is the interpretative 
aspect of character. 
Secondly, it should not go unnoticed that the position is firmly rooted in 
the manifestations of the world we live in.23 The very fact that Eudoxus is the 
incarnation of temperance, that he has the virtue of temperance, means that his 
perception of the world may be trusted. We can, so to speak, trust Eudoxus' 
view, because we can trust Eudoxus' view. This is, with a strained phrase, the 
'indirectly foundational' aspect of character. 
Dialectic, at least where ethical reputability is at stake, is operative well 
within the orbit of morality, not to say of Aristotelian morality. Whence we 
may cautiously advance to the conclusion that character obtrudes into ethical 
endoxa, and so join this, from another direction, to the findings hitherto 
recorded. It remains, however, to be seen in what way this obtrusion takes 
place and what it amounts to. 
5. Aristotle suggests that in ethical dialectic, which is limited by the fact 
that it must proceed discursively, the obtrusion occurs by the mediation of 
*' EN 1095al4-5,1097a5, Rii 1362a23, Ь5-9,1363М2Ч 1365al; Pol 1252a29,1282M4-5, ЕЕ 1218a26-33, Top 
116al9-20 
22
 See ch 1 section 3 
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 EN 1172MO Eudoxus 'saw' (horan) all things aiming at pleasure; at EN 1172Ы2 he uses mêmietn, for 
which see e g DA 403al9, EN ПОТЬ29,1102ЬЗ, ІІОбаІб 
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wish. Ethical dialectic, I claim, is the discursive vehicle which causes our 
wishes to converge with the prevailing morality. 
In the eighth book of the Topics, the book in which the rules for 'la joute 
dialectique' (in the words of Moraux)24 are codified, Aristotle gives us, in a 
short chapter on defending (hypo)theses, a valuable piece of advice: 
One must beware of defending a hypothesis which is adoxos [adoxon hupothesin].*5 It may be 
adoxos in two ways; for both that from which it follows to say absurd things (for instance, if 
someone would say that all things are m motion or that no thing is) and those things which it 
is of a bad character to choose [hosa kheironos êthous helesthaí¡ and which are opposed to 
people's wishes [hupenanha tais boulêsestn] (for instance, that pleasure is the good, and that 
domg injustice is better than being done injustice); for people hate [misousin] one [treating one] 
not as if one were sustaining argument for the sake of argument, but as if one were saying 
things one believes [fa dokmmta ¡egonta]. (Top 160M7-22) 
By courtesy of the rules expounded under the 'instrumenf of 
disambiguation, laid down in the Topics itself (Top A 15; 106a9-22; 107a32-5), 
we are authorised to transplant the twofold way a hypothesis can be adoxos into 
the semantics of its positive counterpart endoxos. Endoxos is what it is of a good 
character to choose and what is consistent with people's wishes. 
It has recently been argued that Aristotle here uses adoxos in a colloquial, 
not in the technical, sense ('disgraceful'), and that it therefore cannot be 
intended as the contrary of the technical term endoxos. On this account, Aristotle 
simply says that we must beware of defending a disgraceful thesis, since 
people will think we really subscribe to its contents - and hate us for it26 In this 
way, the theses that everything (Heraclitus) and that nothing (Melissus) moves 
are adoxoi in a way distinct from the ethical examples listed (Top 104Ы9-22). 
However, if this were so, why would Aristotle call a thesis 'from which it 
follows to state absurd things', like that of Melissus, 'vulgar' (phortikos) (Ph 
185al0-2), in view of the fact that it is the most vulgar (phortikôtatoï) of people 
who entertain the belief that the human good is bodily pleasure (EN 1095Ы5-
6)? 
I think that Aristotle dissuades us from defending irreputable ethical, as 
opposed to 'logical'27 or 'physical', (substantive) positions at all, because the 
former, not the latter, are bound to elicit hatred. Aristotle is thus implying that 
ethical adoxa have a peculiar dynamics; as we put it earlier, discussing ethics is 
'tricky business'. There is, then, no reason why we should not read the passage 
as implying that ethical endoxa have exactly the reverse effect. If one defends a 
reputable position one is likely to place oneself in a favourable light Compare 
the following suggestion from the Sophistical Refutations: 
Furthermore, [with a view to lead people into stating adoxa one should review the possibilities 
resulting] from wishes and apparent beliefs [ek ton boulêseôn kai ton phanerôn doxôn]. For people 
do not both wish and say the same things, but they state [iegousi] the most becoming of 
2« Moraux (1968) 
25
 Anstotle presumably means defending the view of someone other than oneself, Top 159b2-33 
и Smith (1997), ρ 136 
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arguments, whereas they wish [boulontai] the things which appear to be of advantage to them; 
for instance, they say that they prefer dying nobly to living pleasurably, and being justly poor 
to being disgracefully neh, whereas they wish for the contraries. Hence, he who speaks 
according to his wishes must be led into apparent beliefs, but he who speaks according to the 
latter must be led to the hidden beliefs; for m both ways it is necessary that they state 
paradoxes \pvtradoxa legem]; for they will state things contrary either to the apparent or to the 
non-apparent beliefs [pros tas plumeras ê pros tas aphanets doras]. (SE 172b36-173a6; cf. EN 
1178a30-l) 
In doing ethical dialectic, then, we learn not only how to mess up our 
adversaries in (par)adoxa by puncturing the bubbles of pretended morality, but 
also to beware of being so messed up ourselves. To perform well in ethical 
dialectic, we do best not only to represent, at the level of discourse, morality, 
but also to endorse it, so that we can consistently argue for our position. The 
reputability of a position, therefore, can (but need not) be an incentive to live 
up to it In other words, ethical dialectic not only contributes to our learning to 
be sincere to others and, as a consequence, to ourselves; it also exposes us to 
public control. In this way it teaches us to care about the coherence of our 
words and deeds, which (as argued in the preceding chapter) furthers both our 
capacity of and inclination to reflection on ourselves. 
In this connection, it might be worth recalling what we said in the last 
chapter, that although belief and wish are far from identical, this is not to say 
that there is no overlap of any kind whatsoever. In contradistinction with 
deliberate choice, both belief and wish are 'of the end' (ЕЕ 1226al6-7). Ideally, 
we might say, belief and wish collapse, that is to say, when the belief is an 
adequate translation of the intentional content of the wish. 
6. It might be asked why Aristotle says that we hate the defenders of 
irreputable positions. Why hatred, and not another sentiment like, for instance, 
anger, indignation, contempt, or feeling offended? The answer lies, I think, in 
the peculiar object hatred is levelled at 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle includes hate among those affections of the soul 
(patM tês psukhês) which are likely to modify our judgement of a person's 
utterances (Rh 1378al9-21; 1382ЭІ-15).28 Anger (orge), the paradigm affection, is 
definitionally bound, as regards its object to an individual person. The anger 
of John Steinbeck's infuriated Okies, who are being driven off their land by a 
bank, expresses itself in the thirst for vengeance to be quenched only by killing 
the guilty. Since responsibility is diffused over an organisation, this desire is 
doomed to be strangled by frustration.29 According to Aristotle, one is angry 
with Cleon, not with the human species (RA 1378a32-4). 
2 8
 On the anomalous position of hatred in Aristotle's iOietonc catalogue of the affections, see Cooper 
(1996), ρ 248-9 
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 See the following dialogue from The Grapes of Wrath "Who can we shoot? I don't aim to starve to 
death before I kill the man that's starving me," the Оку, suspecting frustration of his thirst for revenge, 
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roiGreek answer goes 
68 
Hatred, on the other hand, can also be directed 'at genera' (pros ta gene), 
"tor when we believe [hupolambanômen] that some person is of a certain kind 
[toionde], we hate him [misoumen]" (Rh 1382a4-5). The defender of an 
irrepu table position is tainted by the position he defends. This piece of advice, 
then, is consistent with what Aristotle himself does when he excludes certain 
views from examination in the Ethics. 
The word toionde points to a universal, a category of persons, and in all 
likelihood its rôle here is limited to providing a contrast term to 'particular'.30 
At the same time, however, it is part of Aristotelian shorthand for moral 
character in virtue of its relationship to the central and technical term for the 
category of quality (poion).31 "We do not say of what quality someone \poios 
tis]32 is in respect of character [to ethos], [when we say] that he is wise or clever, 
but that he is good-tempered or daring" (ЕЕ 1220all-2; cf. EN 1103a7-8). High-
level generalisations on character are typically cast in terms of the correlatives 
toioutos ... hoios (ЕЕ 1227b5-ll). We find them in (to mention a few instances) 
the general account of habituation, of the limited self-responsibility for one's 
character, and of the way character determines the way objects of action appear 
(EN 1103b21-3; 1114аЗ-7; а31-ЬЗ; 1144a29-bl). 
Aristotle's examples of 'universally' hated classes of persons strongly 
suggest ethical types: everybody hates 'the thief or 'the sycophanf. To stick 
with the first example: a thief is not just someone who has stolen. The thief 
living up to his title steals through deliberate choice (dia prohaireseôs) (EN 
1134al9-23). And it is in deliberate choice where both moral wickedness 
(mokhthêria), a state of character brought about by habitual 'thieving', and 
injustice are revealed and located (Rh 137ÍÜ11-2).33 
The fact, then, that hate may suspend itself on moral types, and therefore 
on types of character, seems to account for Aristotle's choice of the affection 
hatred. Of course, if one can help it, that is, if one is familiar with the maxims of 
prevailing morality, the temptation to defend a reputable position is 
considerably more difficult to resist Therefore, the defenders of such positions 
are to be encountered with greater scepticism - although this is far from saying 
that they are impelled by motives which are blameworthy. There just is this 
inherent attraction about a reputable position, that it is likely to meet with the 
approbation of society. Nevertheless, the sensitivity to the approval of others is 
not necessarily a bad thing; on the contrary, it may equally testify to a healthy 
concern for the esteem one is held in by the other. 
30
 'Particular' meaning here individuals, not, as in other contexts, species as opposed to genera For a 
discussion of these matters, see Cooper (1975), ρ 28-9 
3 1
 The correlatives toioutos hoios and other derivatives, having for their nucleus .. οίο , virtually 
permeate the ethical writings, see for example EN 1151all-4, 22-3 
3 2
 Cat 8b25 ροιοι tines 
3 3
 The term for the act of 'thieving' (klopë) in itself signifies reasoned choice, and therefore the state of 
perversion (also meta plmulotêtos) (Rh 1374al2-3, EN 1107a9-12, ЕЕ 1221Ы8-25), Anstotle is uuite clear 
about the logical behaviour of such terms they are not woven into the usual pattern of contrarieties of 
states of character we have already alluded to, since they are conceptually lodged in the semantic field of 
vice Therefore, a proposition like 'stealing is base' would be, m updated vocabulary, tautologous (EN 
1107al4-5) 
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7. Defending a reputable belief, then, can be a sign of solicitude for one's 
reputation or doxa; in the non-dialectical sense of the term, it may be one of the 
endoxa, or 'the things which bring repute' (EN 1127a21; b25). Someone who 
does this without being able to meet the standard set by the position need not 
suffer from the vice of boastfulness (alazoneia). Again, a lack of self-knowledge 
may be the reason for defending a reputable position, for instance, some sort of 
akratic ignorance about the imperiousness with which one's appetites assert 
themselves. 
More interestingly, however, with a view to my purposes, is the 
possibility of a deliberate exposure to the big stick of the expectations of others. 
In this way one might eventually come to carry out an as yet ineffectual wish to 
become a good person. Needless to say, for this deliberately adopted policy to 
work, it is a prerequisite, as already alluded to, that others matter. We shall not, 
however, be able to estimate the importance of the other if we have not first 
given this other an eye to pierce through the coating of the ostensible. It 
remains to be seen, in the next chapters, to what extent reputability plays a part 
in obscuring transparency of the self, via transiucence to opacity. 
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4 
Wish 
1. The present chapter decomposes into two parts. Both of them are 
concerned with wish, but in quite different ways. The second part will flesh out 
the rôle of the imagination in wish. I shall argue that Aristotle countenances at 
least two functions, and try to make clear the importance of one of them for the 
wish to become a good person. On the way I shall supplement Aristotle's 
theory of motivation so as to provide an account of pleasure as the explanatory 
factor not, as traditional psychological hedonism has it, in the formation of 
desire, but of action. I do not only think that an ethic which is practical in the 
true sense of the term is in need of such an account, but also that there is such 
an account to be found in Aristotle. 
In the first part I bring to completion my survey of ethical method, and I 
shall do this by studying Aristotle's exclusion argument for the first category in 
a synecdochic way, that is, on one of the excluded groups, the insane. This 
procedure is justified by the fact that all those groups (children, physically and 
mentally ill) are, as I called it, 'weakly intemperate'; they all live 'according to 
affection', i.e. according to the decrees of appetite.1 They share the characteristic 
of 'not having nous' (ЕЕ 1214b30-l). 
2. A first difficulty is thrown up by the fact that Aristotle nowhere honours 
the category of the insane with thematic elaboration. For this reason we shall 
have to make do with a reconstruction, by bits and pieces, of a profile of 
Aristotle's madman which is germane to our purposes. This covers much of the 
available material, since insanity, for Aristotle as for ancient Greeks in general, 
represents a challenge which is of a preponderantly moral nature. 
We are set into the world with perception of the pleasant and the 
painful, with desire, and the faculty of phantasia (DA 413b21-4; 414Ы-6; 417M6-
8; 433b27-30). The latter helps us out when, in later stages of our development, 
our capacity to think leaves us in the lurch, as it sometimes2 does in affective 
ι Children (or the young) EN 1095a2-8, Ш1Ь8-9, 1128M5-8, П56а22, ЕЕ 1224a28-30, 1240b33-4, Wi 
1389a3-4 The physically ill EN 1095a24, И05Ы2-6, 1152b31-3, 1173b22-5, EL· 1235b33-1236al, Rh 
1397al6-7, 23-4 
2
 'Sometimes' (emote) (DA 429a7) pathei ê ікюоіь è Ιπψΰΐ is not explicative, Aristotle means 'somehmps' to 
modify these, so that he should be taken to be saying not 'sometimes, e g by but rather 'in some case 
of ' 
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turmoil, in illness, or when we are asleep (DA 429a4-8; Insom 458b26-7). It is not 
the case, however, that in such states our intellectual capacities are standardly 
rendered inane. The regression may consist in a temporary loss of reflective 
control over the deliverances of phantasia, which forges beliefs into its service 
(Insom 459a6-8). 
Almost cursorily, in a comparison, Aristotle divests the insane of both 
reasoning and the decisions issuing from it (EN 1149b34-5). On the other hand, 
some forms of madness, viz. pathological, morbid states resulting from habit 
(EN 1ШЫ7? 1149al2), are classified as a kind of aphrosunê (literally 
'thoughtlessness', but also 'foolishness', or 'stupidity) (EN 1149a5; 9-12). That 
aphrosunê does not imply literal thoughtlessness emerges from the sophistic 
argument, reproduced at EN 1146a27-31,4 in which the term seamlessly 
alternates with the generic verb for epistemic states, hupolambanem (DA 427b24-
6).5 At a minimal level, therefore, 'thoughtlessness', in the Nicomactuzan Ethics,6 
is quite compatible with (erratic) belief (doxa [pseudês]).7 Or, more accurately, 
with a belief which, in virtue of its intentionality and concurrence with 
deliberate choice, is in danger of being confused with the latter - because it 
pertains to what is good and what one ought to do (EN Illlb34-1112al2; ЕЕ 
1226a4-5).* 
Arguably, even the highest level of subtlety and refinement of the 
metaphysical systems spun by the schizoid would not prevent Aristotle from 
withholding him the designation noun еМюп. Kenneth Dover points out that 
noun ekliein (literally 'to have thought", in the text provisionally rendered 'to be 
of sound judgement") has semantic overlap with sôphronein ('to be moderate', 
'to have self-control'), and can so figure in opposition with mania.9 In general, 
"Greek lacked words which meant 'sane' or 'normal' in the purely clinical 
sense but did not also denote virtue or intelligence contrasted with vice or 
stupidity well within the limits of clinical normality. Morally shameless 
3
 Omitting ê with the Revised Oxford Translation 
* The argument is this If someone 'supposes' something good to be bad, and therefore thinks that he 
ought not to do it, but, on account of akrasta, still does it, the outcome would be good Therefore, 
aphrosunê + akrasta = virtue 
5
 This means that those who are morbid on account of madness need not be "incapable of reasoning and 
only living by perception [alogtstoi kat monon têt atsthêsei zontas]" (See Sophocles, Ajax 40, dtislogiston) 
These properties therefore seem only to apply to the first category mentioned at EN 1149a9-10, that of the 
brutish 
6
 I am not so sure whether Sherman (1989), pp 106-7, is right m opposing the aphrosunê of ЕЕ 1214Ы0-1 
to the virtue of temperance or »aphrosunê (In the fragmentary and corrupt eighth book of the Eudemtan 
Ethics the term aphron and its related adverbial form are used in opposition with phronèsis (ЕЕ 1246b6-7, 
18,1247al3-21)) Yet the term may have the predominantly nonmoral and noncommittal connotation of 
'stupidity' The opposition aphrôn-phrommos has a moral slant at ЕЕ 1236a4-5 (cf ЕЕ 1239ЫЗ), but a more 
neutral sense of the same opposition may be distilled from comparing DA 410b5 (aphronestaton) with Met 
1000ЬЗ-4 (hètton phrontmon ton alian) (for phrommos see Met 980b21-2,1009Ь28-ЗЭ) 
7
 But see also Rh 1378al0-2, where aphrosunê is adduced as an explanation for 'not believing rightly' (otik 
orthôs ¡loxazousm) 
8
 Hicks, ad loc, lists aphrosunê as contrary of phronêsts Doxa, of course, may be either true or false [DA 
428al9, £Nllllb33,11Э9Ы7-8,1142Ы1) 
' Dover (1974), ρ 128 In Xenophon we find an opposition between the virtue of sôphrosunê and its 
degeneration into manta, Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1116 
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behaviour, carried to an abnormal point, could be treated as evidence of 
insanity."10 
An anthology of the sparse lines on the topic would situate Aristotle well 
within the confínes of this current of thought But for the testimony already 
reclaimed, it would include, for instance, the remarks invoking untempered 
libido as an explanation for some cases of insanity, in combination with the 
thought-silencing pleasure involved in sexual gratification (EN 1147al5-7; 
1152Ы6-8). Sexual gratification, however, as well as other pleasures of the 
body, are among the necessities of human life (EN 1147b25-8), provided they 
are enjoyed moderately, in the right way (has dei) (EN 1154Ы5-8). That is, as 
sôphrosunê, or temperance, ordains. Insanity, then, seems to be both a product 
and a manifestation of 'weak' intemperance. 
3. A methodological note in the treatise De generatione et corrupHone seems 
to fix the insane's ailment at the very level of his wishes.11 Aristotle ridicules 
the attitude of the Eleaucs toward method in natural philosophy, claiming that 
they base their theories on a lopsided and unwarranted reliance on 
ratiocination. Departing from a preconception that one should 'follow reason' 
(toi iogôi akoloutheiri) (GC 325al4-5), they leave their arguments unsupported by 
and contrary to what perception points out to us (huperbantes tên aisthêsin kai 
paridontes autên).12 This Eleatic aberration invites comparison with lunatics: 
Moreover, while these things are thought [dokei] to follow where the arguments are concerned 
[epi ton logon], believing [to doxazan] that this is the case where the things themselves are 
concerned [ept ton pragmatôn] nearly resembles madness [montai]; for no madman is so 
displaced [exestanai] that he believes [doketn] fire and ice to be one,13 but only things which are 
fine and things which appear so [ta phatnomena] on account of habitual disposition [dia 
sunêthaan] - these thmgs are believed [dotó] by some people not to differ on account of 
madness [dia ten maman]. (GC 325al8-23) 
This passage is important for a number of reasons. In the first place, the 
category of the mad, or the insane, is here treated as first and foremost a moral 
category; this dovetails neatly with the findings so far recorded. Although the 
term boulêsis does not occur, it is fairly clear, from the formula of its intentional 
object, that the locus of the insanity is to be sought in the contents of vrishes. 
Further, the cause (dia) for moral corruption is sunêtheia, or a settled disposition 
engendered by habituation; and we have already seen that the education of 
10
 Dover (1974), ρ 127 However, the particular instance of the expression found at DA 429a6 points to a 
more neutral use of the term in Aristotle 
"Seech 2section3 
1 2
 It is perhaps no coincidence that Aristotle mentions ice and fire for examples in the De generatione et 
corruphone text, for elsewhere he says that it is exactly because of the fact that Parmerudes 'looked more' 
or 'better' (mallon Мерен) than his fellow morusts that he, 'forced by the phatnomena', posited two 
principles 'according to perception' (kata tên aistiiêsiri), viz. the contraries hot and cold, in defiance of his 
theoretical conclusions (Met 986b27-987al) However, looking at the things themselves is not by Aristotle 
considered part of dialectic (SE 165a6-9) 
« Cf APo 76Ы8-9 (eh 1 section 8) 
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wish is a matter of inculcating the right habits (Pol 1334b8-28). It is for this 
reason that argument is thought to remain ineffectual (EN 1179Ы6-8). 
Finally, the text connects doxazem, or believing, with the intentional 
objects of wish.14 The text clearly has a dialectical import, inasmuch as it 
imposes methodological constraints on prepossessed argumentativeness: it 
mocks an exaggerated confidence in its accomplishments. This is the reason 
why the matter is treated at the level of belief: the insane, Aristotle says, believe 
there to be no difference between what is noble or what merely appears to be 
so. The lunatic's defect, therefore, is described in terms of a misconception, at 
the level of belief, of the object of wish - a misconception which is, apparently, 
hermetically impermeable as far as rational persuasion is concerned (ЕЕ 
1214b31). 
What is at stake in this rebuke of Eleatic procedure is the rationality of 
the procedure by which a belief about principles is arrived a i The madman is 
ahead of the monist in that he does not suffer from over-sophistication. He is 
more to be trusted because he is unlikely to be taken in by the charms of 
argument where he has other, more efficient and appropriate means of arriving 
at judgement 
Now belief is a disposition, whereas 'what appears' (perceptually)15 in 
virtue of the faculty of phantasia is a transient or episodic mental state. Aristotle 
constructs a disarmingly simple example which serves to prise the two apart in 
such a peremptory manner that its popularity seems undiminished. It is 
possible to have a true belief to the effect that the sun is larger than the 
inhabited world, while enjoying an appearance of it as if it were one foot across 
(DA 428b2-4; Insom 458b29;'6 460Ы8).17 Notably, Aristotle uses the verb 
pistetiein to express the believing, echoing two previous arguments against an 
identification between belief and phantasia (DA 428al8-24).18 Belief requires 
conviction (pistis), and the latter requires 'having been persuaded' (to 
pepeisthai). It is implied that beliefs buttressed by conviction are lost (the 
disjunction is exclusive) either by forgetfulness or a change of mind effected by 
persuasion (DA 428b6-7). 
The distinction between belief and phantasia recurs in a context in which 
wish looms large: 
For the object of desire, Le. the object of wish [to orekton kai boulêton],19 is either the good or 
what appears good [to phatnomenon agathon]. That is why [dtho] the pleasant also is an object of 
desire; for it is something which appears good; for some believe [it is good] [fois men dokei], 
14
 We need not be disturbed by the fact that there is only mention of 'the noble' or 'the fine' (to Шоп) and 
its counterfeits, for in other passages Aristotle treats these as interchangeable with or equivalent to the 
standard formula, see Met 1072a27-8 (cf E£ 1235b25-7) 
1 5
 That it is perceptual perhaps receives confirmation from Top 131b25-30, in particular b27 
1 61 cannot make sense of the fact that Anstotle does not use phametat, but dokei here 
1 7
 Hume, Treatise, appendix, ρ 632 "'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses, 
and makes us imagine, that an object at twenty foot distance seems even to the eye as large as one of the 
same dimensions at ten " 
"Seech 7 
19
 The absence of a definite article preceding boulêton indicates that the km at line Ь25 should be treated 
explicatively 
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whereas to others it appears [to be so] even when they do not beheve it [fois de phalnetai kan me 
dokâ]; for phantasm and belief are not in the same [part] of the soul. (ЕЕ 1235b25-9) 
In some cases belief and phantasia, so to say, telescope. By this I mean to 
say no more than that belief does not discount for error; it yields its autonomy. 
As Aristotle puts it in his treatise on dreams, sometimes belief says that what is 
seen (to horômenon) is false, at other times it is 'fettered and follows' (katekhetai 
kai akoloiitliei) the actual dream (tôt phantasmati) (Insom 459a7-8). The point of 
much moral perversion is, then, that what phainetai is not checked, but 
uncritically followed by doxa. 
It is not so much the case, then, that the insane are intellectually 
incapacitated. Their specific affliction rather consists in a misappreciation of the 
deliverances of phantasia, which faculty has not been properly educated by 
habits from childhood on. They do have beliefs, but these beliefs are grounded 
in a, so to speak, omnipotent phantasia holding sway over their psychology. 
4. This receives confirmation from another side. Aristotle's paraphrase of 
'phenomenal' Protagoreanism in Metaphysics Г 5 is cast in the terms of 
(in)sanity also found in the relevant lines of the Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle refers 
to madness in terms of the verb paraphronein, 'to be deranged' or 'to be 
delirious', having obvious affinities with apfirosunê. Besides, there is the 
opposition with the noun ekhôn and the company of the diseased, designated by 
the same term (kamneiri). It is worth quoting Aristotle's version of the argument 
Similarly, the truth about the things which appear [hi peri ta phainomena alêtheia] has come to 
some from perceptible things [ek ton aisthêtôn]. For they hold that it is not appropriate to 
discriminate what is true by means of large or small numbers, but the same thing is believed to 
be sweet by some who taste it, to others bitter, so that if all were ill or all insane \parephronoitn], 
but two or three healthy and sane [noun eikhon], they would beheve the latter to be ill or insane, 
but not the others. (Met 1009a38-b6) 
Aristotle points out that this scepticism is due to a concoction of two 
mistaken presuppositions: an erroneous identification (reduction) of thinking 
with (to) perception, and of the latter with bodily modification (alloiósis) (Met 
1009a38-bl5).20 Truth is automatically transmitted according to an assumption 
of transitivity, necessarily (ex anankês) yielding the truth of 'what appears 
according to perception' (phainomenon kata tên aisthêsin). For Aristotle, 
perception of the special perceptibles, a type of alteration, is necessarily true 
(DA 418al2; 427Ы1-2; 428all-2; 430b29; Sens 442b8-9; Met 1010b2; 15-26).2i 
2 0
 The term for thinking Anstotle uses in this connection is phronèsis However, I do not beheve it is 
correct to render the term (as Kirwan does) with a view to the virtue of practical wisdom treated of in the 
sixth book of the Ntcomacltean Ftlucs, see Kirwan (1993), ρ 108 Aristotle clearly places the term m a more 
historical context See also DA 404a27-b6/ GC 315Ы0-2 
21
 There is, of course, the troublesome DA 428Ы8-9, where this eo ipso truth is relativized What is more, 
he considers special perception to be a bodily modification The qualification Vaia tên aisthêsin, then, is in 
this connection far from redundant, for phamomeim do not depend for their occurrence on actual 
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Aristotle impugns the phenomenal sceptics by rejoining, ad hominem, 
that they themselves grant the existence of qualitative differences between 
conflicting phainomena, both on the interpersonal and, diachronically, on the 
intra-personal level. For the sceptic himself famously betrays the ultimate 
incoherence of his position by his deeds: 
Further, one may duly wonder if they are perplexed [aporousi\ by this, whether magnitudes and 
colours are such as they appear \phainetm] to those at a distance or to those who are near, and 
such as to those who are healthy or to those who sick, and whether things [appear] heavier to 
those who are weak or to those who are strong, and true those things which [appear] to those 
who are asleep or awake. It is apparent that they do not think so; at least, then, nobody, when 
he by night supposes \hupolabêi\ to be m Athens, while being [actually] m Libya, sets off for the 
Odeon. (Met 1010ЬЗ-11) 
In the previous chapter (Met Г 4) the evident fact of someone exhibiting 
care not to walk into wells or precipices is taken to reveal an actual 
discriminating between what is good and what is not that is, in the field of 
action at least not everything that appears is equally taken as good (Met 
1008Ы2-27). The reconstruction of wish from action (Rh 1392Ы9-20), then, is 
accorded pride of place in Aristotle's overall strategy to combat the sceptics. 
Their actions themselves do not bear out their stance, and they do not because 
they are not really convinced (pepeistnenoi ouk eist) (Met 1011al0-l). By 
implication, they cannot be said to truly believe what they say.22 
It is not amiss to note that the GC passage follows the same strategy 
against the Eleatics.23 The insane's deficiencies infect moral response and 
evaluation. Hence, when Aristotle says that the madman's affliction traps him 
into believing, not that fire and ice are one,24 but that there is no difference 
between what is noble and what appears to be so (GC 325a22-3), he does not 
point to a belief with an embedded clause to the effect that 'There is no 
difference between к and j(k)'. Aristotle's lunatic is not the moral cousin of the 
phenomenal sceptic. 
The madman's belief Aristotle has in mind is not a reflective belief; it is a 
belief we may impute to him by way of a reconstruction of his wishes,mediated 
by an interpretation of his actions, or as to what he does or does not construe as 
noble. The upshot is that the madman's predicament is, from a dialectical point 
perception, as is the case in dreams, hallucinations etc At 1 b9 Anstotle has kata tên aisthêsm dokem, 
human beings do not always believe the same things according to perception 
22
 Belief in the stnct sense, as analysed at DA 428al9-24, requires conviction (pisfts), and conviction 
requires 'having been convinced' or 'persuaded' (to pepeistliai), perfect tense 
25
 Pragma is frequently found in opposition with linguistic items like logos or onoma, especially in the 
Organon, see Cat 4a34-6, Ь8-9, 14Ы8-22, DI ІбаЗ-«, 18Ь37-8, 19аЗЗ, Тор 110а16-7, SE 165а7-9, 174а7-в, 
175а8-9 See also RA 1359Ы5-6 (also Met 1051b2, EN 1171а13-4, for the expression ерг ton pragmatôn). But 
although pragma in Anstotle usually means something like 'thing' or 'fact', 1 conjecture that in this 
particular context we should respect its roots m the verb prattein This parentage, shared by the technical 
term for action, praxis, perhaps becomes most clear from the discussion of the 'action' of a tragedy (Poet 
1450al5-23) - but it is also found in the Nicomachean Ethics, where it sometimes stands in for praxis (EN 
1105b5) Compare EN П26Ы1-2 with 1108all, for both points argued for in this note If we translate 
'fact' here, we miss the point of Anstotle's argument, which deploys the weapon wielded in the 
refutation of phenomenal scepticism 
2 4
 For Oneness' and indiscnmination see e g Met 1006Ы5-7,1007M8-20 
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of view, exactly the reverse of that of the phenomenal sceptic. On the 
assumption that action is the ultímate test of belief, then, in a way, the madman 
unknowingly and unreflectingly lives a moral version of the sceptic's position, 
whereas the self-appointed phenomenal sceptic, because his belief is reflective 
in the wrong way, is debarred from enacting the scepticism he professes. 
Scepticism, as a philosophical position, requires reflection, but insanity 
excludes it - at least, where the ends of action are concerned. The insane's 
beliefs are fettered by the objects of wish as they appear. The sceptic's beliefs, 
qua sceptic, are not Their scope, however, is ill-defined: his assumption that 
thinking and (one type of) perception are identical conspires with a narrow 
focus on perceptual phainomena to yield a fundamentally incoherent stance. It 
leaves action out of the picture to the detriment of his creed. 
Aristotle's compressed statement of the argument leaves room for more 
than one interpretation,25 but I take it that he is not talking about 
somnambulant itineraries through the Libyan desert26 He presumably means 
to say that, upon awakening, nobody actually sets about strolling to the Odeon, 
despite believing (hupolambanein) oneself to be in Athens. 
In my translation, I have italicized 'perplexed' for the following reason: 
being perplexed, as we shall have occasion to see,27 is indecision about what to 
do or to believe,28 regardless of the consequences of the resulting inertia (Top 
145Ы6-20). On several accounts, it entails paralysis of discursive thought 
(dianoia) (Met 995a30; EN 1146a24-5) engendered by an equilibrium of 
competing claims to truth. Aristotle seems to be saying that such a paralysis of 
thinking does not take place, since the truth-claim of what has appeared and 
what was believed in the dream withers away in the face of conscious 
reflection.29 
Aristotle's use of the generic verb hupolambanein, the verb corresponding 
to the noun (hupolêpsis) for the genus of doxa,30 is telling. As we have seen, 
belief, for Aristotle, entails an exclusive commitment to some sort of 
proposition. This emerges from his remarks about Heraclitus, in the course of 
which Aristotle makes the point that one and the same person cannot 
simultaneously hold contrary beliefs (Met 1005b23-32).31 In the Odeon example 
Aristotle seems to point to the state of affairs, already alluded to, described in 
his treatise on dreams, where belief and what appears are in unison (Insom 
458M0-5). There is a commitment here. 
The force of Aristotle's argument resides precisely in the following fact 
For someone to be perplexed, on Aristotle's own notion of aporia, it is necessary 
« See Kirwan (1993), ρ 109-10 
2 6
 Which seems to be the reading forced into the text by one of the MSS 
г?Inch 7 
2 8
 Indecision to believe something should not be taken too literally, especially in connection with 
perceptual beliefs, see Bernard Williams' essay 'Deciding to Believe', in Williams (1973), p p 148-9 
29
 I use this metaphor to do justice to the fact that it sometimes takes some time before the credibility 
da ims of a dream have been completely eradicated 
30 DA 427b24-6 Compare Insom 458Ы-3 with Mem 449b24 
3 1
 See also the rhetorical question at Met 1008Ы0-2 "And if one hupolambanet nothing, but thinks it 
equally so and not so, in what respect would his state be different from that of plants?" 
// 
to have an integrative, higher-order belief to the effect that rival options pull 
one in different, or downright opposite directions. To experience a state of 
perplexity, therefore, already requires the proto-reflective stance of doubt Even 
when, in particular circumstances, some phainomena are believed by us to be 
true, that is, are positively underwritten with assent, this does not mean that we 
do not have the power to retract them. Upon awakening, coming to ourselves, 
we experience bewilderment, relief, or disappointment when we find out that 
'it was only a dream'. And this entails that we have beliefs about beliefs, 
namely, that the belief we had in our dream was false.32 There is, however, no 
perplexity. We just do not walk to the Odeon. So the sceptic does not even 
withhold judgement in this case. 
5. Let us now hark back to the passage quoted in the penultimate section, 
in which Aristotle wedges apart the faculties of phantasia and doxa (ЕЕ 1235b25-
9). The importance of this passage cannot be stressed enough. It finally reveals 
what is wrong with both (Г), the equation of phainomena and endoxa, and the 
extended version we encountered in the preceding chapter (section 3). In the 
case of ethical (and therefore practical) first principles, (I) spoils, or even 
obscures, the view on Aristotle's developmental psychology. Let us see why 
this should be so. 
We have seen that the right paideia consists (partly) in conditioning by 
means of the inculcation of habits, 'immediately from youth on' (euthns ek neon), 
in order to direct pleasure and pain to the right objects (EN 1104Ы1-3; cf. Pol 
1334b23). The reason why we should first instruct by habits, and subsequently 
by argument, is taken to mirror the fact that, in a human being, the conative 
predates the rational (Pol 1334b8-28). 
Aristotle's teleologica! explanation of animal behaviour revolves around 
the generic conative concept of desire (orexis), encompassing the species temper 
(thumos), appetite (epithumia), and wish (boulêsis) (DA 414b2; MA 700b22; ££ 
1225b24-6). The last is only found in humans; the others are part of animal 
nature in general. 
As a rule, Aristotle describes the object of desire (to orekton) by an 
exclusive disjunction which is intended to cover all options available to action: 
it is (in the case of wish) 'either the good or what appears good' (ê to agathon ê to 
phainomenon agathon), or (in the case of appetite) 'either pleasant or what 
appears to be pleasanf (ê hêdu ê phainomenon hêdu).33 As we have seen, not 
every type of good (and, presumably, apparent good) stirs to action, but only 
the 'practical' good (to prakton agathon) (DA 433a29-30; Ы5; MA 700b25-6). Part 
of the meaning of 'practical' here is to be understood as what is practicable by 
us (EN 1112a30-l; b27-33). 
Ω Donald Davidson, 'Rational Animals', in LePore & McLaughlin (1985), pp 478-480 
33 DA 433a28-9, FN 1113al5-6, 2 3 4 E£ 1235b25-7, 1236a9-10, Top 146b36-147a4, Ph 195a25-6, Met 
1013a27-8, Rh 1369Ы8-29 See also EN Ш4а31-2,1155Ь25-6, Юі 1369a2->, MA 700b28-9 (with Top 146b36-
147a4) We shall put treatment of the object of the third species of desire, thumos, on ice until section 9 
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In the fact that to have a phainomenon is a function of phantasia, which is, 
like all three species of desire, with us from birth on, the bones of an 
explanation begin to shine through (EN 1114a32-b3; £E 1235b26-9). According 
to Aristotle, we have the capacity to experience phainomena before we have the 
faculty of belief (to doxastikon) (Pol 1334b22-5; EN 1139all-4; 1140b25-28). Belief 
concerned with what is good, then, ultimately goes back to the intentional 
object of wish, which may be invaded by that of appetite: for the pleasant is 
'what appears good' (ЕЕ 1235b26-7; EN ШЗаЗЗ-bl).3 4 The education of desire, 
then, is, in a way, tied to the cultivation of phantasia - preparing the arrival of 
reason. 
By equating 'what phainetai' to 'having a doxa', then, the extended 
version of (I), when plotted onto the Eudemian Ethics passage excluding 
children, the diseased, and the insane, obliterates the vital point that these 
groups still live in the limbo of an earlier phase of moral development That is 
why Aristotle calls 'followers of the affections' 'youthful in respect of character' 
(EN 1095a7). We should give phainetai the significance and emphasis it 
deserves. 
Let us now turn to the second part of the chapter, that concerned with 
wish and the imagination. 
6. Wishes may be either dispositional or occurrent,35 general or particular.36 
Aristotle recognises what I call 'ineffectual' wishes; one type of these are, for 
instance, wishes which do issue in a decision to act or an intention, but are 
nevertheless not acted on. The wishes of akratic persons fall under this head. 
Another type is what are usually called 'idle' wishes.37 Typically, these are 
wishes for what one believes, or knows, to be impossible. Someone may wish, 
for instance, to be another person than he or she is - without, of course, deciding, 
like Don Quijote, to pursue its fulfilment (cf. EN ШІЬгв-ЗО).38 Or one can, like 
Ovid's Narcissus, wish to reconquer a past longing for something one turns out 
to have possessed all along - vellem, quod atnamus, abesset!.. (Metani Ш. 468). The 
immediate impracticability of some wishes provides us with grounds to think 
that a boulêsis is a "desire for something at a distance".39 In English, 'desire' 
connotes more direct ties to action than 'wish'. 
This distance is not necessarily a distance in place. For the object of 
Narcissus' desire is spatially continuous, not to say identical, with his own 
body - quod cupio, mecum est (Metam Ш.466) - and the desire, which is the object 
of the wish, is wretchedly locked up with it in the same bit of space. Neither 
need it be a distance in time. Sitting on the edge of my armchair I can ardently 
wish my favourite football team to win, well aware of the fact that there is no 
3 4
 Unfortunately, Aristotle does not explain how this invasion occurs. 
»Sherman (1989),
 P P 33-4 
3 6
 See ch 2 section 9 
3 7
 For the term 'idleness', see Plato's Laws, 742e4 
3 8
 See the piece on Cervantes in Javier Manas' Vida del fantasma, Manas (1995) 
3 9
 Broadie (1991), ρ 106 However, Anstotle seems to allow for 'immediate' wishes as well, and he uses 
such wishes to distinguish wish from reasoned choice (FF 1226b3-4) 
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way of manipulating the result of the match (EN llllb23-4). If 'we' win, this 
does not detract from the idleness of my wish. 
In Aristotle's philosophy of action the characteristic function of a wish is 
to trigger a process of deliberation, the task of which it is to scan possible ways 
of traversing the distance. Ultimately, when ways are identified and conceived 
or perceived as possible, there may follow a deliberate choice to carry it out 
Boulêsis, then, in the words of one commentator, is the general 'rational desire 
for the good' which is the starting-point for deliberation.40 
7. The prevailing practice governing treatments of Aristotelian wish is to 
review it under the aegis of deliberative rationality. As a matter of fact, in the 
Rlietoric wish is set apart from 'alogical' species of desire by the differentia 
logistikê (Rh 1369a2). The conceptual character of this tie seems to be 
underwritten by a recapitulatory enumeration, immediately afterward, of 
possible causes of action, in which wish is substituted by, and made equivalent 
to, reasoning (Rh 1369a6-7). 
By the same token, (inconclusive) evidence from the Topics, imbued with 
residual tripartite psychology of Plato's Republic, locates 'every7 wish in the 
reasoning faculty (Top 126al3).41 And, the last remains of this psychology 
having been cleared away in the De anima, wish is unambiguously connected 
with the faculty of reasoning or deliberation (logismos, ¡ogtstikon) (DA 432b5; 
433a22-5). This would seem to clinch the matter - if it were not for some 
counterindications. 
First, in the De anima the universal quantificator holding sway in the 
Topics example has been dropped. At the surface level the text offers some 
interpretive leeway: movement according to deliberation is made conditional 
on movement according to wish, but not vice versa (DA 433a23-5). 
Secondly, the 'alogical' part of the human soul, described as "the 
appetitive part and, in general, the desiderative part" (to epithumêtikon km holds 
orektikon), is said to 'have logos' inasmuch as it is subservient to the part which 
essentially has it (EN 1102b30; cf. 1095al0). As so often in Aristotle, the term 
holôs marks the subsumption of species under a genus.42 By way of this 
construction, there seems to be no intrinsic link between wish and deliberation. 
Quite the contrary appears to be the case: for it is strongly suggested that wish, 
over time, becomes amenable to reason. 
Incidentally, for instance when he takes up the developmental 
perspective in the Politics passage just cited, Aristotle disconnects wish and 
« Irwin (1988), ρ 337 
4 1
 In terms of this tripartite psychology, wish cannot be the genus of friendship, because the latter 
belongs to the appetitive part Cf Rh 1380b35-1381al 
4 2
 What we have here is a truncated form of a device quite common in Aristotle It has the form τ, y, ζ, 
holôs G, the listed items are subsumed under a genus, see e g EN 1095b5, APr 32b7,12, Ph 210Ы6-24, Top 
105al5 Nussbaum & Putnam (1992), ρ 44, ad DA 403a7 It is too adventurous, however, to conclude 
that subsumption is invariably meant, one of the passages induced by Putnam and Nussbaum (Met 
1026a2-3) actually undermines their interporetation, since it refers, strictly speaking, to the relation of 
part to whole 
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deliberation; the unreasoning part (to alogori) of the soul, including all three 
species of desire, is chronologically prior to the reasoning part (to logon ekhon). 
It is, so he says, an evident fact that all three species of desire are present in 
children (huparkhei tots paidiois) from birth on. The acquisition of reasoning and 
thought, for which human beings are naturally disposed, follows suit upon 
advancement (Pol 1334b20-5; cf. ЕЕ 1224a24-30; 1226b21-2). 
It should not, however, be thought that this emergence is unconnected 
with the education of desire; the latter takes place 'for the sake of the former 
(Pol 1334b25-8). A child does have the deliberative faculty (to bouleutikon), but 
in an 'unfulfilled' or 'imperfecf form (áteles) (Pol 1260al2-3). 'Unfulfilled' 
presumably means 'dependent1: it lacks the power of autonomous prescription, 
but is 'relative to' that of the person to whose authority he is subjected. This 
entails that a child, like the slave, is capable of understanding and obeying, in 
action, parental admonitions, criticisms or reproaches, and exhortations - or, in 
short, the wishes of other persons (Pol 1260a31-3; b5-7; 1254b22-4; EN 1102b30-
ИОЗаЗ; Ш9ЫЗ-5): 
the appetitive and, in general, the desiderative part partake of reason in a certain sense, in so 
far as it listens to it and obeys it; in this way, then, we say that we respect [ekhan logon] our 
father and our friends, and not like we respect our mathematicians.43 (EN 1102b3O-3) 
The readiness to execute another's wishes, not from fear of punishment, 
but from respect is, as I shall elaborately argue in the next chapter, an effluence 
of that natural endowment we call shame (cf. EN 1179bll). I claim that 
Aristotle is here gesturing towards nothing other than the mental phenomenon 
of internalisation, which will play a large part in the next chapters. 
8. The Politics passage is not a solitary lapse. There is other testimony 
which affords us a richer view of Aristotelian wish, unhampered, in principle, 
by any ties to deliberation, thus sacrificing classificatory rigour to psychological 
realism. In this section, my specific purpose is to isolate wish from deliberation 
and deliberative action so as to show up the close links binding up Aristotelian 
wish and the imagination. 
The isolation is quite easily effected. Wishful action constitutes a 
subclass of the voluntary (to hekoasion); it is possible to act voluntarily without 
wishing to do so, as is the case in akratic action. Yet there is a huge class of 
sudden actions44 which we perform 'wishingly' (boulomenoi) and therefore 
voluntarily, but which do not involve deliberate choice (££ 1224al-4; 1226b30-
43
 Contrary to most accepted interpretations of ton mathêmatikôn, I believe Aristotle means persons, not 
mathematical objects What he wants to make clear is the difference m the respect we have for our 
father's and fnends' characters, or their integral personalities (which, of course, may very well include 
mathematical brilliance), as opposed to the respect we can have for a brilliant mind (which does not 
exclude contempt for the character of the same subject) 
44
 Stnctly speaking, children do not perform actions, since full-blooded action involves logtsmos, which 
they lack (ЕЕ 1224a28-39) Interestingly, Aristotle elsewhere denies action to animals, not to children, on 
the ground that perception on its own does not make for action (EN 1139al9-20) 
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6).45 Accordingly, given the conceptual bonds of the latter with deliberation, 
these actions are not deliberate (aprobouleuta) (EN 1112al4-6; 1135b8-ll). 
Imagination enters into the picture as follows. 'Nobody wishes' for 
something unless that something is somehow conceived as good, no matter 
whether the object is possible or impossible (Rh 1369аЗ-4; ЕЕ 1223b32-3). 
Aristotle exploits idle wishes (e.g. for immortality) to distinguish wish from 
deliberate choice (EN llllb20-6). But whereas he says that 'nobody 
deliberates'46 about things eternal, solstices, luck, climatic vicissitudes, or the 
way the Scythians organize their polity, in short, about things which are not 
(taken to be) in our power (EN 1112a21-30; 1141Ы0-1), he does not say, nor 
imply, that it is foolish or insane to wish for such things. It is, for instance, 
normal to wish for well-being, although we tragically lack the slightest bit of 
control over certain of its essential ingredients: luck (EN llllb28-30; 1099a31-
Ь8).47 
Nothing in what Aristotle says shows that he considers idle wishes 
illegitimate or unwelcome inhabitants of our psychology. What would be foolish 
is 'deliberately choosing' what is impossible, 'while knowing' (eidotes) it to be 
so (ЕЕ 1225b33-4). Of course, one, but only one, crucial way of coming to know 
about the idleness of a wish of mine is by fruitless deliberation (EN 1112b24-6), 
but then again, this awareness need not grow from confrontation with my sad 
Sisyphean record of abortive deliberations. However that may be, I can (and 
often do) wish to find a treasure, but as long as I forgo deliberating how to go 
about it, there is no reason for Aristotle to call me a cretin. 
The importance of Aristotle's acknowledgement and acceptance of the 
idle wish lies in its connection with the imagination and its standing apart from 
action. This calls for a modification, or rather, a refinement of Aristotle's 
motivational theory. On his 'official' account, which aims at the teleologica! 
explanation of behaviour, desire is 'prepared' by pivintasia (MA 702al7-9); this in 
itself already amounts to an implicit assignment of some part to the 
imagination. The idle wish, however, is especially revelatory of another rôle for 
the imagination in wish, and it will turn out that this rôle is best studied on the 
neglected species of desire, temper. 
An occurrence of the wish summons up my imagining myself finding a 
treasure, that is, my imagining my wish fulfilled; and because there is no 
perspective of its realization, the (surrogate) pleasure it evokes is not the 
pleasure of anticipation.48 It is directed at the imagined state of affairs. All 
45
 Both children and non-human animals partake of the encompassing class of voluntary actions, but not 
of reasoned choice (EN UllbS-lO), this, however, does not mean that children cannot or do not act 
according to wish 
46
 The reference of the deliberative 'nobody' has previously been emptied of fools and madmen, thus 
leaving behind the assembly of persons of, as I provisionally render it, 'sound judgement' (noun ekhontes) 
(EN 1112al9-21) Thus we should read 'nobody' as 'no person of sound judgement' (Top 104a5-6) 
47
 For example, we are completely powerless when we loose a good child or friend (EN 1099b5-6), such 
ill-fortune is at least partially constitutive of eiuiatmoma What does rank as a sign of folly is to say that 
one 'deliberately chooses' immortality (¿N ]lllb20-3), and presumably so because it betrays a cast of 
mind not merely prone to fuzzy semantics (EN llllb20-3, 28-30) 
48
 We should be careful not to mistake these operations of the imagination for deliberation, although 
deliberations may very well play a part in them 
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through the duration of the mental state I am aware, but not articulately, that I 
shall never even attempt to act on, or out, the wish. It is embedded, or 
bracketed by belief, or knowledge, and it introduces itself in this way. The 
idleness of the wish is, so to say, stamped all over the imagery representing its 
fulfilment. The pleasure involved in the pseudo-fulfilment of vainglorious 
basking in self-aggrandising fancy, like that of the erotic daydream, tends to 
entrench the wish deeper and deeper in the dispositional reaches of my life.49 
Given the constraints of deliberative feasibility Aristotle imposes on the 
wish, the boulêsis figuring in accounts of practical reasoning is a purified 
extract; it is a wish which is conditioned by and which conditions in turn, our 
deliberating i t On this supposition Aristotle can appeal to the introspective 
state of affairs, shared by his audience, that we can, in some way, identify our 
idle wishes. Out of the whole assembly of wishes making up an individual 
mind Aristotle is concerned to sort out an upper crust; he countenances the 
residue, but it does not seem to interest him. Impoverished though the resulting 
picture of our moral life may be from the perspective of descriptive 
psychology, practical efficacy of a rational kind is best ministered to by the 
wish which is deliberatively feasible. 
9. Sir David Ross, in his acclaimed 1923 introduction to Aristotle's thought, 
describes the interactions of phantasia and desire (orexis) under the chapter 
heading 'Psycholog)/: "But thought and imagination set us in movement by the 
object of desire, so that there is really only one faculty that sets us in movement, 
viz. that of desire. Desire, however, is of two kinds, wish or rational desire, 
which desires the good, and appetite or irrational desire, which desires the 
apparent good... Desire is thus the cause of movement But desire presupposes 
imagination of good and pleasure to be attained - imagination which may be 
calculative (i.e. deliberative) or merely sensitive."50 
It is tedious to try to find fault with every impropriety occasioned by the 
synoptic spirit of an introduction. Yet there are two, or three, points in the 
paraphrasis which I want to exploit - but not more than that The first is the fact 
that Ross says that there are two not three kinds of desire. This inaccuracy is too 
patent not to arouse suspicion. In virtue of the fact that Ross, in this particular 
passage, comments on the De anima account of motion, in which the third 
species is merely mentioned and not expatiated on (DA 432b6), this lapse is 
excusable. Nevertheless, as we shall see, what is an excusable lapse in Ross has 
been caught in its own dynamics of institutionalisation. 
This takes us to the intertwined second and third points, concerning the 
terms 'presupposes' and 'imagination'. Needless to say, the latter term is Ross' 
rendition of phantasia. We should dwell upon these terms for a brief instant 
A concerted assault on the wide-ranging array of functions and 
manifestations of phantasia found in Aristotle is ways beyond my present scope; 
4
' In the nexl chapters I shall draw a picture of how a dispositional wish may conspire with shame m 
curtailing appetite 
50
 I quote from the recently published paperback edition (1995), ρ 150 
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as announced, I shall concentrate on its part in conation.51 First, however, a 
pilot paragraph serving as a gloss on 'presupposes'. Its concern is, 
unsurprisingly, with motivation. 
Aristotle is quite insistent on the involvement of phantasia in animal 
movement in general, and in human action in particular. Desire is conditional 
upon pimntasia and it is so invariably (DA 432Ы5-6; 433a20-l).52 The faculty 
presents the subject with the final cause, the object, of the action. Much like in 
traditional psychological hedonism, pleasure accounts for the desire: something 
is perceived, thought of, or whatever, it is done so under the aspect of the 
pleasant (or its opposite), and the desire is there. This, by and large, is the view 
Ross ascribes to Aristotle (DA 428b3; MA 700M9-21; 702al7-9). 
The backbone of my argument is that the practical nature of ethics not 
only requires an account of how desire is aroused, but how desire, when 
aroused, motivates to action. We saw that the recipients come to ethics armoured 
with the right wish; so much can be presupposed. The question remains, 
however, why these wishes are reckoned to be acted upon. The wish to become 
a good person must in some way be capable of dealing with interfering 
appetite, which makes the akratic unfit for ethical inquiry.53 What is more, a 
wish not only motivates to action, but also to deliberation (EN 1139a31-3). Since 
a central rôle in my account is reserved for the imagination, we must first study 
its workings in Aristotelian conation. 
10. 'Imagination', as a translation of phantasia, may be outmoded, it certainly 
is not entirely inept We need not go through the pains of pointing out its close 
relationship to the verb phainesthai and of performing an autopsy on this term 
with the instruments developed by such philosophers as Chisholm and Austin. 
Others have done that in quite adequate and comprehensive way - with the 
result that 'imagination' has by now largely been supplanted by 'appearance'.54 
This translational practice has a peculiar causal efficacy. One of its 
consequences is that imagination tends to be ditched as a factor in motivation to 
action. This, in turn, cannot but mortgage any viable phenomenological 
treatment of wish. By this, I do not mean that wish (which, as noted, must 
definitionally contain phainomenon (Top 146b36-147a4)), in so far as it 
'presupposes imagination', may involve some 'merely' imagined good. 
Typically, I would venture to argue, since wish is, as we have seen, for 
91
 The view that there are intricale ties between the verb phainesthai and the faculty of phantasm is deeply 
embedded in exegesis See Ross (1995), ρ 147, Nussbaum (1978), pp 222-3, 242-4, cf. Schofield (1992), 
pp 250-1 
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 I agree with Nussbaum (1978), ρ 233, against Modrak (1987), p. 95, who sees a general instead of a 
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 Obviously, by 'action' I also intend acts of restraint 
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 Notably, Schofield, 'Aristotle on the Imagination', in Nussbaum and Rorty (1992), pp 249-256, esp ρ 
251nll, Nussbaum (1978), pp 241-255 
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something 'at a distance', it is for something yet to be realised or, for that 
matter, for something which cannot be realised at all (EN 1112Ы1-5). 
The problem with phainomencm may seem to be that its grammatical 
marker and its taking an object for a grammatical subject collude in boycotting 
imagination. It is something which phainetai to me, and this does not sit well 
with our intuition that imagination, in certain cases at least, is an activity. I can 
command my imaginatively unfolding a narrative in a way I cannot do this 
with dreaming. Aristotle, however, seems aware of this, for, as he revealingly 
says, "this affection \pathos] is in our power [eph' hêtnin], whenever we wish 
[hotan boulometìw]" (DA 42/Ы7-8). It is possible, then, to have an affection 
administered to oneself, if one wishes to. I take the brilliance of Aristotle's 
phrasing the matter exactly to lie in this: although there is a voluntariness to 
imagination which is absent from dreaming, or remembering, it does stop short 
of anarchy. We still are bound to repertoires to work from. 
In point of fact, I shall take this all for granted. As said, my primary 
interest is not this rôle of the imagination. I shall be rather concerned in the 
efficacy of one function of the imagination, which has a central feature in 
common with some of its other manifestations. This feature is called 'iconicity'. 
A word or two, then, on iconicity.55 Roughly, iconic mental states share 
three properties. The first concerns their intentionality. Iconic mental states are 
of events, narratives constructed on the interactions of its characters. The second 
attribute has to do with how intentionality is, so to speak, 'voiced', or the 
relationship between the intentionality and the subjectivity of mental states. 
They are, in one reckless word, represented. The third, and most consequential, 
characteristic is their psychic force. They have causal efficacy, and have this in 
virtue of the addition of both other properties. It will not come as a surprise 
that, paradigmatically, dreams and certain forms of imagination, notably, 
visualising, belong to this class. It should be kept in mind that visualising is not 
tantamount to 'thinking of myself seeing something'.56 Pieces of visualising, 
like dreams, are famously subject to an effortless shifting of viewpoints, either 
within the frames of the envisaged scene, but also overflowing them. 
Let us make clear the workings of an iconic mental state in connection 
with desire by means of an example. In the first act of Gluck's Orfeo the 
following scene unfolds. When, after Eurydice's funeral, Jove hears Orpheus' 
self-lacerating complaints, he sends Cupid to the cypress grove where Orpheus, 
left alone with his grief, reproaches the gods for taking his beloved away. The 
god of love is to communicate to Orpheus that the gods have seen fit to return 
Eurydice to him upon the following conditions. Orpheus is to descend into 
Hades and to placate the gods with his music, and, notoriously, he is not to set 
eye on her before they have left the underworld - if he gives in to temptation, 
Eurydice will be irrecoverably lost 
In Orpheus' recitative Che dissel che ascoltai! we behold his mounting 
faith, a crescendo of confidence, culminating in an unshakeable resolve, 
carrying him past doubt and fear. In a flurry of presaging distress and elation 
ω See Wollheim (1984), pp 624 
и
 Williams, 'Imagination and the Self', in Williams (1973), pp 26-45 
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he foresees Eurydice's anguish at his puzzling behaviour; his mere visualising 
it makes his blood congeal and his heart shudder: nel figurarlo solo/sento gelarmi 
il sangue/ tremarmi il cor... At the same time, however, it precipitates his 
resolution: Ma...lo potrò...lo voglio. 
Orpheus' soul is torn apart by, in his own words, a guerra d'affètti. The 
conflict between the desire to see his beloved and the desire to have her is 
representationally fought out in the aforementioned piece of imagination. It 
conveys to him the terrible costs of obeying the decree of the gods, which 
implies an excruciating thwarting of the short-term desire. Orpheus, therefore, 
imagines the force of his desire to see Eurydice, the agonies it will entail. Yet he 
does so from a point of view which can only be that of an Orpheus who is in 
the course of acting on the other. When he notices this, he knows that he can do 
it - and what he learns is that the other desire, expressed in his imagination, 
will give him the strength to endure the urges of the other. 
Orpheus' coming to grief need not be related. Yet his ruin, his 
inadequate estimation of the other pressures operative within him does not 
detract from the efficacy of his imagination. The whole project may have ended 
in disaster (the moralistic appendage of de' Calzabigi's libretto discounted) -
still, the single most important lesson we can draw from the foregoing is that 
the imagination is more than an accidental excrescence of desire. This is exactly 
what is borne out by a review of Aristotle's treatment of temper. 
11. What about the object of that third species of desire, omitted in Ross' 
relation of Aristotelian motivation, temper or thumosl In the standard thematic 
passages coping with desire, the emphasis is disputed between its two co-
specifics, and temper, although briefly mentioned for completeness' sake, is 
sadly consigned to oblivion (DA 432b6; MA 700b22). As a consequence, 
commentators generally consider it a matter of little account - a fact reflected in 
the tacit exegetical verdict of silence. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle does give it full attention, but he does so, so to 
speak, pseudonymously. Under its nom de plume anger (orge) it is dissected not 
in the De anima, nor in the De motu animalium, not even in those Rhetoric parts 
concerned with desire and related issues, but in the catalogue of the 'emotions' 
in the second book of that treatise (Rh 1369Ы1-5; 1373b35-8). 
In numerous places, temper and anger alternate as if they were 
synonyms. Of course, it is always dicey to maintain that two terms of 
Aristotle's technical apparatus are synonymous tout court - and I am not sure 
whether they are interchangeable in each and every context This hesitation, 
however, should not be taken to express a claim to the effect that the terms do 
not semantically intersect in any significant way; for it seems that they do up to 
the point of virtual synonymity. Depending on context, it may very well be the 
case that they can be treated, without qualms, as functionally equivalent, either 
on Aristotle's or on our part An inventory of the evidence, consigned to a 
86 
footnote, amply shows that they can in the relevant contexts, and that is all we 
need.57 
For present purposes, however, it is enough to stress two points 
attaching to the inclusion of two species of desire in Aristotle's lists of ta pathê 
tês psukiiês. First, it renders questionable 'emotions' as a translation for this 
term.581 shall therefore employ the traditional 'affections of the soul', or simply 
'affection', deriving from the Latin tradition. Secondly, it helps to shed some 
light on a manuscript reading of the Rhetoric definition of anger, which was 
condemned as a dittography by Spengel. Anger, Aristotle says, is59 
a desire [orexis] with pain for what appears \phainomenes] to be revenge because of what 
appears \phainomenen] to be a slight, committed by someone who is not fitted to, toward 
oneself or someone belonging to oneself. (Rh 1378a30-2) 
The phainomenês modifying 'revenge'60 should be retained for two 
interconnected reasons. First, forming part of the description of the object of the 
desire which anger or temper essentially is, it satisfies a constraint imposed on 
definitions of desires in general. And secondly, its presence turns out to vouch 
for an important phenomenological property of anger implied by the 
definition. The property which we are given the chance to study in anger is 
wholly absent from discussions of the other types of desires. If we are licensed 
to extend the analysis to wish (and I shall argue that we are), we can 
manoeuvre ourselves in a position from where to uncover a less one-
dimensional Aristotelian conception of motivation. We shall tackle these rather 
generally and elusively stated points in turn. 
12. One of the definitional topoi expounded in the Topics requires the 
differentia in virtue of which the various species of desires are distinguished, 
i.e. their objects, to contain a standard reference to the phainontenon-version of 
that object "for often those who desire [tons oregomenous] do not notice what is 
good or pleasant, so that it is not necessarily good or pleasant, but only 
phainomenon" (Top 147a2-4). This is one of the passages signalled, not 
57
 The evidence (inconclusive) Top 113a35-b3, 126al0„ where arge is said, Platonically, to reside en foi 
thumoada EN 1111а24-31, Ы8-9 with 1106а2-Я, Ш5Ь25-7,1149M4-5,1116b23-1117a9 with Wi 1385b29-
30, 1126al9-21, 1147al5, 1149a24-b3, esp 32^3 with Ь20-3, КЛ 1378a30-2, Rh 1373b36-7 with 1369M1-5, 
1378a21, 30-b5, 1369a4-7,1368b20, 1370Ы0-5, ЕЕ 1229a24 {Rh 1369M1), Ь31-2 (Rh 1378M-10), 1222a42-
Ь4,1221M2-5,1223M8-28,1225b26-7,1229a27-9,1231b5, DA 403a7 with 17 
5 8
 Some of Aristotle's enumerations contain appetite, all of them contain either temper or anger, DA 
403a7,17, 408М-Э (but cf 409Ы5-7, EN 1105b21-3,1106Ы8-20 ЕЕ 1220M2-3, Rh 1378a21 Wish occurs in 
none of them 
5 9
 Strictly speaking, Aristotle here uses the imperative esto, 'let be', on the force of which there is 
controversy, see Fortenbaugh (1970) and (1975), ρ 16 I shall assume that the RJietoric definitions of the 
affections fall short of the scientific ngour Fortenbaugh wishes to read into them 
6 0
 It escapes my comprehension why Rhys Roberts and Kennedy translate both participles of plmuiesihm 
in this passage with 'conspicuous' Do they impute to Aristotle the strange view that anger is only 
directed at public offenses and that it will only be remedied for by public revenge? 
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containing the slightest trace of temper. However, the level of generality of its 
phrasing affords us to have this species of desire subsumed under the topos.61 
Conceivably someone might remonstrate that Aristotle talks about 
including it in addition (proskeitai), that is, a proper definition must disjunctively 
contain both modifier and modified, and the modified is conspicuously 
deprived of independent reference in the Rhetoric definition of anger. It would 
be dense to deny this. Yet this concession does not in itself discredit the 
paralellism. The emphasis on the object-side of desire should not lead us to 
think that what is truly χ is not, subjectively, phainomenon (x): "for the good man 
judges each particular rightly, and in each particular case what is true appears 
\phainetai\ to him" (EN 1113a29-31). Aristotle omits the operator here 
presumably to make clear that subjectivity does not entail relativism. 
In general, Aristotle himself violates this demand of precision time and 
again, when its presence does not seem contextually imperative (Rh 1369M5-32; 
1370al7-8). What counts in the Rhetoric is how to arouse anger in hearers in 
order to effect persuasion; for this purpose it obviously does not matter 
whether the anger is arbitrary or justified. A separate mentioning of the 
variable bound by phainomenon is therefore not strictly required. Quite to the 
contrary, Aristotle may have another ground for this omission, which might be 
deliberate, to emphasise the fact that every object of temper is, in whatever 
modality, phainomenon - and this other ground brings us to the second, 
phenomenological, point, which revolves around the problematic notion of 
phantasia. I shall argue that the iconicity of dreams provides the key for the 
required extension of the workings of phantasia in temper to those of wish. 
We left the phenomenal sceptic where he was upon awakening, without 
having him set off for the Odeon (Met 1010bl0-l). This, however, does not 
mean that the desire he may have developed in his dream does not spill over 
into full consciousness. We may imagine the exile dreaming of his homeland 
and waking up with a panging yearning to go where he cannot go. The desire 
may subside, but it may also be felt for the rest of the day, knowing it to be 
impossible to have it consummated. It may be converted in an idle wish, or 
prod less consequential or even sublimating activity. In other words, dreams 
tend to leave us in a condition which resembles the condition we would have 
been in if they would have been more than 'only dreams'. This is a 
distinguishing mark of iconicity. 
Dreams are one type of deliverance of the faculty of phantasia (Insom 
459al5-22). To give a sense of Aristotle's awareness of the enormous complexity 
of pliantasia's workings we only have to refer to his report on those who 
perform mnemonic tricks while dreaming (Insom 458b20-3). The faculty is 
evidently capable of concurrently generating imagery over and above (and 
subject to different laws than) that belonging to the dream itself. Aristotle, 
however, does not consider this imagery part of the dream. Although he seems 
to take such two-track phantasia as a limiting case, it is nevertheless an 
instructive one in that it at least suggests strong linkages between settled 
61
 Top 146b36 ejn ton orexeôn 
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dispositions and their manifestations. More important yet (as we shall see) is 
the externalisatíon of belief, which may 'contradicf the dream's contents (Insorti 
458b24-5; 462а29-30).й 
It is an uncontroversial matter for Aristotle that the character of 
character, and thus, of dispositions, is in some way communicated to the 
quality of phantasmata had in sleep; those of morally good persons are 'better' 
than those of any old person (EN 1102b9-ll; ЕЕ llVíbU-S).** This is nothing 
unusual, since our preoccupations with our actions, either planned, or in the 
course of being executed, or the execution having been completed, spread to 
our dreams (Div 463a24-7).64 More interesting, however, is the fact that some 
(enia) phantasmata in our sleep are said to have causal efficacy: they are aitia of 
our own actions. It is also necessary, Aristotle says, that 
the movements in sleep [fas kath' hupnon tañeseis] often are a principle [arkhdn] of actions 
during daytime because, conversely, the thought of these has been prepared [dm to 
proôdopoiêsthtu] in the phantasmata during the night. (DID 463a28-30) 
It is easy to misunderstand this passage. When saying that nocturnal 
stirrings frequently are the principle of daytime actions, Aristotle does not 
mean that what is experienced in sleep is converted in a desire to act only 
during daytime. In sleep, the desiderative faculty (to orektikon) is not deprived 
of all force, despite its falling short of its capabilities in normal circumstances 
(áteles) (ЕЕ 1219b23-4). Neither does Aristotle say that we remember, upon 
awakening, what we have dreamt of, and that this, whatever it is, is 
subsequently endowed with motivating force in the act of remembering. 
Instead, Aristotle employs a quite different terminology, viz. 'to prepare', or 
more literally, 'to pave the way', or perhaps, in modern philosophical parlance, 
'to condition' (proodopoieomai).65 
When Aristotle says that the 'thought* of certain actions has been 
'prepared' in dreams, and that the 'movements' going on during sleep exert an 
influence on the phantasmata or phantasiai of their subjects, to such an extent that 
they supply them with causal efficacy, I take him to refer to a familiar tendency 
of dreams. It is the tendency to contagiously transmit certain of ib accessories, 
and most notably a residual version of its subjectivity, to the ensuing state of 
6 2
 Without committing the fallacy of adumbration, we can say that Aristotle even reports the state of 
affairs which led Freud to formulate his doctrine of the judgemental bracketing of the dream, with the 
crucial difference that Aristotle does not locate the judgement m the dream (and that he exploits it merely 
to pinpoint the source whence it emanates) For a succinct statement of the doctrine, see Traumdeutung, ρ 
341 Aristotle does not explicitly refer to a judgement 'This is just a dream', and it would be absurd to 
foist Freud's interpretation of this phenomenon on it His remark to the effect that "belief says that what 
is seen is false", be it in full consciousness or while having a dream, suggests the possibility of disavowal 
by belief of what appears m a dream (fnsom 458Ы5-7, 24-5, 459a5-8, 462a2-7) (I take leget here literally 
(с/ ¡пьот 458Ы2-3), in virtue of the linguistic nature of doxa (DA 428al9-24) See e g DA 426Ы7-28, Mem 
449b22-3, MA 701a32-3, EN 1147b34 ) 
6 3
 See Plato, Republic 571c-572b I take phantasmata to stand in for enhupma or dream (Insom 459al9-21), 
not for other imagery 
« Aristotle uses the word hnrâis, see FN 1102b9, ЕЕ 1219Ь24 
6 5
 At Rh 1379a23-4 the term is used to describe the disposition to experience anger the specific hardships 
suffered by persons pave the way for their own anger (cf DA 403a21-2) 
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consciousness. The dream tends to leave us in a 'residual condition', which is, 
as already alluded to, an essential effect of iconic mental states, and of dreams 
in particular.66 
As I already intimated, we should take Aristotle's location of the 
conditioning in the mental imagery of dreams (en tois phantasmasi) very 
seriously. Although he recognises the possibility of disavowal by belief of what 
is experienced in a dream, the disavowal is, strictly speaking, extraneous to i t 
So that, in so far as the dream (pliantasma) can present some object as a principle 
of action to us, it does so in virtue of the faculty of phantasia. Belief, therefore, is 
not required to be foregrounded or actualised in the generation of wishes -
leaving, of course, uninjured its background rôle. To summarise the foregoing 
counterfactually: if it were the case that Aristotle had meant to convey that 
belief is necessary for the generation of wish in dreams, he would not have 
deployed the restricted notion of phantasma. 
Dreams not only engender desires, they also express them. A dream, for 
instance, may articulate a dispositional wish which, during daytime, abides in 
latency. Reality is unlike tragedy in that an action may, falteringly or fluently, 
expand over considerable stretches of time. This, I gather, is what Aristotle 
expresses by 'being in actions' (en tais praxesin) (Insom 463a24-5). Hence it may 
be surmised that, between beginning and completion of execution of an action, 
the efficacy of the originating wish is in some way preserved or enhanced. 
However, this is not the only conceivable way in which a disposition may be 
modified. 
Anger, despite its being a painful desire, is bound up with two types of 
pleasure deducible from its definition. The one derives from a realistic 
expectation (elpis) of vengeance.67 More particularly, this pleasure is grounded 
in the person's phantasia (Юі 1370a27-35). The phantasia involved in expectation 
ranges over ta mellonta, which it is careless to render simply 'the future'.68 There 
is a difference between 'what will be' (to esomenon) and 'what is now likely to 
come abouf (to mellón) (Div 463b29).69 This difference roughly coincides with 
that between necessity and (objective or subjective) probability.70 
In De ira (1.3.2), Seneca disposes of an objection to his Aristotelian 
definition of anger. Anger cannot be a desire for punishment, since the very 
weak are often angry with the most powerful, yet they do not desire 
« Wollheim (1984), ρ 70 
6 7
 Anstotle says that this pleasure invariably, universally follows anger. 
6 8
 As Rhys Roberts and Kennedy do Rhys Roberts' translation of the passage, however, is superior to 
Kennedy's because of his rendenng Wpis 'expectation' instead of 'hope' 
6 9
 The mellonta Anstotle invokes to clarify his claim with are typically drawn from that sanctuary of 
contingency which coincides with the realm of human action (EN 1112b8-9,1139al2-4,1140al-2, 31-b6) 
For obviously an intention to act, brought about by no matter how patient plotting, is tragically exposed 
to frustration (Dro 463b27-9) Expectation of what is likely to come about through one's own doings is 
described in terms sufficiently reminiscent of the entena for deliberation to suspect that anger is at least 
compatible with some sort of scheming This is of course perfectly consistent with the tact that we 
expenence anger aproliairetôs (EN 1106a2-3) 
70
 If it is true to say that something will be the case, then at some future point it must be true to say that 
it is the case, but if it is true now that something is likely to come about, there is no such necessity (GC 
337b4-7) On these matters, see Sorabji (1980a), especially part Π. 
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punishment which they cannot plausibly hope for. But, as Seneca rightly 
observes, desire and practicability are two very different things - a distinction 
we are by now fully prepared for. Aristotle's retort, as I reconstruct i t would be 
more subtle. 
In the first place, in the Topics Aristotle considers an objection or 
counterexample against an abbreviated specimen of anger's definition.71 Being 
angry with our parents supposedly excludes a desire for revenge. Yet, Aristotle 
counters, 'paining or making someone regret something' are in themselves 
adequate expressions of revenge (Top 156a27-b8). More interestingly, however, 
is the second hypothetical reply. The pleasure inherent in expectation is made 
ultimately conditional on what is phainomenon-possible.72 It is the pleasure 
connected with finding realistic prospects for revenge, but what is realistic is 
quantified over by phainomenon. In other words, Aristotle builds into his 
analysis the possibility of a distorted appreciation of what is realistic. In still 
other words, anger is a desire for phainomenon-revenge, but what that is is 
crucially dependent on the affection itself (Insorti 460b8-ll). 
This leads us to the second type of pleasure accompanying anger. So far 
nothing in what Aristotle says refers to that kind of imagination which is 
usually called 'visualising' (which is only one mode of imagination).7, But this 
alters with the following remark: 
for a certain pleasure follows both because of this and because people in thought dwell on 
performing the act of vengeance [en tôt ttmôretsthat]; the phantasm which then comes about, 
then, produces pleasure in them [hêdonên empoteí\, like that of dreams. (Rh 1378b8-10) 
These lines, as suggested, do refer to visualising, or iconic imagination. 
The comparison with dreams, the most conspicuous bearers of this property, I 
contend, is exactly supposed to bear this out. Visualising the satisfaction of 
one's desire tends to leave one in a condition which resembles the condition the 
actual experience would have left one in. To be sure, it is the actual avenging, 
the real thing, which causes anger to subside through the expulsion of pain by 
pleasure (EN 1126a21-2). However, both contriving an opening to it and 
imagining the consummation of the desire (for we may reasonably suppose that 
this is what Aristotle refers to) procures Mdonê tis, a certain kind of pleasure, 
not pleasure period. It may not be the kind of pleasure that the angered person 
pursues,74 but, so to speak, a surrogate. Still, to say this is not to say that it is not 
a very real pleasure. For it is. 
71
 However, phainomenon, absent in the De anima vereion (403a30), is present here Cf Top 151al5-9 
72
 His use of ephtenai ('to aim at') may be significant The claim that "nobody aims at things which appear 
to be impossible for himself [tón phamomenôn adunatoli hantôi]" (Rti 1378b3-4) should be compared to the 
claims that we do wish for impossible things and that we deliberate about what is in our power The 
term ephienai, therefore, seems to carry connotations of expected success This cannot be said of 
boulesthat This throws some light on the endoxon with which the Nicomadwan hthics opens and on the 
practical character of the treatise 
73
 'Visualising', I stipulate, is perfectly compatible with perceiving, within the visualised scene, in other 
sense-modehties than sight 
74
 For an analysis of the indefinite pronoun fis, see Burnyeat (19%), pp 94-6 
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And my claim is that it is not only real, but also causally efficacious. One 
of its effects is a reinforcement of the desire which evokes it75 Besides the 
alleviation of pain, the imagination of the desire satisfied, and satisfied in a 
pleasurable way, acts as a lure. Aristotle, therefore, seems to advocate a slightly 
more complicated version of 'psychological hedonism'. It is not only a doctrine 
about the origins of desire, but also about the way in which a desire 
motivates.76 Pleasure both explains and presupposes desire.77 
13. A final word on imagination. There is Sartre's argument (from 
L'imaginaire) that we cannot learn anything from the imagination, because the 
thought-content of the imagined in entirety stems from what the person already 
knows, or, in a popular but ugly word, his belief-system. Apart from its tacit 
assumption that the web of beliefs is closed under implication, this argument 
fails to do justice to that function of the imagination which initiates us into how 
it is to experience an event "The two points against Sartre's argument are 
linked in that what experience, or its surrogate, imagination, can distinctively 
do is to effect a synthesis of what we know by report"78 Despite of this, 
experience remains, as we shall see in our narrative, second to none. 
We have gone through the pains of the last sections to prepare the field 
for the arrival of the contraption by which the animal appetites can be 
mastered. I shall argue, in the next chapter, that the wish to become good 
cannot be understood without its counterpart, shame. The dispositional wish to 
become good manifests itself in, and only in, more particular, or concrete 
wishes involving the workings of prospective shame, inducing in us the 
pleasures and pains involved in the spontaneous exercise of our powers of 
visualisation. Apart from spurring us on to action, this mechanism, if action is 
not to be expected, inscribes the wish deeper and deeper in our characters - up 
to the point that it comes to be backgrounded in all our actions. 
75
 Other effects could be the modification, or even the subsidence, of the desire 
76
 Note thatthis interpretation differs from that of Modrak (1987), pp 95-9, which concerns the rôle of 
phantasm in the arousal of desire, not in its motivation to action 
77
 Wollheim (1984), ρ 89 
7 8
 For this argument, see Wollheim (1984), pp 83-4 
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5 
The inner eye 
1. Let us, in good Aristotelian idiom, 'put before the eyes' two scenes. The 
first unfolds the modern, domestic version of 'weakness of the will', described 
in deliberately dull terms by Donald Davidson. We envisage the philosopher 
lying in bed, relaxing after a hard day of work. Upon discovering that he has 
forgotten to brush his teeth, he starts to ruminate. On the one hand, prudential 
considerations enjoin him to get up and brush his teeth. On the other hand, his 
teeth are strong and not subject to rapid decay at his age; besides, getting up 
could disturb his serenity and cause a restless night All things considered, it 
would be better to stay in bed. Eventually, against his better judgement, 
perhaps from a residual sense of duty (a 'feeling' that he 'oughf to brush his 
teeth), he gets up and saunters to the bathroom.1 
In the other scene we envisage the young heroic warrior Neoptolemus as 
depicted in Sophocles' Philoctetes.2 Having been lured by Odysseus into 
deceiving Philoctetes, he fails to carry the cunning scheme to its conclusion. 
When the vexed Philoctetes rises and for the first time confronts Neoptolemus 
as an erect man, the latter, oppressed by shame, gradually breaks forth into a 
sequence of (to Philoctetes) abstruse statements which culminate in confession. 
We have here two actions. By his own criteria, Davidson's teeth-
brushing is an akratic action; in Aristotle's terms, Neoptolemus' confessing is 
not (EN 1146al8-21; 1151M7-9). For the former it is crucial that the action be 
performed against his better judgement, which is the outcome of a weighing of 
considerations; for the latter that Neoptolemus' motives for giving up the plan 
are noble (EN 1151a29-b4). If, however, we assume the dialogue with Odysseus 
(in which Neoptolemus is, consequentially, seduced to comply) to take the 
place of internal deliberation, then formally, in Davidson's terms, 
Neoptolemus' action may be labelled akratic as well, since his behaviour can be 
construed as acting against his better judgement At any rate, decisive is the 
fact that he does not abide by his deliberate choice or prohairesis.3 
ι Davidson (1980), ρ 30 
2
 The quotations from the Philoctetes in this chapter are from the translation by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, they 
are adapted in those plates where I think a more literal translation to the point 
3
 Aristotle, it is true, in both passages referring to Sophocles' Neoptolemus, does not use the term 
prohmrests, but doxa However, it is clear that the latter term can serve as a stand-in for the former (FN 
Ш6а16-21,1150Ы), 1151a29-b4) 
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2. By giving one still current translation of the term akrasia, 'weakness of 
the will', a rather grotesque ring, domestic versions of the phenomenon nicely 
illustrate the emergent tendency to 'demoralize' the perennial challenge to 
morality. The contrast between the settings of an ancient tragedy and a lullabye 
ritual effectively epitomises this development. Davidson's proposal to divorce 
the problem of akrasia "entirely from the moralist's concern that our sense of 
the conventionally right may be lulled, dulled, or duped by a lively pleasure" 
is only the codification of an already existing current4 I cannot but comply on 
this point; but for a quite different reason. 
Strong though the temptations of progressive contentlessness may be, 
we have grounds for not succumbing to them open-eyedly. By allocating the 
problem of akrasia 'essentially' to the philosophy of action rather than to moral 
philosophy,5 Davidson seems to overlook that akrasia and, by implication, its 
positive counterpart, enkrateia or self-control, are not just about what we want 
to do, but, in a more fundamental, but relatively neglected sense, about what or 
who we want to be, either prospectively or retrospectively. In an important 
sense, they serve, in our examined lives, to parse our actions. 
Davidson's well-known analysis of akrasia is, of course, only part and 
parcel of a larger project centering around the commonsense explanation of 
action in terms of desires, beliefs, reasons, causes, and their mutual relations.6 It 
is not my intention to take issue with Davidson's justly hailed analyses; what I 
do want to question is the following triad of contentions on the practical 
syllogism,7 taken conjointly:8 
(1) The practical syllogism, since it exhibits an action under one reason, cannot reconstruct the 
practical reasoning yielding it (it fails to describe how competing reasons 'add up'). 
(2) The practical syllogism, as Aristotle conceives of it, gives (among other things) a 
rudimentary account of practical reasoning, that is, reasoning about what to do. 
(3) The practical syllogism, as Anstotle conceives of it, cannot account for simple cases of 
moral conflict. 
I subscribe to (1) and (3), but emphatically deny (2), thereby questioning 
Davidson's criticism levelled at Aristotle that he has no adequate conception of 
moral reasoning and, by implication, of moral conflict.9 Aristotelian scholarship 
has already made amends for the interpretive myopia yielding (2),10 for an 
4
 See, in particular, his reference to J L Austin's 'A Plea for Excuses', Davidson (1980), ρ 29 
s Davidson (1980),
 P 31&nl4 
6
 Davidson (1980), essays 1-5 
7
 Anstotle's conception of the practical syllogism is represented thus "Following Anstotle, the desire 
may be conceived as a principle of action, and its natural prepositional expression would here be 
something like 'It would be good for me to know the time' or, even more stiffly, 'Any act of mine taht 
results in my knowing the time is desirable ' Such a principle Anstotle compares to the major premise in 
a syllogism The proposittonal expression of the agent's belief would in this case be, 'Looking at my 
watch will result in my knowing the time' this corresponds to the minor premise Subsuming the case 
under the rule, the agent performs the desirable action, he looks at his watch " Davidson (1980), pp 31-2 
» Davidson (1980), pp 16, 31-6 
' Note that I am only talking about Davidson's interpretation of Anstotle, not of his thoughts on the 
practical syllogism in general, for these see Davidson (1980), essay 5 
i° By Cooper (1975), ch 1 
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important strand of exegesis denies that the practical syllogism is supposed to 
represent the deliberative process. I shall, in the next chapter, dwell only briefly 
on this matter, using it as a stepping-stone for my own argument Let us now 
take a quick glance at an example of an Aristotelian practical syllogism: 
if everything sweet must be Usted, and this here, as some one particular thing, is sweet, it is 
necessary [anankê] that he who is capable [ton dunamenon] and is not impeded [mê kôluomenon] 
at the same tune also acts [hama toulo km prattein]. (£N 1147a29-31) 
Not surprisingly, commentators are generally fond of stressing the 
disparagingly nonmoral, trivial, prudential, or downright 'crazy*11 contents of 
Aristotle's examples of practical syllogisms, of which this one is fairly 
representative.12 Such criticisms are unfair; analytical philosophy virtually 
floats on paltry and flimsy versions of reality extracted under (thought-
experimental) laboratory conditions. This is not to say that such examples have 
no worth whatsoever. It is just a matter of pointing out that the pot's calling the 
kettle black will not do for a criticism of Aristotle's means of exposition. 
Ironically, Aristotle's examples look suspiciously like the trifling illustrations of 
Davidson's, so that, at least in this respect they can be considered brothers in 
arms.13 
Rather than putting us off, the ostensibly nonmoral character of 
Aristotle's practical syllogisms should alert us to the question as to what 
significance to plot on the terms 'moral'. The contents of the practical syllogism 
quoted are, for Aristotle, highly moral, since they point to the deliberate choice 
of bodily pleasure. Instead of making the foolish mistake of missing the aspect 
under which exemplification takes place, we had better ask ourselves what it is 
that Aristotle wants to illustrate. 
It has been pointed out that akrasia is quite intransigent to dissociation 
from its ethical roots. Even if we no longer conceive of the phenomenon in 
terms of an episodic perversion of reason by the beast in us, we continue to 
define it in terms less obviously ethical - but ethical none the less (provided we 
do not restrict the ethical realm to that of moral action or obligation). Covering 
events in our lives by an 'ethically significant narrative', explanation in terms of 
akrasia may not be reducible to psychological explanation just like that14 
Quite justifiably, Davidson concludes that "[w]hat is special in 
incontinence is that the actor cannot understand himself: he recognizes, in his 
own intentional behaviour, something essentially surd".15 This lack of self-
understanding becomes particularly disturbing if the akratic agent is an 
obdurate recidivist On an Aristotelian account of the ontogenesis of virtue the 
11
 Such is Nussbaum's verdict in Nussbaum (1978), ρ 20, maintaining that Aristotle's pressing for 
deductive validity yields "completely crazy" explanations of a rational agent's behaviour 
'2 See Cooper (1975), ch 1 
1 1
 How about Davidson's practical syllogisms, in Davidson (1980), about people 'desiring' to know the 
time (p 31), people having 'pro attitudes' towards improving the taste of the stew (pp 85-6)? Whence 
this preoccupation with the ordinary, the deadly tedious, so characteristic of analytical philosophy? 
» Williams (1993), pp 44-6 
is Davidson (1980), ρ 42 
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inveterate akratic is disconsolately imprisoned in his own impotency to convert 
knowledge into action. 
It should not surprise us that the serial killer Dennis Nilsen is a serial 
killer, taking into account his own surprise at the sudden onset of his 
murderousness.16 His biography becomes only more intelligible to us if we dive 
below the surface of action to his conative history; Freud's invention of 'pale 
criminality' provides us with a narrative no practical syllogism by itself is able 
to accomodate.17 It would seem, then, that we need, in the words of the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, a 'thicker description' than the one provided by 
the desire-belief schedule.18 
3. To connect the various strands of the preceding section, I recapitulate. 
Donald Davidson is right, in principle, to extend the class of akratic actions 
beyond subversions of the conventionally right; but the ensuing assignment of 
the phenomenon to the philosophy of action can, I believe, only be defended by 
a suitably narrow conception of the moral, akrasia, then, inasmuch as it 
subverts not only the subsystem of morality, but the very control over our own 
lives is, therefore, not just a moral problem (narrowly construed), but a 
thoroughly ethical problem (broadly construed). A too one-sided focus on the 
explanation of action is not going to provide us with a lead to 'cure' (if that is 
what we want) ourselves from weakness of the will. The same goes, mutatis 
mutandis, for self-control. 
My primary concern in this chapter and the following is not akrasia, but 
the emergence of self-control. Self-control hardly ever makes it into the 
limelight the privative is traditionally spoilt with. I shall proceed on the 
provisional assumption that the self-controlled man is, in a minimal sense, the 
hearer Aristotle requires for his lectures, and I shall give two quotations which 
conjointly bestow an initial plausibility on this assumption: 
For such people [i.e. those who live 'according to affection'] the knowledge [he gnosis] becomes 
unprofitable, bke [it is] for the akratic; whereas for those who forge their desires and act 
according to reason [fois kata logon tas orexets potoumenots kat pratlousin] it would be very useful 
to know about these things. (EN 1095a8-ll) 
This [i.e. the appetitive part of the soul] appears to partake of reason as well, as we said; 
therefore this part of the self-controlled man obeys the commands of reason... the vegetative 
part does not have anything m common with reason, but the appetitive (and, m general, the 
desiderative) [to epilhumêtikon km holds orektikon] do partake of it m a way, m so far as it is 
capable of listening to it and obeying its commands. (EN 1102b25-31) 
i« Wollheim (1993), ρ 124 
17
 Wollheim (1993), ch 7 'Pale cnminality' is a term adapted by Freud (in his 'Einige Charaktertypen aus 
der psychoanalytischen Arbeit', section 3, 'Ehe Verbrecher aus Schuldbewußtsein') from one of the 
chapter titles of Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra ('Über den bleichen Verbrecher') The pale criminal 
acts from a sense of guilt in two senses the act is done because o/its illicit character and thus furnishes a 
possibility to rationalize the guilt, and by the subsequent punishment the guilt can be purged, Wollheim 
(1993), pp 114-5 А шее example is found in Dostoevski's The Idiot, when Nastasha Philipowna runs 
away from Prince Myshkm 
к Geertz (1973) 
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If this assumption is correct, it would seem that we need a reconstruction 
of the emergence of self-control as one of the most important preliminaries of 
morality. It is such a reconstruction I undertake in this and the next chapters. 
By way of introduction, I shall illustrate rather than argue that, for self-control 
(as for akrasia) to play a significant part in and to make a difference to a 
developmental ethical account it is not to be analysed insularly. 
To keep in style, let us describe an uninteresting case of self-control. By 
adopting a principle of a prudential import (say, 'never drink alcohol') I may 
give myself the impression of creating a pragmatic trick to see myself safely 
through temptations. By adopting a principle I make a particular action 
(drinking this beer here and now) 'stand for7 a whole class, and so I infect the 
utility of the particular act with the disutility of robbing the principle of its 
rationale.19 Ceteris paribus, then, the principle tells me to refrain from 
performing the action (and I leave the beer untouched). 
In obvious ways, this can all be crammed into a practical syllogism of 
the rule-case type.20 But what this schema, by itself, would fail to capture is 
this. Suppose I tell all my dearest friends that I have installed this principle, 
and suppose that I do not do this deliberately, as it were to increase its 
effectiveness, but quite unawares of its possible effects. Now a principle is not 
just a rule or an obligation. In a commonsense morality which is (like ours) 
imbued with etiolated Kantianism living by principles is something which calls 
for emulation. It purportedly requires and displays, so to speak, strength of the 
will. This fact may well play an important (but not necessarily countenanced) 
role in my refraining: drinking this beer is violating my prudential principle, 
but it also jeopardizes the whole project of structuring my life by means of 
principles. The 'standing foi7 relation, then, transitively encompasses the polic 
of structuring life by principles as well. 
Drinking this single, innocuous beer touches a fundamental value, one 
on which the whole edifice of my self-esteem is constructed, not in the least 
because of my solemn proclamations to my friends ('Read my lips...'); a value, 
as a self-appointed adherent of attenuated Kantianism, I would be deeply 
ashamed of to be caught (either by myself or by others) trampling on. 
Impending exposure as a wimp (which, in virtue of having to adopt a principle, 
I essentially am), not the principle itself, is what actually makes me refrain, 
without, however, my acknowledging this. It would be too perturbing to find 
myself reacting, not to the principle, but, in a cowardly heteronomous way, to 
the anticipation of the derision of others. Yet my refraining can be desribed as a 
case of self-control. What is more, I may, in this way, actually learn to control 
myself, and get rid of my appetite for beer. 
Suppose I had deliberately told my friends about my act of self-
legislation, in order to double-check my compliance. Suppose, again, that I had 
been fully aware that my refraining was due to a mere avoidance of shame. 
Suppose a good friend of mine, knowing that I am not the kind of guy to turn 
i» See Nozick (1993), pp 14-21, 26-10 
» Davidson (1980), pp 31-1 
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down a beer, but completely ignorant of my newly adopted principle, would 
ask me why on earth I refuse the beer he has just offered me. Suppose I justify 
my refusal by sincerely shouting a practical syllogism into his ear: 'I want to 
avoid anything that could provoke shame in me, drinking this beer will 
provoke shame, so I avoid drinking this beer'.21 Is it not very likely, and 
reasonably so, that he, in turn (but not out of revenge), refuses my 
'explanation'? My action is just unintelligible to him, as it must be to anyone 
who is not privy to the essential background information (which it would 
require considerable ingenuity to ply into a procrustean practical syllogism 
comprising a major and a minor). The problem, then, with this sort of 
explanations is that, whatever its value, it leaves the interesting bit of 
motivational history off the page. 
To account for the emergence of self-control in an agent we have to 
retrieve this history. If we cannot fìnd a way, in Aristotle, of structuring 
competing motivations into a practical syllogism, we shall not even be able to 
learn from it that the action is self-controlled. Self-control is as much of a 
problem for this sort of explanation than akrasia is just because the agent enacts 
his or her decision. There is a tendency for the contrary desire to go 
progressively unnoticed, which is exactly what cannot be said of akrasia. 
The emergence of self-control, I shall argue, is effected by the 
mechanism of prospective shame. It is the task of this chapter to consider how 
prospective shame is to get its motivational efficacy. Ьл this sense, self-control 
essentially depends on a particular type of awareness of one's motivational 
infrastructure; and if this awareness can be, in some way, integrated in 
deliberation, if it can function as an articulate reason for actions or omissions, 
one may helpfully short-circuit rational deliberation, and, in some cases at 
least, save it from indeterminacy. It goes without saying that we need to go far 
beyond Davidson's representation of Aristotle's picture of practical reasoning, 
which, unduly confined to a fairly common, but tenacious misinterpretation of 
the practical syllogism, leaves room for none of this.22 
But we also need to go beyond Aristotle's extant remarks, for these are 
fairly scarce and fragmentary. This will involve some speculation; but this is 
the price for recovering, to adapt a term of Michael Polanyi to my purposes, a 
'tacit dimension'. The vehicle for my reconstruction will be 'Sophocles' 
Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes',23 the tragedian's play which, in the words of a 
2 1
 Note that this description satisfies Davidson's entena for being a 'pnmary reason' for the action, 
Davidson (1980), ρ 5 
2 2
 Note that I am not talking about Davidson's own thoughts about the practical syllogism, but about 
what he thinks Aristotle's thoughts are 
2 3
 I give the plot of Sophocles' play as it is found m The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, ρ 433 
"Philoctetes is living wretchedly on Lemnos, suffenng from his wound, supporting himself by shooting 
birds with his beloved bow of Heracles Odysseus and Neoptolemus arrive to carry him off to the siege 
of Troy Odysseus reveals his plan to Neoptolemus the latter is to pretend that he has quarelled with the 
leaders of the Greek army and is on his way home, he is to heap abuse on Odyssaues, and to try to get 
possession of the bow Neoptolemus is at first unwilling to join m this deceit, but eventually agrees He 
meets Philoctetes and tells his story Philoctetes makes a pitiful appeal to be taken to Greece, and 
Neoptolemus agrees But Philoctetes is seized with a paroxysm of pain, after which he falls asleep 
Before sleeping, however, he entrusts his bow to Neoptolemus When he wakes up, Neoptolemus, stung 
with remorse, confesses the plot He is on the point or returning the bow when Odysseus appears and 
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recent evaluation, is "most remarkably involved in the workings of shame, the 
expectation of it and its attempted avoidance".24 
4. According to Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, Nietzsche's 
philological 'conscience', the play does not recommend itself because of its 
style, its chorusses, or its 'economy' (demanding a deus ex machina),75 but 
because of its brilliant portrayal of Neoptolemus' character. By the same token, 
Aristotle extols the truthful Neoptolemus (epainetos) for not abiding by 
Odysseus' scheme (EN 1146al9-21). It is not 'through akrasia', because not 
'through pleasure', that Neoptolemus is drawn to confession, but 'through a 
noble pleasure', namely, that of truth-telling, which to his person, his character, 
is something noble (kalon): "for not everyone who acts on account of pleasure is 
intemperate, bad, or akratic, but he [who acts] on account of a disgraceful 
[pleasure] [di' abkhran]" (EN 1151M7-22). 
An initial difficulty for my argument is that shame is suspiciously absent 
from Aristotle's two succinct references to Sophocles' Neoptolemus. There are, 
however, good grounds to assume that shame is exactly what he is pointing to. 
Apart from appealing to the 'enthymematic' reticence explained by dense 
patterns of reference shared with the audience (which apparently only needs to 
be reminded of Sophocles' version of the story), we may forge the connection 
with shame in the following way. 
Shame (aidas, aiskhunê),26 what has been called 'the semivirtue of the 
learner7,27 is what one experiences in connection with what is aiskhros or 
disgraceful. What is noble or kalos, the opposite of what is aiskhros (DI 17b30-4; 
Top 106a20-l), and the pleasure inhering in it, constitute, according to 
Aristotle's latter reference to the play, the motivation for Neoptolemus to reveal 
the truth (EN 1151Ы9-21; Phil 915). Virtuous action is acting for the sake of 
what is noble, which is inherently pleasant (EN 1099al3-21; 1115bl2; 1116al2; 
1120a23; ЕЕ 1229a4; 1230a29-33). 
There are strong ties between shunning what is disgraceful and desiring 
what is noble, as Aristotle's discussion of 'political' courage, or citizen's 
courage, shows. Although this simulacrum of the real virtue works through the 
distribution of honour (time), which is something kalon, it is virtuous because it 
takes it He and Neoptolemus depart with it to the ships, Philoctetes is Left lamenting his loss, while the 
chorus of sailors is trying to persuade him to ]oin them They are about to leave him when Neoptolemus 
returns, determined to give back the bow but pursued by Odysseus Philoctetes, having regained the 
bow, tries to shoot Odysseus but is prevented by Neoptlolemus who again tries to persuade Philoctetes 
to accompany him to Troy He fails, and reluctantly decides to abide by his promise and take Philoctetes 
home to Greece At this point Heracles appears from the dead, he reveals Zeus' plan for Philoctetes, that 
he is to go to Troy with Neoptolemus, Philoctetes yields to the voice of one whom he cannot disobey " 
* Williams (1993), ρ 87 
и See Willamowitz-Mollendorf (1974), pp 83-4 
2 6
 Aristotle uses these two words for shame, of which the latter is the more frequent one From the 
thematic treatment of the affection in EN \ 9 one gets the impression that they are, by Aristotle's time at 
least, virtual synonyms I shall not be concerned, then, to separate the two families of words deriving 
from the respective roots aid- and aiskhtm-
v By Burnyeat (1980), ρ 78 
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is engendered "by shame and the desire for what is noble [di' aida kai dia kalou 
orexin] and avoidance of the blameworthy, being disgraceful [aiskhrou ontos]" 
(EN 1116a28-9; £E 1230a23-4). Its virtuous credentials derive from the workings 
of shame, mediated by laws and public opinion (EN 1116al7-21), not from 
courage. But when Aristotle describes the ethos or character of the young, he 
calls them aiskhuntêloi, giving as a reason that they not yet believe other things 
than those taught by law or custom to be noble (Rh 1389a28-9). Apparently, 
there is ample room for a development of 'taste' here. 
The search for civic or 'political' honour self-defeatingly implicates its 
pursuers in what has been called28 'Coriolanus' paradox', by virue of making 
themselves dependent on those whom they want to be superior to. The 
accompanying concept of shame resembles the heteronomous passion described 
by e.g. Descartes, who, in discussing its role in the incitement to virtue, refers to 
the importance of the judgement of le peuple as a determinant of our actions;29 
Aristotle, on the other hand, enshrines the good deeper in the self (otkeion ti kai 
dusaphaireton), so that it cannot be withdrawn ad libitum by others (EN 1095b23-
6); it is acting from an internalized virtuous disposition, which is intrinsically 
and not merely superveniently pleasant (EN 1099al3-8). For the philotolos, the 
'lover of the noble', the actualisation of this disposition is in itself pleasant so 
when Aristotle says Neoptolemus confesses the truth because of noble pleasure, 
he appears to be saying that being truthful is to him inherently and by nature 
(phusei), that is to his person, pleasant 
So it seems that, in terms of these connections, Aristotle, in the latter 
reference to Neoptolemus, only tells half the motivational story, namely, the 
more positive and constructive one, referring to a desire for the noble because 
of its nobility. Yet this interpretation is far from mandatory. For Neoptolemus, 
would he have been a veritable philokalos, there would have been no chance for 
conflicting pleasures beguiling him (EN 1099all-3). It is, however, exactly such 
conflict which exposes him to Odysseus' rhetorical dexterity. 
Of course, truth-telling can be both noble and pleasurable to someone, 
without its being pleasurable on account of its being inherently noble. The 
pleasure may accrue to it by mediation of public approval, which considers 
truth-telling something noble. By saying that Neoptolemus acts from a noble 
pleasure, since truth-telling, to him, is something noble, Aristotle does not 
commit himself to any direct connections between the activity and its 
properties. In that case, we would have expected his usual kath' hatito idiom 
(EN 1099a7; 15; 21; 1104b6), referring to the essential pleasantness of the deed 
itself. Moreover, he seems to differentiate an authoritative and a derivative 
sense of the term philokalos when he talks about a "truly noble-loving person 
[hos alêthôs philokalon], ready to be possessed [katokôkhimon] from a virtuous 
2» By Williams (1985), p. 39. 
29
 Les Passions de l'Ame, m art 206 "Car encore que le peuple juge tres-mal, toutefois, à cause que nous ne 
pouvons vivre sans luy, & qu'il nous importe d'en estre estimez, nous devons souvent suivre ses 
opinions, plustot que les nostres, touchant l'exteneur de nos actions". 
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disposition [ek tes aretes]" (EN \179bS-9).30 It has all the appearance, then, that 
Neoptolemus is not, or not yet, a true philokalos. 
The other half of the story, which is concerned with the workings of 
shame, may be exhumed in the following way. The prospect of being in 
disgrace, deterring and motivating Neoptolemus, is given vent in this line: 
I shall be seen to be in disgrace [aiskhros panoumai]; that is what has long been paining me. (Phil 
906P· 
The pain which, according to Aristotle, agonizes the lying Neoptolemus 
and which prompts his confession (dia to lupeisthai pseudomenos) (EN 1146a21) 
can be redescribed in terms of shame.32 Shame, according to Aristotle, is an 
affection (pathos) rather than a relatively permanent disposition (hexb)33. In the 
Ntcomachean Ethics, at least, the definiens suggests that it is a certain type of fear 
(phobos tis) of contempt or disrepute (EN 1128Ы1-2)34 and pain is said to 
'follow' affections (EN 1104M4-5; 1105b21-3; cf. Rh ІЗУваІС-гі).35 In the 
Eudemian Ethics, this relation of 'following' is said to hold only 'for the most 
parf, yet essentially (kath' hauta) (ЕЕ 1220Ы2-4). However, the Rhetoric's 
definitions of both fear (in the definiens of shame at EN 1128bll-2) and shame 
have 'a certain pain or disorder' (lupe tis é36 tarakhê) for their genera (Rh 
1382a21; 1383M2-3).37 
Although the fact of pleasure and pain occurring in the definition of 
both the affections as a genus and their several types would incline one to 
conceive of it in terms of a conceptual relation, it is, after all, by no means clear 
30
 I render ek tés aretes 'from a virtuous disposition' and not, as is usually done, 'by virtue', as Burnyeat 
(1980), ρ 75, does, or 'by excellence', as the Revised Oxford Translation does It makes no sense, I thmk, to 
translate so as to get a sense that the veritable 'lover of the noble', who has been described as acting 
'according to virtue' (fart' aretên) at EN 1099a13-21, is 'ready to be possessed by virtue' He already acts 
from a virtuous disposition It is farmore likely that the term ek, as it idiomatically does, refers to acting 
'from', and thus points to the actualisation of a disposition This is confirmed by Pol 1342a8, where 
Aristotle talks about people who are susceptible of enthousiasmes, and describes the actualisation with the 
help of the preposition hupo (tantes tes kwêseôs), and HA 572a32, where he deploys a dative case when 
describing bull-struck cows possessed 'by' an affection, (katokôkhimai tôt pathei gignontai) 
31
 Cf 11 912-3 I here depart from Uoyd-Jones' translation, who renders aiskhros phanoumai 'I shall be 
seen to be a traitor' For expository reasons, I prefer a more literal translation here 
32
 Another possibility would be the pain involved in regret (EN 1110Ы8-23, lllla20-l) On regret, see the 
next chapter 
3 3
 See EN 1108a30-5, RA 1383Ы2-5, ЕЕ 1220ЫЗ But Aristotle seems to imply that shame is a virtue at ЕЕ 
1221al The evidence for this endoxon (doka) is that the workings of shame are betrayed by a reddening of 
the face, whereas fear is accompanied by turning pale, these corporeal phainomena cause shame to be 
believed to be a pathos rather than a hexis (EN 1128Ы2-5, Cat 9Ы1-33) 
&Ш see Rh 1ШЫ2-4 
ω Cooper (19%), ρ 245 
s» Some MSS read kai (Kassel) See Cooper (1996), ρ 246 
3 7
 To complicate matters further, the Topics expressly warns us against conflating genus and 
concomitants, and the affection of anger is exploited to make clear that pain is not the genus, but the 
cause of anger (Top 125b28-34) Aristotle says that pam 'follows' (parakolouthei) the species 'in a certain 
way' (tropon tina), and that the person who is in anger is pained (lupeitai) because of pain having come 
about in him earlier (proféras en autôt tes liq>ês genomenès) So we need not understand the pain being 
anger's cause as a completely antecedent factor which is replaced by an affection, pain may both cause 
anger, persist through the episode of anger (and even beyond) 
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what the nature of this relation is.3* Hate (misos) for instance, does not involve 
pain (Rli 1382al2-3). Whatever the exact relation of pain to a painful affection in 
general, it is sufficient, for present purposes, to point out that at a lower level 
of generality, a token occurrence a certain type-affection in most cases licenses 
the inference to the presence of pain. Furthermore, it is important to note that a 
type affection has its own kind of pain (ЕЕ 1229Э35-9).39 The point is that when 
Aristotle says that Neoptolemus' being pained by lying propels him forward 
into confession, it is both legitimate and plausible to ascribe to him the pain 
involved in feeling shame. For Neoptolemus' behaviour to be both adequate 
and laudable I take it that neither of the halves of the motivational story, taken 
separately, is sufficient 
Aristotle's silence about shame is eloquent It does not authorize us to 
conclude that it does not play a part in the stirrings of Neoptolemus' 
psychology. What is more, we cannot infer, from the notoriously perfunctory 
treatment of the 'stepchild'40 in Aristotle's phenomenological inventory of the 
virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, to any form of subliminal absence in the 
treatise.41 On the contrary, it may as likely be taken as evidence to the contrary 
effect For the Nicomaciiean account of shame corresponds neatly with its 
function assigned in moral development through its inversely proportional 
relation to moral maturing shame is destined to render itself superfluous. The 
tragic fate of the stepchild consists in its self-cancelling teleology. 
Not surprisingly, then, the affection especially befits the young, 
for we think that young people must be liable to shame because of the fact that they make 
many errors on account of living by affection [ώα to palhei zontas polla hamartanein], but are 
inhibited by shame [hupo tes aidons kôluesthai]; and we praise those young people who are liable 
to shame, but no one would praise an older man for being prone to shame [aiskhuntêlos]; for we 
think that he should not do \prattein] anythmg occasionmg shame. (EN 1128Ы6-21)42 
An elaborate discussion of shame is not apposite because the 
developmental stage at which it is endemic is presupposed by the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Shame moulds the young, and the young are, as far as Aristotle is 
concerned, not his favorite audience (EN 1095a2-9). Their aptitude to follow the 
affections (tois pathesin akolouthikos), which shame is precisely designed to 
constrain (EN 1128Ы6-8), will nip in the bud the harvest Aristotle's ethics is 
supposed to sow (EN 1095a4-5). Compare Aristotle's appraisal of the prevailing 
conditions of moral education: 
3 8
 Leighton (1996), ρ 219, too readily assumes Aristotle's claims to be conceptual 
3 9
 Leighton (1996), ρ 220, does not take this passage into consideration to support his otherwise justified 
conclusion that "[f]or each emotion-type there is a type of pleasure or pain peculiar to that emotion" 
« Hartmann, cited m Dirlmeier (1991), ρ 395 
41
 It would be rash to construe the lark of explicit textual evidence as an indication of the waning of a 
shame culture, especially in the fare of the more elaborate remarks in the second book of the Rhetoric, 
which may be taken as a strong indication of the still very influential workings of shame See Williams 
(1993), pp 5ff 
4 2
 Top 117a31-3 
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As things are, however, while [arguments] appear to have the force to encourage and mate the 
generous among the young, and to make a character both well-bred and truly noble-loving 
[philokalon], capable of being possessed from virtue, they are incapable [adunatati] of 
encouraging the many [fous pollous] to noble goodness [kalokagathtan]; for they do not by nature 
obey the commands shame [ou pephukasin aidoi patharkhem], but fear [phobôi], and they do not 
refrain [apekhestat] from base deeds because of disgracefulness [dm to atskhron], but because of 
punishment [dia tes timarías]?3 for they, since they live by affection [pathei zontes], pursue the 
pleasures which are appropriate to them [tas oikeias hêdonas] and the things through which 
these will be [di' hon hautat esentai], and they avoid the opposite pains, and they do not have an 
idea of the noble and the truly pleasant [tou kalou km hôs alêthôs hêdeos], having never tasted it 
[ageustot ontes]. (EN 1179Ь7-16) 
Proneness to shame is, apparently, a natural endowment Aristotle is 
quite clear about the importance of shame's potential of restraint to moral 
development A suitably fostered prospective shame may establish the right 
patterns of behaviour. And this, Odysseus senses, is exactly what he has to 
build his tactics on. 
5. A full-blooded account of the phenomenology of shame would unsettle 
the frames of this discussion.44 What I am primarily interested in is how 
Aristotle could envisage prospective shame to acquire motivational efficacy. 
'Prospective' shame, it will emerge, is a somewhat misleading term. Let us 
briefly review the two most important and explicit passages from the Philoctetes 
in which prospective shame plays a motivational part 
The young heroic warrior Neoptolemus, since he falls short of being a 
true phtlokalos, is not infallible. Odysseus, whose epithet poluniêtts does not 
accrue to him fortuitously, scents this and ingeniously assails his weak spots. 
Odysseus' words portentously adumbrate Neoptolemus' predicament 
I know, my son, that by nature you are not the sort of man [phttsei se me pephukota] 
to speak such words or to plot to harm others. 
But-it is a pleasure [hôfo] to acquire a possession by victory-
bring yourself to do it, and m due course we shall be shown to have been m the right [dikawi]. 
Now give yourself to me for a few hours of shamelessness [anaides], 
and later for the rest of time 
be called the most dutiful of mortals (Phil 79-85) 
In effect, Odysseus insidiously asks Neoptolemus to suppress his 
concern for his reputation by appealing to his concern for his reputation, to 
trade one character trait yielding a good reputation (truthfulness) for another 
(dutifulness). Neoptolemus is confronted with the (pragmatically paradoxic) 
43
 Strictly speaking, Anstotle does not use a Greek equivalent for 'fear of punishment', as it is found in 
e g Rawls (1971), §§ 67-75, but the text at £N 1179Ы1-3 makes it plausible to assume that this is precisely 
what he intends to say For the inferiority of fear to shame as a motive, see also EN ІІІбаЗІ 
4 4
 Neither shall I have to say something on the still fashionable topic of the relations of shame with guilt, 
or engage anthropological, histoncal, or cultural considerations which are standardly provoked by this 
theme Though nothing hangs on it, I shall simply assume that shame, by being concerned with what I 
am, encompasses guilt, which seems to be primarily about what I do For discussion in the context of 
moral philosophy, see Rawls (1971), pp 442-6, Wollheim (1984), pp 218-21, Williams (1993), pp 88-95 
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Suggestion that on the one hand, 'bracketing the action from the rest of life',45 
provides a realistic possibility for preserving the integrity of his person, but 
that, on the other hand, a future reward will have to justify some past 
'shamelessness'. In a sense, Neoptolemus is aware of what Odysseus asks of 
him: 
Son of Laertius, things which it distresses me to hear spoken of are things which I hate to do' It 
is my nature [ephim] to do nothing by treacherous plotting; that is my nature, and it was also 
my father's nature [out' autos outh' houkphusas erne]. (Phil 86-9)*6 
Nevertheless, temptation (to be called 'clever and valianf) proves 
irresistible: 
Let it be' I will do it, casting off all shame [pasan atskhunên apheis\ (Phil 120)47 
Parenthesising an action from one's nature (phusis) or (inherited) 
character makes very good sense if one's character provides a compelling reason 
for non-compliance. Odysseus' encouragements to 'suspend' nature, then, steal 
a dodgy march on Neoptolemus' motivational repertoire; they neutralize a 
deliberative course open to him, viz. that the prospect of being pained by 
shame while lying is a good, if not the best, reason not to do what Odysseus 
enjoins him to do. But they neutralize it by appealing to a reason issuing from 
the very same source; the natural endowment of concern with one's reputation. 
Both refraining from deceit and engaging in it appeal to one and the same 
motivation, but one does so inherently, the other consequentially. It is enough 
to sbr up conflict in Neoptolemus. 
Having gone some way in carrying out the plan, the mortgage of evil-
doing on Neoptolemus' soul threatens to wax beyond redemption. When we 
find him on the verge of disbosoming, the shrewdness of Odysseus' words 
resounds: 
NEOPT Everything is distasteful, when a man has abandoned his own nature [ten hautou phusm 
lipon] and is doing what is unlike him [ta me proseikota]* 
PHIL But you are not doing or saying anything unlike your father [exê tou phuteusantos, m 
helping a noble man' 
NEOPT I shall seen to be m disgrace [atskhros phanoumai]; that is what has long been pammg 
me. (Phil 902-6) 
When I said that 'prospective shame' is a misleading term, I meant to say 
that it is not a very accurate designation in that it suggests autonomous 
operations of the imagination. Now I certainly do not wish to argue that such a 
45
 Wiliams (1993), ρ 87 "When Odysseus tries to persuade Neoptolemus to help him in deceiving 
Philocletes, he is brilliantly shown as seeking to bring about something that is precisely designed to undo 
the effects of a prospective shame, namely, to bracket the action from the rest of life " 
4 6
 Odysseus immediately counters Neoptolemus' argument by confirming his noble nature and that of 
his ancestry "Son of a noble father" (1 96) 
4 7
 On the sense of apheis, in Lloyd-Jones' translation rendered 'casting off', see Williams (1993) pp 87-8. 
The term is meant to suggest suppression rather than bearing the sense of shame 
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constellation is impossible; and I certainly believe operations of the imagination 
are essential to any complete account of i t In any case, Aristotle acknowledges 
it in the following passage: 
For those who expect [tots prosdekhomenois] some other pain there could probably be another 
pain and another affection,... for instance, if someone were to foresee \prohorôito] that he will 
suffer [such] a pain... as those who are ashamed [hoi aiskhunomenoi]. (ЕЕ 1229a35-9) 
What I do want to deny is that mere imagination suffices to give 
prospective shame the required motivational force, and that Aristotle 
acknowledges this as well. As we shall see, 'prospective shame' is ambiguous 
between Neoptolemus being persuaded and Neoptolemus persuaded. 
6. I am keeping a diary in which I record my most intimate thoughts and 
feelings. Needless to say, many of those are hurtful to others, sordid, and, 
generally, detrimental to my carefully constructed reputation. Suppose I know 
that I shall die in the near future, and that I am convinced to the bone that there 
is no hereafter of any kind whatsoever. Now let us assume, with Aristotle, that, 
not implausibly, shame involves a concern ('a certain fear7) about one's 
reputation. Reputations, in a sense, have this peculiarity of outliving their 
subjects. It is a fact well-attested by experience that some human beings are, as 
a matter of fact quite selfishly concerned about the immaculacy of their post 
mortem repute. 
Suppose I start pondering the question whether to destroy my diary. 
One consideration crossing my mind is the following. I try to imagine what it is 
like for the people getting to know my less lovable sides after I have passed 
away, and, reasoning that it makes no difference to me whether they will think 
differently about me than I think they do now, since I shall, by then, no longer 
be a subject for shame to be predicated of, I come to the conclusion that the 
question is pointless. Yet in spite of my efforts to convince myself that I shall 
not be there for the future shame to suspend itself on, I am overcome by shame, 
here and now. And I am so overcome not on account of the renewed direct 
confrontation with my past, but of seeing myself, as it were at one remove, 
through others' eyes, exposed as the product of this past This 'seeing myself 
through others' eyes, a deliberate exertion of my imaginative powers, effects 
exactly what it is designed to forestall. I decide to destroy my diary. 
I contend that this is a genuine case of prospective shame. What it lays 
bare is this. However I exert myself imagining what it is like for others to get to 
know what my 'real' self was like, I am still aware, at some level of 
consciousness, that it is my self which is imagining this. What is prospective 
about it is that it involves imagining some future event, which, should I be there 
to experience it, would, at that time, inevitably elicit shame. However, even the 
complete (epistemic) certainty of the impossibility of this future event evoking 
feelings of shame in me is not enough to safeguard myself from being ashamed 
at the time of imagining it. Why should this be so? I submit the answer is: 
because the shame is already there, motivating and suffusing not only the 
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imagination prompted by the question, but the very question itself. As we shall 
see, this is precisely what we come across in Neoptolemus' psychology. 
In other words, the picture of 'practical reasoning' involved cannot but 
be incomplete, since it picks out, as a given starting-point, the terms of the 
question. But this is plainly oversimplificatory, and in more than one way. For 
one thing, the very posing of the question itself, its belonging in my repertoire 
at all, is revelatory of and motivated by an emergent shame. To someone truly 
committed to the pointlessness of the question it would never have made any 
sense to weigh considerations in the light of it in the first place, except in some 
detached way, as an interesting intellectual puzzle (if there is something like a 
complete detachment in non-pathological cases). For another, shame, while 
'carrying' deliberation, may play a decisive role in it without ever gaining 
propositional or articulate status. In other words, shame disposes without being 
a consideration at all. 
Obliquely, but certainly not less importantly, the example makes clear 
something I believe to be fundamental to the human condition, with 
noteworthy (but scarcely acknowledged) consequences for practical reasoning: 
when shame is, at some level of consciousness, at play, it is virtually impossible 
to transcend the self in imagining. And this is because shame is concerned not, 
or at any rate not primarily, with what I do, but with what I am and, 
consequently, with what I shall be as a result of having done this. 
7. It is about time to surface a problem which, despite allusions, has 
hitherto subcutaneously affected the argument It is that of the, in a Kantian 
phrase, heteronomy of shame. If shame is defined as a type of fear (namely that 
of a bad reputation), and if, in the Cartesian way,48 it motivates us in a 
superficially consequential way (namely, by a fear of being found out by 
others), what makes responding to fear of punishment inferior to or less noble 
than doing or leaving something from fear of disrepute? Aristotle 
acknowledges the widely accepted, well-testified, and natural association of 
shame with 'being seen' in his treatment of the affection in the Rhetoric.*9 Does 
that commit him to a conception of shame defined in terms of being caught by 
others in flagrante delicto?50 
Bernard Williams has admirably discussed the matters of autonomy, 
shame, the moral identity, and their mutual relations in connection with the 
Homeric mentality; I shall not rehearse his arguments here.51 Let it suffice to 
4 8
 On the one hand, Descartes, m Les Passions de l'Ame, art 206, exhibits realism in reproving the Cynics 
for abandoning shame altogether On the other hand, he seems to be susceptible of the 'silly' mistake of 
grounding shame in the narcissist side to the self and making it dependent on injuries of this wounded 
'Amour de soy mesme' 
4
» Apart from referring to the proverb "shame is in [the] eyes" (еті ophthalmms autos) (Rh 1384a34), he 
repeatedly speaks of 'being seen' (horasthai), 'being perceived' (tnsthêsasthai), 'in the open' (en plumerai) 
(Rh ІЗМаЗЗ, Ь32,3b, 1385а8) 
5 0
 Kennedy (1991), ρ 143, thinks he does "shame only occurs if someone else, or society in general, 
perceives disgrace to an individual " 
51
 Williams (1993), especially chs 4 and 5 I shall, in the following, have nothing to say about the 
relations between shame and guilt Non-anthropological discussions of the differences between these 
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point out the two mistakes which, according to Williams, are made by 
adherents of moral autonomy. The first is the 'silly mistake' (and it is silly 
indeed) that shame depends on actually being found out The example from the 
last section, in so far as it deploys imagined others, is lethal to such a position. 
The other mistake concerns the identity of that other. To be sure, the 
other may be a particular individual (say, a parent) or the representative of a 
certain social group, but this is by no means necessarily so. The identity of the 
other may as likely as not be defined ethically, in terms of reciprocal respect 
The objection that this other has no independent part in the motivational story 
other than that of "an echo chamber for my solitary moral voice", i.e. that there 
can be no other at all, is mistaking an "abstracted and generalised and 
idealised" somebody for a nobody.52 Without an internalised other "the 
convictions of autonomous self-legislation may become hard to distinguish 
from an insensate degree of moral egoism."53 The real mistake, then, is at the 
presuppository level of unreflectingly privileging autonomy: the internalised 
other "embodies intimations of a genuine social reality - in particular, of how it 
will be for one's life with others if one acts in one way rather than another."54 
There is (implicit) evidence that Aristotle, to a certain extent, views 
shame as an interiorized affection, involving one or more imagined others; this 
emerges most clearly from the Rhetoric, where Aristotle gives the following 
(semi-)definition of shame: 
Let shame [aiskhunê] be a certain pain or disorder [lupe tis ê tarakhê] about those harms, either 
present, past, or future, which appear to contribute to disgrace. (Rh 1383M2-4; cf. 1384al5-7) 
Now it could be objected that this does not in itself rule out the 
possibility of an imagination of future events eliciting shame, so that the 
affection is aroused by and a causal consequence of the cognitive operation. 
This objection misfires, since it fails to appreciate the intimate connection of an 
affection with a judgemental content When Aristotle sete out to specify those 
before whom shame is felt, he says: 
since shame is phantasm about disrepute, and for the sake of disgrace itself and not for its 
consequences, and [since] nodoby cares about the opinion [tês doxês] except because of those 
who hold it [tous doxazontas], it is necessary that one is ashamed before those whom one 
respects [hôn logon ekhei] (Rh 1384a21-5) 
Aristotle twice couples shame with the faculty of pimntasia (Rh 1383M3; 
1384a21-2); but in the second case he straightforwardly says that shame is a 
certain pimntasia. The cognitive component, then, is a constituent of the 
experience. Although pltantasia, in general, cannot be said to be equivalent to 
our 'imagination', it is hard to think of another translation where future harms 
two moral emotions are to be found in Rawls (1971), eh 8, and, from a psychoanalytical perspective, 
Wollheim (1984), ch 7 
52 Williams (1993), ρ 84 
»3 Williams (1993), ρ 100 
M Williams (1993), ρ 102 
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are concerned. On Aristotle's account, it is possible for someone to (currently) 
feel shame at future events (apparently) damaging one's reputation; 
prospective shame, therefore, seems to be not just fear of shame mapped onto 
an autonomously imagined, hypothetical ex post facto future - one actually feels 
the pain of shame here and now about that future event as imagined here and 
now (which is not to deny fear any part in it). This, so it seems, is just what we 
need to make Neoptolemus' motivational household more perspicuous. 
8. 'Casting off shame', 'abandoning one's nature', 'saying or doing things 
unlike one's father7 seem to be interchangeable expressions for one and the 
same thing. In the Ajax, it is a similar complex which drives the title figure to 
suicide.55 As it is impossible to cast off one's nature and as it is, in the end, 
impossible to elide one's pedigree, so it is impossible to evade the workings of 
shame deeply entrenched in one's soul. This is what Odysseus has been aware 
of all the time and what Neoptolemus cannot but acknowledge. He has to 
recognize the impracticability governing the deceit from its very inception and 
the futility of his efforts to 'suspend' it turns out to be a source of a central 
insight about his nature. Needless to say, one's father need not be alive to be 
alive, as Freud's analysis of the Rat Man case shows,56 or, less pathologically, to 
feel ashamed before him; and, as Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes, Achilles is as 
dead as a slain warrior can be (11. 329-335). The complex appeal to shame, one's 
(inherited) nature, and one's father strongly suggests widely accepted patterns 
of patrilineal identification. 
I should now like to adapt to my purposes some elements of an 
apparatus grown out of a more psychoanalytically oriented account of moral 
development One of these is a distinction between 'mere' internalisation on the 
one hand and identification on the other on the basis of different modes of 
imagination connected with it57 When I imagine a (merely) internalised other I 
imagine him or her peripherally, that is, I imagine myself centrally (I am the 
perspectival protagonist of the imagined scene), and other is seen 'from the 
outside'. Identification requires centrally imagining the other: I project myself 
into the perspective of the (internal) other, with the result that I peripherally 
imagine myself.58 This is, with appropriate modifications, what I try to do in 
the diary example. The most single important modification consisting, of 
55
 Sophocles, Ajax, 11 457ÍÍ On these lines, see Williams (1993), ρ 85 "Not only is his language full of the 
most basic images of shame, of sight and nudity, but it expresses directly a reciprocal relation between 
what he and his father could not bear But. once again, it is not the mere idea of his father's pam that 
governs the decision, nor the fact that it is, uniquely, his father Ajax is identified with the standard of 
excellence represented by his father's honours " See further the words Ajax directs at his son Eurysaces 
(545-582) 
5 6
 See Freud's Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose from 1909, and its discussion, basing partly 
on Freud's original session notes, in Wollheim (1984), chs 5, 6, 8 
37
 Wollheim (1984), pp 120-5 It is his idiom I adopt here 
58
 On these distinctions, see Wolheim (1984), pp 72-6 Strictly speaking, mere internalisation can also 
involve acentrally imagining- viewing every figure 'from the outside' This is, of course, only to say that 
the scene is imagined from the point of view of no figure within the scene itself I shall leave this 
possibility aside 
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course, in the fact that, in that case, my imagination is a mental activity 
deliberately engaged in.59 
With the shift of intemalisahon to identification the person undergoes a 
considerable change in psychology: "For with centrally imagining we get a new 
type of internal audience, a change in psychic force, and appropriately different 
consequences as far as the beliefs, desires, and emotions of the person are 
concerned. Centrally imagining an internal figure creates, or helps to create, the 
identification that it indicates."60 We could enrich (or complicate) the account 
by overlaying it with another distinction. 
Whereas the merely internalised other, in virtue of the relevant 
perspective, sits in (hypothetical) judgement over my public behaviour,61 the 
person identified with interpenetrates with the totality, the outward and 
innermost, of the self. The reader will, I hope, excuse me for resorting to an 
example drawn from the by now discredited method of introspection. 
Identification with my mother does not only consist in wanting to do things 
likely to meet with her approving internal gaze. She has been given a 
privileged access to the motives for my doings as well and, retroactively, even 
for my motives for doing this.62 Her death has fostered an awareness in me 
how very much I (still) want my internal life to be transparent to her; and I can 
only make it so by engaging in it in this particular way. The internalised figure 
comes to occupy the entire space of consciousness, but the power to veto my 
character from no one else but me (or so I like to think).63 
We witness some such awareness (however inarticulate) dawning upon 
Neoptolemus. The demands made on his nature conflict his father would be 
proud at both his truthfulness and his dutifulness, but not necessarily at one 
having been sacrificed to the other. We have two cross-sections of 
Neoptolemus' psychology, separated by a momentous divide of life-experience. 
Two times he is standing under the gaze of a future shame, two times his 
nature furnishes him an argument to ward it off (11. 89; 902-6). Only the latter 
time the argument succeeds, but only so, significantly, because a yet 
uninterpreted shame has been fermenting in him from the very start When he 
exclaims, "I shall be seen in disgrace; that is what has long been paining me" (1. 
906), he does nothing more than express the fact that he has finally pinpointed 
the locus of his pain. 'From the very starf, because the graduation of pain into 
unequivocal mortification is, I submit, only the logical climax of a process 
triggered by his very decision 'to cast off shame'; and it is this decision, precisely 
5 9
 This is to forestall the impression that everyone I imagine centrally is someone I identify with. I do, of 
course, in a sense identify, but I do so only transiently, not disposibonally 
«o Wollheim (1984), ρ 218 
6 1
 We should keep in mind the distinction between the activity of centrally imaging oneself, which is 
indubitably internal, and the imagined activity, which is, relative to the imagined situation, external 
6 2
 Centrally imagining my mother is, as it were, peripherally imagining my own centrally imagining her 
The vortex of indeterminacy which seems to threaten this account is, I think, checked by very real limits 
to our powers of imagination One of these limits being, as already pointed out, the impossibility of 
transcending my centrally imagining her 
6 3
 It goes without saying that such mechanisms are concealed from us most of the time and, in many 
cases, may never come to the fore 
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in virtue of the identificatory ties with his father, of which the effect will 
become clear with a decelarated reflexive loop. 
Prospective shame, therefore, in some cases at least, is not necessarily 
something other (fear together with imagination) than shame. What 
Neoptolemus undergoes when shame eventually perplexes him is perhaps 
more adequately described as the amplification of a suppressed shame 
retrieved by an extrapolative imagination. But, and this is important, it still 
involves the imagination oí future disgrace and ensuing shame. Since shame 
'looks to who he is', the peripheral vision, in the eyes of his father, of his future 
self, chiselled by what he is now, at this very moment, in the course of 
accomplishing (as a result of his ignoring his father's envisaged verdict on his 
motive for doing it) is elicited by and feeds back into his current state. Shame, 
so to say, at what one is doing is excavated, sustained, or rather, enhanced by 
shame at what one will be as a result of this doing having been done. The 
extrapolative imagination is both vehicle and originator of a fully conscious, 
undeniable shame.64 
So prospective shame twice over (in both of its forms distinguished 
earlier) determines Neoptolemus' moral awakening. The first time it presents 
itself as a reason, but, because its overriding importance goes unacknowledged, 
it recedes into the background. The second time this very misappreciation 
virtually conditions its second, causally efficacious, occurrence. Shame, so to 
speak, recule pour mieux sauter. What, at first, autonomous imagination was not 
able to convey now obtrudes itself so imperiously that it cannot be repressed 
any longer: what it is like to be the person who does what he, Neoptolemus, is 
in the course of accomplishing. Only this, in the words of Gide's 'immoralisf, 
'palpitante découverte' can motivate him to do something 'praiseworthy' in 
Aristotle's eyes: to prevent the completion of the disgraceful act 
9. Neoptolemus is wrong in thinking that he can give his nature the slip. 
The loose conjunction 'that is my nature, and it was also my father's nature' (1. 
89) suggests that these, held together by the ties of contingency, drift idly side 
by side in the shallows of his psychology, misleadingly betokening to him a 
lightness of being which turns out to be a mere figment of his own making. 
They cloak the inescapable fact that there is a necessity of sorts inhering in his 
character, his identity. In the Oedipus at Colonus we get a sense of the 
imperiousness of this complex, when Antigone tries to persuade her brother 
Polynices not to destroy Thebes, the latter proving to be unyielding in the face 
of the demands of consequentialist rationality: 
ANTIG Why must you be angry once more, brother7 What proñt [kerdos] do you gam by the 
rum of your country' 
M
 Formally, the condition resembles that of the 'pale criminal' "destres reinforce the very beliefs on 
which we might expect them to be conditional, and beliefs in turn are the products of desires whose 
fulfilment they anticipate", Wollheim (1993), ρ 127 
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POLYN To run away is shameful [aiskhron] and it is shameful for me, the senior, to be mocked 
like this by my brother. (Oed Col 1420-3)*5 
Neoptolemus yields to the prospect of future rewards. However, he errs, 
and he errs, however understandably and inevitably, on the side of 
subjectivity. 
Following, once again, Richard Wollheim, we may analyse the 
phenomenology of a mental state into, on the one hand, its intentionality or 
thought-content and, on the other, its subjectivity or experiential character (the 
'feel', or 'what-it-is-like'66 for the subject to be in that state). As Wollheim points 
out, there are insuperable difficulties involved in describing the determinable 
property of subjectivity of a particular mental state. But we can, in however 
tenuous terms, isolate it, by performing the following test We should ask 
ourselves whether it is conceivable, while holding constant complete 
intentionality, to have another kind of experience with that same though-
content6 7 "The answer Yes must not be understood to commit us to envisaging 
just what it would be like if it did change: all the question asks us is whether in 
the broadest terms change is conceivable."68 If Yes, then we have succeeded in 
isolating i t 
This admittedly meagre result should already serve to mitigate our 
verdict of Neoptolemus' misappreciation. We can extend its findings to matters 
of motivation. The twofold structure presents us with two courses for 
motivation to take. It can be conducted through the intentionality of a mental 
state by itself, ignoring its subjectivity, as when a certain uneasiness arouses a 
mental state consisting of a sequence of articulate thoughts ('I cannot do this', 
'It is against my nature', 'What would my father think of me?'). There is 
motivational force in this state, but it is nothing compared to the very same 
uneasiness eliciting a state amounting to full-feathered shame, that is, the very 
same intentionality accompanied by flushing of the cheeks, the inarticulate 
wish to evaporate instantaneously and all the usual symptoms. In this case, 
motivation exploits the integral phenomenology.69 
Two characteristics about this second state of affairs call for our 
attention. In the first place, impulses exploiting the entire phenomenology 
have, in Wollheim's words, a 'very special efficacy7, and I construe this phrase 
as meaning not only that their motivational force is greater than that of 
exclusively intentional impulses, but that it is so, partly, because of their 
peculiarity; it makes them stand out against other types of states. Secondly, they 
precipitate imagination about what to do or, particularly in the case of shame, 
what to be.70 The imagination, be it conscious, pre-, or unconscious,71 
6 5
 The translation is, once again, Lloyd-Jones' 
66
 This expression ultimately derives from the tide of Thomas Nagel's famous article on 'what it is like to 
be a bat', Wollheim (1993), ρ 65&n2 
67
 Wollheim (1984), pp 38-9, gives the following example "So, seeing the eucalyptus trees bending in the 
wind, we ask ourselves whether we could see just what we currently think we are seeing but do so 
through having a different land of experience " 
« Wollheim (1984), ρ 39 
« Wollheim (1993), ρ 121-2 
™ Wollheim (1993), ρ 122 
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intensified by an enhancement of its vivacity and its persistence, charges the 
state with imperiousness. 
For prospective shame, and by implication, one's nature, to attain to 
motivational supremacy, to acquire the status of a compelling reason, it is 
imperative to know what is at stake in an attempt to subvert its commands. The 
first Neoptolemus cannot yet know this, because the reason remains too 
autonomously abstract The prospect of shame is just that, a prospect To the 
second Neoptolemus, because the cognitive manipulations are controlled by 
shame, the prospect is endowed with all the lure it can possibly have. 
Resignation in shame is simply not a feasible option to him. If he does not want 
to become the person who is the logical consequence of what he is now doing, 
he must, in some way, change his behaviour. That is, it becomes necessary for 
him, relative to his identity (and therefore necessary in a quite absolute sense), 
to undo the harm he has already caused (1.1249). 
Experience, which we have seen to be one pillar of ethical paideia, 
teaches, by way of making clear what it means to disobey the dictates of one's 
nature, something essential about its resilience, its boundaries. The experience 
of prospective shame, the self-regarding emotion involving the extrapolation of 
who one will be as a result of one's current behaviour, is the undisputed 
vehicle for an important increase in self-awareness. And an integral part of this 
self-awareness consists in an increased knowledge of what one must do, in 
order to become who one is.72 
We should not, of course, suppose that, when Aristotle attributes his 
confession to 'noble pleasure', he thinks Neoptolemus is lured into discharging 
by the prospect of having great fun.73 The expression 'noble pleasure', relative 
to the circumstances, could be more plausibly called 'relief. For an adequate 
understanding of the emergence of a motive to do anything noble the fix 
Neoptolemus has brought himself in is indispensable, for his perception of it 
gradually replenishes his mind with the central insight that in general, it is 
pleasurable to act in accordance with one's nature. 
Neoptolemus comes, so to say, to learn the true meaning of what it is to 
be a philokalos. Being, by nature, a lover of truth-telling, the very act of side-
stepping this beloved virtuous practice only deepens its meaning and, by 
implication, what it means to him. But, as I shall argue in the next chapter, this 
is still not enough to make him a true philokalos; a considerable amount of 
reflection is needed. Reflection conducted with terms buttressed by a deeper 
semantics is more likely to be effective than the self-stultifying reiteration of the 
71
 Implying, of course, that, as Wollham rightly remarks, in addition to introspection, self-interpretation 
is called for 
72
 This may very well be the reason why Aristotle says that the many, in refraining from doing what is 
disgraceful, only obey the dictates of fear of Umana This word, carrying connotations of vengeance and 
retribution, as against kolasis, meaning checking or correction, may be taken to convey that the pain 
administered is not for the sake of the well-being of the wrongdoer, but to satisfy the relnbutor (Rh 
1369M2-3, cf EN 1180a9) From the side of the subject that is punished, even a hmona which is at the 
same time a kolasis is not construed as accruing to him on behalf of his well-being, but as a (however 
diluted) form of sadism Compare Rawls (1971), § 70, on 'the morality of authority' 
73
 In that case the expressions of his 'perplexity', his 'bemg pained' etc (U 895-913) 
would amount to just another lie 
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dictates of conventional morality, as we hear Neoptolemus do when countering 
Odysseus arguments.74 The emergence of self-control must be located in this 
process; it is here that the subjugation to reason takes place. Along this path, 
prospective shame ultimately spawns a truly efficacious, imperious, and 
dominant desire for what is inherently noble, and not what accrues to the agent 
consequentially. 
In other, i.e. Aristotle's words, it is possible to be simultaneously 
motivated by shame and the desire for the noble (EN 1116a28). Still, this is not 
to say that the one glosses, or is merely explicative of, the other. They have to 
telescope. And when they do, the mention of shame suffices, as in the parallel 
passage on 'citizenly' courage from the Eudemian Ethics (ЕЕ 1229al3; 1230al7), 
in which any reference to a desire for the noble fails. 
10. Neoptolemus' retort to Odysseus, that he prefers to err while acting 
nobly (falôs drôn examartaneiri) than to win badly (nikan kakôs), speaks volumes. 
The rhetoric of conventional morality Neoptolemus resorts to in order to rebuff 
Odysseus' arguments, although not entirely deprived of content, is still 
relatively empty. This, however, does not boil down to saying that he is 'not 
really7 committed to it; it only shows something about how far this 
commitment, in the face of life-experience, goes. Neoptolemus cannot in fact, 
be more committed to i t 
As already noted, we cannot simply say, then, that Neoptolemus suffers 
from a complete lack of self-understanding. What we could say is that this 
awareness of who he is and what that stands for has not yet, to use an 
expression of Aristotle, 'become natural' to him, or is not yet 'grown together' 
(sumphuênai) with him (EN 1147a22). This 'becoming natural' is a time-
consuming process which leads along the tortuous, long-winded path which 
Aristotle sometimes calls 'experience' (EN 1142al5-6). 
In the next chapter I shall continue my account of the emergence of self-
control for which we have, in this chapter, prepared the ground. To summarise: 
what Sophocles has bequeathed to us is the portrayal of a human being who, by 
placing himself in a position which he senses to be 'unlike' his nature, 
undergoes a tremendous deepening of his self-understanding which would 
have remained inaccessible to him had he, from some indeterminate motive, 
not got into that position. A primeval experience, the medium of which is 
prospective shame in the strong sense of the term, a subject naturally liable to 
the workings of shame may undergo a momentous reshuffling of the items in 
its motivational repertoire, so that what formerly was one reason among many 
becomes the paramount determinant not only for action, but for deliberation as 
well. If this has been accomplished, we may call the person self-controlled. 
Shame has succeeded to subdue the motivational appeal of the baser appetites. 
But this is running ahead of my account 
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6 
Canvassing conflict 
1. Philoctetes' heart-rending dialogue with the chorus of sailors is 
interrupted by the entrance of Odyseus and Neoptolemus, quarrelling and 
altercating. The latter, determined to make amends for the harm he has caused, 
now proves impervious to Odysseus' entreaties not to return Heracles' bow to 
Philoctetes: 
ODYSS Will you not tell me why you are hurrying back in such haste7 
NEOPT TO put right the error11 made [hos' exêmarton] before. 
ODYSS What you say is dreadful' What error did you make [hi d' hamarba (is ft«]? 
NEOPT Obey mg [pithomenos] you and the entire army-
ODYSS YOU did what thmg that was not proper for you [ou sot prepon]7 
NEOPT I overcame a man with shameful [mskhrais] trickery and deceit. (Phil 1222-8) 
The puzzled Odysseus, groping for an explanation, is obviously 
searching for the key to the decipherment of Neoptolemus' hazy answer to his 
first question. The idiom of 'error' (hamartia) and its kindred is, apparently, still 
too unspecific to render further questions redundant Neoptolemus' reply to 
the effect that his error consists in his yielding to Odysseus (instead of, 
presumably, hearkening his own inner voice), is not, at least not primarily and 
on the face of it, a description of a moral error; it describes the error which has, 
so to say, efficiently or historically caused his trouble, being a misjudgement of 
the self. It is a moral error only by implication. Odysseus, upon grasping this 
implication, throws in a question concerning the 'appropriateness' (prepon) of 
the action prompted by the misjudgement It queries the moral charge of the 
action as against the moral character from which it emanated. 
The replies are not just interchangeable descriptions; both descriptions 
occupy an opaque context We can distinguish them, roughly, in the following 
way. Neoptolemus expresses, in this bit of dialogue, both regret and shame. He 
regrets his surrender to Odysseus and he is ashamed of his perfidy towards 
Philoctetes. We should attend to the distribution of these feelings; whereas 
regret is more likely to latch on the misjudgement, shame is more germane to 
1
 For reasons lo become clear presently I prefer to adopt a translation of hamartia and its cognate verb in 
this passage, exhamartanè, which is neutral on the moral/non-moral distinction For nonmoral hamarba 
seeEN1142M0 
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the moral incongruity of act and character. Neoptolemus reformulates the two 
desciptions in his decision to make up for his mistakes: 
The error I made was disgraceful [ten hamartian aiskhran hamarton], and I shall try to undo it! 
(Phil 1249) 
This line, fusing an epistemic misjudgement with its moral implications, 
pointedly captures Neoptolemus' insight a deficit in self-appreciation spills 
over into first-rate moral wrong. 'Moral' does not only point to the harm done 
to others; it touches a deeper layer. The hamartia corrodes the self, both object 
and subject of the misjudgement because it is an infringement on the 'ethics of 
belief: 'one should have known better'. But at this level as well it extends 
beyond one's own person; it both sullies the memory of one's ancestors and 
causes them to 'turn in their graves'. Regardless of his own solution to the 
theoretical nods these matters be, Aristotle registers general agreement to the 
effect that the vicissitudes of progeny, depending on degree of relationship, do 
have some influence on our ascriptions of eudaimonia to the dead (EN 1100a29-
30; 1101a22-4). And it should be recorded that beliefs in affairs like these are 
very helpful in creating the conditions they report 
2. There are, of course, both different degrees and modes of self-
understanding, and not every one of them will have the same effects on 
behaviour. Shame and regret, it would seem, involve different modes of 
reflection. Just as there is something like prospective shame in the weak sense, 
there is prospective regret, typically appealed to and condensed in the 
following piece of Hollywood rhetoric: "(I warn you,) you're gonna regret 
this". Yet shame and regret should be carefully kept apart, both intentionally 
and subjectively. John Rawls pinpoints the distinction thus: "Regret is the 
general feeling aroused by the loss or absence of what we think good for us, 
whereas shame is the emotion evoked by shocks to our self-respect a special 
kind of good."2 
For reasons which should be evident by now, Rawls' characterisation of 
the distinction is hardly more than skin-deep. Contrary to shame, regret does 
not require an internalised other; in having the prospect of regret one just 
centrally imagines oneself having done something, rather than occupying other 
perspectives in the imagination. Others are peripheral or functional 
embellishments to the envisaged scene. (This is not to say that the feelings are 
mutually exlusive: Neoptolemus may both regret and be ashamed of his 
doings; he may also regret to have suffered an injury to his self-esteem.) 
On the other hand, one may have spent all conceivable effort in a piece 
of deliberation, be sure that one could not have done better than that, and still 
regret that the action went wrong because of intervening factors. Although we 
often, in such cases, soothe ourselves by saying that, in view of our efforts, 'we 
need not feel ashamed', this topical tranquillizer does not refer to the substance 
2 Rawls (191), pp 442-3. 
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of our deliberations, but rather to the ethics of belief: we did ail we could 
possibly do to make the decision we made, that is, we have not resigned to 
inertia or remediable ignorance. Needles to say, one of these intervening factors 
may be a sudden upsurge to do something contrary to our deliberated decision. 
This is, we know by now, one possibile description of akrasia. 
When Aristotle distinguishes vice (kakia) from akrasia, he resorts to the 
susceptibility of (agenf s) regret 
The intemperate man is, as was said, not capable of regret [metamelêtikos]; for he abides by his 
deliberate choice [emmena th prohcuresei]; but every [pas] akratic man is capable of regret. That 
is why it is not like we expressed it m our formulation of the perplexity [i.e. at 1146a31-b2], but 
the former is incurable, the latter curable; for moral deficiency is like a disease such as dropsy 
or consumption, whereas akrasia is like epileptic fits [fois eplêpHkots]; for the former is, but the 
latter is not, a continuous badness. (EN 1150b29-35) 
Akrasia, because it does not like vice, go unnoticed by the subject (ou 
lanthaneî) (EN 1150b36), gives a hold for cure (infos), and the liability to regret 
points to a certain consciousness of a discrepancy between a deliberate choice 
and the action actually performed. 
The absence of shame from this particular context is telling. Aristotle is 
unequivocal about akrasia's disgracefulness (aiskhra) (EN 1149a24; b2). What is 
more, the akratic acts voluntarily (hekôn) (EN 1152al5-6)3 and shame is felt at 
voluntary wrongs (EN 1128b28-9). Part of my thesis is that shame makes the 
difference between self-control and akrasia. Whereas the self-controlled person 
is someone who has learnt to abide by his decision through prospective shame, 
the akratic is not deterred from the akratic action, because the ex post facto 
experience of shame does not strike him as a real possibility. 
'Mere' regret, or metameleia, which is not among Aristotle's pathê tes 
psukiiês, or affections of the soul,4 is not likely to have a comparable restraining 
force, its focus being confined to the performed action. It functions as an index 
in the determination of 'involuntary' or 'countervoluntary' action (EN 1110M8-
lllla21), and it has been argued that the corresponding regret involves the 
rejection of oneself as being the originator of the action (either knowingly or 
unknowingly), and that this rejection is "best characterised as the opposite of 
the postpractical acceptance that is logically expected in connection with 
voluntary actions performed."5 According to Aristotle, the akratic does not 
seem to be obsessively bothered by the blows his action may have dealt to his 
reputation, and this is very likely to hamper progress, that is, to practically 
implement his deliberated desires. 
The disease analogy corroborates this. The interstices between the 
occurrences of akrasia offer ample occasion for regret and even provide, to use 
a term of Bishop Butler's, 'cool hours' for distanced reflection. However, as 
already noted, it is quite possible to regret things one does not take oneself to 
3 Cf EN 1136a31-M4 
4
 Regret is to be found among Descartes' passions, tes Passions de l'Ame, art 209 His description is not 
essentially different from that of Rawls in focussing on squandered goods 
5
 Broadie (1991), pp 140-1 
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be responsible for. Regret, therefore, is not necessarily something we learn 
from; for the experience of regret is compatible with dissociating the action 
from the self. 
When, in Dostoevski's novel The Idiot, Rogoshin is about to delve his 
dagger into Prince Myshkin, the sight of the tatter's paroxysm of epilepsy 
transfixes him in his murderous pose. The author goes on to interpose the 
following observation to account for the miraculous deliverance of his hero: 
It is a well-known fact that epileptic fits, the epilepsy itself, come on instantaneously. At that 
instant the face suddenly becomes horribly distorted, especially the eyes.6 Spasms and 
convulsions seize the body and the features of the face. A terrible, quite incredible scream, 
which is unlike anything else, breaks from the chest; m that scream everything human seems 
suddenly to be obliterated, and it is quite impossible, at least very difficult, for an observer to 
imagine and to admit that it is the man himself who is screaming. One gets the impression that 
it is someone inside the man who is screammg. This, at any rate, is how many people describe 
their impression; the sight of a man m an epileptic fit fills many others with absolute and 
unbearable horror, which has something mystical about it. 
The paroxysms evoke, both in spectators and (afterwards) in the subject 
itself, a heightened sense of self-alienation or rather, self-forgetfulness. By 
identifying the attacks with the disease the narrator appears to be detaching it 
from its subject; instead of a permanent disposition for intermittent outbursts, 
the disease is (in an extensional sense) the collection of seizures.7 The self, as it 
were, is time and again invaded and 'taken possession of (epilambanein) by the 
continual popping into and out of existence of epilepsy. In this way, the self not 
suffering from it, the 'usual' or 'normal' self, can be conveniently set apart from 
the self episodically overcome by it 8 
In Metaphysics Θ 3, Aristotle scorns the Megarian mistake on 
potentialities: as if a builder looses the capacity to build when not actually 
building (Met 1046b29-36).9 This position, he says, is patently absurd, for (gar) 
in that case 
it is clear that there will be no builder if he does not build (for being a builder [to oikodomm 
emai] is being capable of building [ίο dttnatôi anm otkodoman]), and it is the same with the other 
crafts. (Met 1046b33-6) 
6
 [Probi] 960al8, where Aristotle (if he is the author) discusses the question why of all animals human 
beings alone are prone to squinting, one of the answers proposed ties it with epilèpsis, saying that 
whenever if occurs causes squinting 
7
 We should note that Aristotle talks about epileptic fits (ta epilêptika), thus stressing their intermittent, 
episodic character He could have employed the term epilêpsts ([Probi] 960al8), which LSJ s ν , referring 
to this passage, render 'epileptic fit' But if this were its sense the 'whenever it occurs' clause is 
redundant, since an epileptic fit is by definition an occurrence Apparently, the insertion of the 
'occurrence clause' seems (at any rate, to the author of the Problêmata) necessary, because the term 
epilepsia is ambiguous between referring to the disease (dispositional) and its transient manifestations 
(episodic) Aristotle's choice of words is ету careful, so as to bring home the point of fits not firmly 
anchored in the self 
• On the other hand, as Dostoevski himself was well aware, it is the first step to wisdom to integrate the 
disease in one's self After a fit of epilepsy, he frequently experienced shame at the humiliating 
incontinence (not akrasia) caused by it 
' A position which, according to Aristotle, has close affinities to the Protagorean position for something 
will loose its perceptible qualities if it is not actually being perceived (Met 1047a4-6,1010b3O-1011a2) 
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It is essential up to the point of tautology for a builder, a doctor, and, in 
general, any craftsman, to have the potentiality or capacity (dunamis) to practise 
the relevant skill when the appropriate (internal and external) conditions 
obtain. The persistent capacity of the subject is exactly what defines it (in that 
role). A builder, in so far as (hêi) he is a builder, is a subject having as an 
essential property the capacity to build. In the same vein, an epileptic or 
akratic, qua epileptic or akratic, is defined by the 'capacity7, or liability, to be 
overcome by manifestations of the respective 'ailments'. Their appearance of 
triviality notwithstanding, these claims, in so far as they ground actualities in 
permanent dispositions and traits, distinguishing them from mere 
possibilities,10 suffice to show that severing a disposition from its subject may 
critically alter that subject 
Now if the regret focuses on the action, the action, that is, in isolation 
from the self, it need not even be genuine agenf s regret; 'impartial' reflection in 
however cool an hour is as likely to distance the action from the self as to 
perceive it as its perpetrator. Let us hark back to Dennis Nilsen's reaction at his 
surge of murderousness; his (and our) surprise become quite intelligible upon 
conflation of the questions why someone has certain urges or desires and why 
someone acts on them.11 By professing our lack of understanding ("I don't see 
how anyone could do such a thing") we do not only dissociate ourselves from 
the crime and the criminal; we also, by univeral quantification ('anyone') cloud 
our view of our own persons and, by implication, the susceptibility to the more 
ominous thoughts and urgings inscribed in us. 
This is exactly the reverse of the effects of shame. Shame is not like anger 
(or, for that matter, an epileptic fit)12 in inducing a displacement from the self: 
on the contrary, in shame one is painfully conscious of a diminishment or 
reduction of self triggered by something one does, says, thinks, or desires.13 For 
this reason, it is the primary ethical emotion; in the sense, that is, that an 
experience of it presupposes some sort of cognitive awareness of who one, 
10
 This is, among other characteristics, what distinguishes an Anstotehan potentiality from a mere 
possibility Irwin (1988), ρ 229, clarifies the difference m the following way "If I am thrown into the 
water, and manage a couple of swimming strokes to get to the side, I have the potentiality for self-
preservation, and I exercise it by swimming to the side It was because my action was self-preservation, 
not because it was swimming, that some persistent state of mine explained why I did it then No 
persistent state equipping me to swim is needed to explain my action, and it does not actualize a 
potentiality for swimming Trained swimmers, however, have a potentiality to swim, not just to preserve 
their lives, because it is the fact that they are swimming which explains why they do it They have been 
trained for swimming, not (except coincidentally)for saving their lives or making money If this is how 
Aristotle understands potentiality, then he can fairly deny that actual swimming requires a potentiality 
to swim " 
» Wollheim (1993), ρ 124 
12
 Seneca, De ira, 11 2, referring to 'wise men' calling anger a 'short-lived insanity' (brems insania), 
desenbes it as impotens SKI The ensuing depiction of the emotion and its corporeal manifestations are 
conspicuously similar to Dostoevski's portrayal of an epileptic fit Mozart, m a letter to his father (26 
September 1781), on the third ana from Di£ Entführung aus dem berat!, in which we witness the mounting 
rage of Osmin at Pednllo "For just as a man in such a towering rage oversteps all the bounds of order, 
moderation and propnety and completely forgets himself, so must the music too forget itself " But not 
up to the point of being offensive to the ear - which is why Mozart choose a key not too remote from F 
13
 This is, of course, not to say that shame entails self-understanding 
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integrally, is and who one wishes to be. It makes no sense to say "I am ashamed 
at what I've done, but it wasn't me who did it". Shame functions like a two-
way mirror: it enables one to see one's 'dark side' and, beyond this, one's 
receding in ever-diminishing copies. 
However, there is an unhelpful silence on any form of discomfort, on the 
part of the self-controlled agent, at the mere fact of having potentially akratic 
desires. It is only said that the self-controlled man 'knows', in a rather 
Pickwickian way (eidos), that they are base, and that he does not yield 'through 
reason' (dia ton logon) (EN 1145bl3-4). Although the akratic agent is, in some 
minimal sense, aware of the fact that there is something 'surd' or anomalous in 
his behaviour, and that this anomaly is caused by pathos (EN 1145M2-3; 
1150b36), this awareness seems to have little prophylactic force. This, I submit, 
is because it is not lodged in the right pattern of feelings; the sense of shame, 
and its prospective workings, is what makes the difference. So we must find 
some way of bringing shame to bear on self-control, and once again this will 
require explicit examination of the implicit 
3. Self-control is more like virtue than akrasia (ЕЕ 1223Ы1-2), since it 
entails enacting the deliberate choice formed. The self-controlled person, 
although not being led by strong and base appetites (iskhurai kai phaulai 
epithumiai), stili has them, contrary to the temperate person, who has succeeded 
in taming them (EN H19all-20).14 The difference between akrasia and self-
control must not I claim, be sought in the respective strength of the desires; 
Aristotle quite unambiguously says that there would be no point in praising 
self-control if the appetites involved were weak (EN 1145b8-9; 1146a9-10; 15). 
However, in spite of its praiseworthiness enkrateia falls short of virtue (ЕЕ 
1227Ы6). In a puzzling (puzzling, that is, because of its position) sentence, 
Aristotle says:15 
Self-control too is not a virtue, but a mixed sort of state [fis mikté]; this will be shown later. (EN 
1128ЬЗЗ-4) 
Stewart deemed this sentence, darting up towards the end of the 
perfunctory chapter on shame, so out of place that he wondered whether it was 
an interpolation.16 It could seem that the remark is there because of a formal 
resemblance of self-control with shame. Neither is a virtue, because both lack 
some essential property: shame ensuing on wrong action cannot possibly be a 
sufficient condition for virtue; self-control is not virtue because of the presence 
14
 Anstotle says that were the self-controlled to relinquish, he would relish the corresponding pleasures, 
whereas the temperate man does not have the moral character (towutos hotos) to enjoy them in defiance of 
reason (1151b34-1152a3) But the self-controlled would not be self-controlled if he were to enjoy those 
pleasures, because then he would be akratic Nothing what Aristotle says, then, counts against my thesis 
that shame checks appetite 
1 5 1 quote the Revised Oxford Translation 
is Stewart (1892), vol 1, ρ 372 
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of strong inferior appetites. If the similarity is purely formal, then the link, it 
must be said, is rather tenuous. 
We can solidify it by asking what can be possibly meant by 'virtue'. In 
the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that shame (aidas) 'contributes to' (sumballetai 
eis)17 temperance, which is why many people take the former to be the genus of 
the latter (££ 1234a30-33). We recall mat shame is the affection hindering, or 
preventing, (kôluesthai) those who 'live by affection' ([hoi] pathei zôntes) from 
error (hamartanein), i.e. especially the young (EN 1128Ы6-8). In this expression 
(as in its cognate, kata pathos zên), the term pathos should be construed as 
epithumia, and, particularly, as a morally inferior appetite, with something 
shameful (typically, a pleasure) for its object In an etymological digression on 
the term akolasia (intemperance), the vice corresponding to temperance, 
Aristotle remarks: 
for what desires disgraceful things [to ton atskhrdn oregomenon] and what has a great capacity 
for growth ought to have been chastened [kekolasthai], and such is appetite and the child [hè 
epithumia kai ho pais]; for it is the case both that children live according to appetite [kat' 
epithumian zôsi\ and that in them the desire for the pleasant [he tou hêdeos orexis] is strongest. 
(EN1119b3-7) 
Significantly, the self-controlled man is said by Aristotle not to 'undergo 
change by affection, i.e. appetite' (dia pathos kai1* epithumian ou metaballei) (EN 
1151b8-9; cf. Ь27-8). On the other hand, the young are 'appetitive' 
(epithwnêtikoi) qua character (ethos), and most disposed to 'follow' (akolouthikoi) 
bodily appetites (among which, notably, sexual desire) (Rh 1389a3-5). Because 
of this propensity to give in to appetite, the virtue most called for in the case of 
the young is temperance (sôphrosunê) (Top 117a31-3). It seems, then, that we can 
explain the odd insertion about enkrateia in the discussion of shame by their 
joint characteristic of falling short of temperance, despite their inhibiting 
workings. 
Now the distinction between temperance and self-control, like that 
between shame and temperance, is also prone to the conceptual muddle of 
popular usage (EN 1145Ы4-5; 1151b32-4). Self-control (in the strict sense) (EN 
1148b9-14) ranges over the same appetites as temperance does (EN 1148a4-6; 
1149a21-4; 1150a9-15; 1151b34-1152a33), the bodily appetites in the sphere of 
the sense of touch, which, as we have seen, accrue to us not in virtue of our 
human, but our animal nature (EN 1118al-b3). Intemperance is shameful 
(eponeidistos) because it brings out the animal in us (EN 1118Ы-3); it makes us 
pursue the 'shameful pleasures' (hai eponeidistoi Mdonai) (EN 1173b21) and it has 
the 'disgraceful' for its object Conceptual confusion instantaneously vanishes 
upon seeing that temperance is incompatible with having any appetites of the 
sort; and a 'hindering disposition' (hê kôluousa hexis) like self-control cannot be 
commendable if what it hinders are morally solid appetites (EN 1146al3-5). 
17
 Solomon, in the Revised Oxford Translation, has 'tends to' This is not the nght sense. The middle of 
sumbailetn typically means 'to contribute', and 1 suggest that it here has the sense of being among the 
factors contributing to some state of affairs, see LSJ s V 9 
18
 Кді is explicative 
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Curbing our darker thrusts seems to be common ground between shame 
and self-control. Both provide us with devices for restraint from more dubious 
kinds of amusement The many, we saw, abstain (apekhestai) from inferior 
pleasures through fear of punishment rather than because of a natural 
endowment which alerts them to their shamefulness (EN 1179Ы1-4). Living by 
affection (pathei zôntes), they pursue both the pleasures appropriate (oikeias) (cf. 
EN 1173a5) to them and those things 'through which' (di' hon) mese will be 
secured. Admittedly, it is tempting to accredit them with the bovine 
psychology of preference we have talked about some chapters ago, since their 
behaviour does not testify to their having the slightest idea of the truly noble 
and the veritably pleasant, let alone that these, in progressive moral 
development, have a tendency to converge (EN 1179M3-6; 1099all-8). It is, 
however, noteworthy that Aristotle allows them some (low-level) form of 
practical reasoning; for they pursue the things 'through which' future pleasures 
are secured.19 
Construing pleasure as good, they accordingly pick out the pleasant as if 
(has) it were, because it appears (phainetai), good (EN 1113a34-b2). This 
amounts to an implicit attribution of the rational species of desire, boulêsis or 
wish; for this capacity requires the (apparent) good for an intentional object 
(EN 1113alS4; 33-b2; Top 146b36-147a4; MA 700b28-9; £E 1235b25-7; Rh 
1369a2-4). Hence, it is careless to construe 'living by affection' as 'living by 
blind instinct' in the way animals lacking memory are supposed to do (DA 
434a5-12; EN 1147b2-3; Met 980a27-b27). Living by affection does not, as we 
argued in the second chapter, boil down to living a completely haphazard life, 
in which the formation of desires and the behaviour issuing from them occurs 
in splendid isolation from reason.20 This is all very natural, unless children, 
who are, according to Aristotle, notoriously enslaved by the affective, are 
supposed to enjoy a mental life radically discontinuous with that of adults. 
At the outset of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes it clear that those 
who live kata pathos are, on exactly the same grounds, not the right hearers of 
his lectures. It is worth while to quote the relèvent passage in full: 
That is why the young шал is not an appropriate hearer of political science; for he is 
inexperienced [apeiros] in respect of the lief of action, and its arguments are both from these 
and about these; furthermore, being is a follower of the affections [tots pathesin akolmithtkos]21 
he will listen vainly and unprofitably [matatôs km anôphelôs]. It makes no difference whether he 
is young m respect of age [neos tên hêhkian] or immature m respect of character [to ethos nearos]; 
for the defect is not in tune, but because of living according to affection [to kata pathos zên] and 
pursuing each particular thing [diôketn hekasta]. For such people the knowledge becomes 
unprofitable, like [it is] for the akratic; whereas for those who forge their desires and act 
according to reason [rots kata logon tas orexets powumenois kai prattousm) it would be very useful 
to know about these things. (EN 1095a2-ll) 
19
 Bumyeat (1980), ρ 83-4, 90n20, allows them some minimal capacity for practical thinking (referring to 
EN 1142Ы8-20 and ЕЕ 1226b30), but denies them a "steady conception of the good to reason from" 
» As Bumyeat (1980), pp 83-1 seems to hold 
21 For akolouihtkos see Rh 1389a5 
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In this particular context, Aristotle is primarily concerned with the type 
of hearer who will most likely implement his recommendations (EN 1095all-2). 
With this objective in mind the young, immature, and akratic can all be treated 
on a par; for in all these cases the knowledge yielded will not come to fruition. 
So we should read the participle construction (tots kata logon tas orexeis 
poioumenois kai prattousi) as a conjunction of two conditions, which have to be 
satisfied jointly: the course will work only with those who both form desires 
according to reason and act in accordance with those rational desires.22 Since 
the emphasis, I claim, lies on action, this description yielded by the 
satifisfaction of these conjoint conditions is not only well-tailored to the ethical 
competence possessed by the virtuous person, but also, minimally, by the self-
controlled person. 
Those living by affection apparently live a staccato life, atomistically 
organised around the pursuit of particular pleasures (diôkein hekasta). Clearly, 
such a life disallows such people neither deliberation nor foresight; but it does 
not even, at any rate not in so many words, rule out a stable, integrated, and 
reflected conception of what is good for the person one happens to be, or, for 
that matter, what is truly, by nature, good.23 Aristotle does not, in this passage, 
explicitly locate the deficiencies in reflection or its outcomes; when suspended 
in mid-air, reflection is as idle as a day-dream.24 
However, the term 'particular' (hekasta) does seem to point to a defective 
conception of one's moral development over time. Although nobody craves 
(epithumei) to be intemperate, the intemperate craves the gratification of the 
related appetites in particular actions (ta kath' hekasta) (EN 1119a31-3). The 
shamefulness of a vice is proportional to the voluntariness (hekousia) of the 
particular deeds constituting the process of habituation (ethismos) leading up to 
it; and actions motivated by sheer (inferior) pleasure (di' hêdonên) are 
indubitably voluntary, originating in oneself and accompanied by a 
'knowledge' of the particular circumstances (eidoti ta kath' hekasta) in which the 
action takes place (EN Hlla24-b3; 1119a21-6). Such actions characteristically 
elicit shame (EN 1128b28-9), that is, when one is among the lucky few endowed 
22
 It is more probable, then, that fan liiôketn hekasta at £N 1095a8 should be read as being explicative of 
kata pathos zen in the same line (cf EN 1156a32-3) For connection of the expressions kata pathos/pathei zên 
with actual pursuit, see EN 1179ЫЗ (dwkousi), 1156a32-3 (diôkousi), with actual error, EN 1128Ы7-8 
(hatnartanem) 
2 3
 This seems to be exactly the plight in which the mokhthêros or vicious person finds himself This is why 
Aristotle says, at EN 1095b21, that the lived out good which their lives manifest 'happens' to have 
something to be said for it It is not an essential feature of their way of life that they act according to a 
conception, rather they do not entertain something like a conception of it But this does not mean that 
they have no conceptions in other areas, or that they do not have the capacity for instrumental 
rationality 
24
 This is confirmed by the application of the (secondary) potentiality/actuality distinction to 'living' 
(sen) In the case of human beings, living in the strict sense (tunos) is by Anstotle defined as the actuality 
(energeia) of thinking (noem) (EN 1170al6-9) Accordingly, living by affection, albeit not distinctively 
human, does not, in itself, exclude thinking The distinctively human life is a practical life according to, 
or not without, reason (FN 1098a3-8), and by implication, it must be the active, not the dormant life of 
action which Anstotle has in mind Virtue which lies unpractised (apraktem) for an entire lifetime is not 
going to make for eudaimoma (EN 1095M-1096a2,1098b3O-3,1102b-ll), since eudmmonem is constituted 
in living as an activity (en toi zên kat energeni) (FN 1169b28-31) 
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with the capacity to experience it (EN 1179Ы1-3). The feedback mechanisms 
inherent in shame enable one to forge the desired connection of a particular 
action with one's self over time. 
It is my central thesis that prospective shame is not only the vehicle and 
instrument for canalising the motivational flow, but also the organizing 
principle of practical reasoning. Aristotle's insistence on the affective, and 
therefore (i.e. by definition) corporeal, nature of shame bears testimony to its 
countervailing force in the likewise physiological change involved in the 
experience of appetite (DA 403a7; 24-5; EN 1128Ы0-5; 1147al4-8; 1178al4-6).25 
But since it involves, at the lowest level, rudimentary practical reasoning in the 
form of the manipulation of images, it is capable of momentously and 
decisively directing and fashioning reflection on who one is and, feeding into 
the future, who one wants to become.26 
4. Aristotle repeatedly insists on a good upbringing as a prerequisite for 
his intended beneficiaries; this means that the moral learner has to have at his 
disposal the right patterns of experiencing pleasure and pain in the face of 
action (EN 1094b27-1095a2; b4-6; 1099al7021; 1103b23-5; И04Ь8-13; 1172a20-3; 
1179b29-34; 1180al-4). As the case of Neoptolemus shows, this fabric of 
evaluative responsiveness is not an airtight protection against moral failure. A 
good upbringing, then, cannot be more than a prerequisite for being a hearer of 
Aristotle's lectures; there is nothing to vouch for conversion into action. 
However, being well-bred by right habituation provides one with an 
ineradicable motivational structure which can be suppressed only to strike back 
with double force. 
Neoptolemus is clearly mistaken about the distribution of imperiousness 
among his motives for action. The constitution of his character is an articulate 
reason, but it is still a very sterile one, inconspicuously figuring on a 
sumptuous menu as one dish among numerous others to choose from. Yet 
articulacy means that there is a thread for rational persuasion to clutch - be it as 
thin as gossamer, yet strong enough to tie a noose with, as Odysseus senses). To 
understand what happens to Neoptolemus it is necessary to appreciate that his 
'nature' is an articulate consideration open to him. For experience renders this 
reason more robust, by infusing its key terms with, so to speak, a richer 
semantics. 
Although this phenomenon is intractably volatile and resistant to 
description, it may perhaps be made more palpable in an indirect way, by 
2 3
 The affections of the soul have a material component· their definitions are 'enmattered' (enuloi) and 
need a specification of the bodily conditions for their occurrence (DA 403a25) 
2 6
 The other condition found in this passage, practical experience, does not stand apart from the 
motivational tandem To be sure, if we take it at face value, the condition is of an epislemic nature, 
pertaining to the suitable mode of receptivity in view of the peculiar character of the arguments to come, 
ineluctably generalizing in the face of the contingency of their subject-matter (EN 1094Ы1-9) But in view 
of their projected motivational appeal, it is likely that this condition is merely functional or 
preconditional The bestowal of motivational force on his words is to a substantia] extent devolved or 
delegated to their recipients It is clear that there are strong hints of motivational intemalism here 
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means of what I rather artificially call 'utterer's opacity'.27 Utterer's opacity is 
not a test operating with substitution of terms entailing a switch in truth-
values, but rather with substitution of utterers entailing a loss or gain in 
importance of the utterance. Holding constant, on the one hand, intentionality 
of an utterance, and, on the other, the subjective state of its recipient (excluding 
knowledge about the utterer), a type expression may, for a certain person, gain 
and loose semantic force on several of its occasions relative to the information 
about the utterer available and the context in which it is uttered. There is a 
special reflexivity to the notion, since it is not possible to say that 'we are all 
familiar with if; for it is precisely the fact that we are not which is responsible 
for its capriciousness. 
Take a type expression with a stable truth value, paradigmatically a 
cliché like "life goes on". We learn, in the course of life, to differentiate 
important and meaningful tokens from trivial and meaningless ones. 
Undeniably, it makes a difference by whom and in what context the phrase 'life 
goes on' is offered as consolation when one is in deep distress; in one case one 
feels fobbed off with a bromide, in another the words embody nothing short of 
wisdom.28 It is this sort of experience we try to lay hold on when we say 
something like "Only now I have come to know what these words really 
mean", misguidedy mixing up the (lexical) meaning of a term and the 
subjectivity in which an occurrence of it is embedded. Of course, we have 
known all the time what these words mean. 
The appeal to utterer's opacity, which is only a heuristic device, should 
not be taken to imply that, in someone's set of reasons, complete intentionality 
of a reason should be kept constant This only served to make the point In fact, 
it might work only in the case of certain key terms. Thus, on the intra-personal 
level, we may, by holding constant the key terms in an articulate reason 
('nature' in Neoptolemus' cae), register the shift in subjectivity on its 
occurrence in deliberation. However, it is at least conceivable that, if we 'time-
slice' Neoptolemus, we get, on either side of the watershed of experience, two 
mental states with one and the same thought-content, but with two radically 
different subjectivities. It is important to see that this only goes for articulate, 
propositionally formulated reasons; that is, reasons which figure in a fully 
conscious course of deliberation, much in the way that Neoptolemus' nature 
figures as an inadequate articulate reason. 
What I want to argue for is this. Once one has seen that one's nature is 
the single most important reason available, this reason, as it were, swallows the 
entire repertoire. It is not any longer one dish on the menu, it has graduated to 
being the menu itself. And, when it has come to set the limits for the 
determination of viable deliberative courses, filtering out counternatural 
urgings, it inevitably recedes into the background, to show up only at moments 
27
 The test is an obvious venation of the one deployed in the last chapter 
28
 It is too simple, 1 believe, to say that tnte phrases are deprived of meaning, in some cases they are, in 
some they may even gain in meaning This does not only go for clichés, proverbs, etc, but also (mutatis 
mutandis) for commonplace argumentative strategies and rhetorical figures and tropes It goes without 
saying that utterer's opacity is crucial to the formation of the trust forging the bonds between partners in 
adversity 
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of great (i.e. existential) pressure. This accounts for the background rôle of the 
wish to become a good person. Importance, so to say, is inversely proportional 
to articulacy. Much of the efficacy of self-awareness, I submit; just like, in 
psychoanalytical theory, the very efficacy of a subconscious desire, is located in 
its inarticulacy. 
But we have, in our zeal, dashed past our goal, the description of the 
emergence of self-control. The 'swallowing' described above appears to be one 
stage beyond: incompatible, or mutually conflicting urges are, to the greatest 
extent possible, exiled. This is the condition of the virtuous person. It is my 
contention that self-control exactly coincides with the stage of enriched, or 
deepened, articulacy. The reason is still propositional, but it is not any longer 
abstract, or sterile. What is more, the consideration, since its gain in efficacy is 
grounded in the very impulses it is supposed to counterpoise, since, that it to 
say, its source is one's sincere recognition of these less enlightened pigeon-
holes of one's psychology, and since it is deeply ingrained in the self by ib 
essential connections with the workings of (prospective) shame, sitting, in 
virtue of the imaginative mechanisms described, in judgement over the very 
entertainment of these impulses - in this way, that is, it attains to control. 
5. The physical fullness of Philoctetes' stature may well be the last straw 
which breaks Neoptolemus' back. The cryptical eruptions of compunction 
finally culminate in confession: 
О Zeus, what am I to do [ti drasôp Am I to be doubly convicted as a villain, 
by wrongful silence and by shameful speech [iegôn aiskhtst' epôn]... 
It is not the thought that I will desert you, but rather the thought that I 
will take you on a journey that will cause you gnef, that has long pained me 
[tout' amomai palai]. {Phil 908-13) 
It would surpass the limits to human obstinacy to deny that 
Neoptolemus' predicament amounts to a moral conflict It would also be hard 
to deny that he is, in some sense, deliberating about what course of action to 
take.29 Moreover, shame, by both prompting and directing it, unmistakenly 
plays a decisive role in the deliberation. It will be the task of the rest of this 
chapter to prepare the ground for the integration of shame in Aristotle's 
concept of deliberation. The path leading us towards it will be tortuous, but it 
will have to be trodden. 
It is exactly moral conflict which Davidson contends Aristotle's picture 
of akrasia cannot account for, since it presents us with two unconnected 
contestants, 'reason' and 'passion', "each armed with an argument or 
principle".30 Another image (found in, among others, Plato, Dante, and Butler) 
admits of a third, arbitrating, or adjudicating element the 'will' or 'conscience'. 
Aristotle's image is inferior to this one, since it leaves no room for weighing 
29
 Deliberation, to be rational, does not require clearheadedness, one may deliberate rationally in a 
condition of frenetic affliction 
» Davidson (1980), ρ 35 
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considerations against each other and is thus unable to explain and account for 
cases of moral conflict 'in one person's soul' in general and cases of 
(incontinence in particular.31 
Now if the image Davidson ascribes to Aristotle is trustworthy, then his 
criticism is justified; for conflict to obtain an agent must know more than the 
reason on each side, but 'he must know how they add up'. If it is the case that 
the akratic agent acts against his better judgement, then this presupposes a 
piece of practical reasoning which issues in a conclusion based on all relevant 
considerations. But the two practical syllogisms, both representing one 
contestant in the bipartite picture are completely unilateral; each of them falls 
short of bringing in the rival considerations. 
This line of interpretation is warped by the tacit assumption that for 
Aristotle the practical syllogism represents a rudimentary form of practical 
reasoning "i.e. reasoning about what to do, reasoning that leads to action."32 
We have already made the acquaintance of this contention in the form of 
proposition (2). I alluded to the fact that this assumption has been under severe 
attack in the last couple of decades. It is not part of my strategy to rehearse and 
subsequently to subscribe to these argumente. I shall assume their validity and 
relevance, and proceed to elaborate my own account on their basis. The 
practical syllogism, then, does not represent deliberation, but its upshot, the 
deliberated decision (the major premise) and a pointer to its feasibility here and 
now (the minor premise).33 
6. Admittedly, the so-called 'practical syllogism' is a figment of exegesis.34 
Since I am no advocate of the proliferation of terminology, I suggest that we 
comply with usage. In the following, my objective will be not so much to give a 
comprehensive account of the practical syllogism, but rather to show that 
Aristotle does not intend it to be a complete account of motivation, so as to 
accomodate for a less schematic and more realistic account of practical 
reasoning in which the 'adding up' of reasons has a legitimate place.35 Such an 
account, it is true, is nowhere to be found in Aristotle's extant remarks on the 
3 1
 We have already seen that Davidson does not construe 'against his better judgement' as what is 
conventionally considered right or good, but what the agent holds on the basis of an inspectionf of all 
relevant resons and considerations 
3 3
 Davidson (1980), p. 31 The assumption that the practical syllogism describes or is part of deliberation 
has been successfully and convincingly challenged by John Cooper (1975), ρ 58, according to whom the 
practical syllogism is not conceived as the last step in deliberation, "but rather as a means of making 
explicit the contribution of perception to the performance of an action after a deliberated decision has 
been reached " 
3 3
 Cooper (1975), ρ 50, Sherman (1989), pp 58-9 
3 4
 The Greek equivalent of which this term would be a translation, ho praktikos sidlogtsmos, is not an entry 
in an Aristotelian dictionary An approximation (hot sullogtsmm ton prnktôn) may be found m the sixth 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics (1144a31), but it is unclear whether this is supposed to point to what 
tradition has so vehemently commented on 
35
 I shall have nothing to say on the issues of necessity, causality, or necessitating conditions, since my 
concern with the practical syllogism is only instrumental for my purposes it suffices to show that there 
is evidence that Aristotle situates practical reasoning somewhere else 
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subject But then again, it is a central tenet of my argument that this is exactly 
what is presupposed by it 
Apart from some dispersed remarks which on benevolent interpretations 
could be taken to refer to something like it, the practical syllogism is treated 
thematícally in three contexts by Aristotle, two of them obviously concerned 
with akrasia (DA 434all-21; EN 1146b35-1147bl9), one of them with animal 
movement in general (MA 701a7-bl). To this distinction correspond remarks 
about the nature of its premises or protaseis; in the texts concerned with akrasia 
the basic distinction is that between a universal (katholou) major and a 
particular (kath' hekaston) minor premise (EN 1146b35-1147a7; 25-b5; DA 
434al6-21), whereas the other passage talks about two 'forms' of premises, 'one 
through the good' (dia tou agathou) and one 'through the possible' (dia tou 
dunatou) (MA 701a23-5). 
It is usually held, not implausibly, that the latter corresponds to a 
(major) desiderative premise and a (minor) one in which the concrete 
possibility of conversion of the desire is stated.36 Thus motivation finds full 
expression in the syllogism as it stands; the practical syllogism, to put it 
pointedly, represents nothing but the prototypical desire-belief schedule. 
The schedule is taken to yield a conclusion which is an action: "Since 
there is no distinguishing the conditions under which an agent is in a position 
to infer that an action he is free to perform is desirable from the conditions 
under which he acts, Aristotle apparently identities drawing the inference and 
acting."37 Apparently. Aristotle leaves no room for moral conflict because the 
necessitation of the action precludes the weighing of possible alternatives. The 
action "merely reflects the outcome of a struggle" within the agent38 
Now Aristotle in fact does distinguish these sets of conditions. And, 
therefore, the conclusion is not necessarily an action; action ensues only when 
certain further conditions are satisfied, and these are explicitly (although 
elliptically) stated by Aristotle, but frequently misinterpreted. Let us recall one 
of Aristotle's examples of the practical syllogism (quoted above at the outset of 
the last chapter): 
for instance, if everything sweet must be tasted, and this here, as some one particular thing, is 
sweet, it is necessary [ananke] that he who is capable [fon dunamenon] and is not impeded [me 
kôluomenon] at the same time also acts [harm louto km prattein]. (EN 1147a29-31)3' 
Aristotle says that he who is capable (ton dunamenon) and not being 
prevented (mê kôluomenon) or forced necessarily acts.40 This clause is usually 
»See Nussbaum (1978), ρ 190, Wiggins (1980a), ρ 248 
37 Davidson (1980), ρ 32 
м Davidson (1980), ρ 35 
3 9
 Similar clauses are found in the De motu ammahum "for instance, when one thinks that all men must 
walk, and that one is a man, one immediately walks, and when [one thinks] that no man must walk now, 
and that one is a man, one immediately comes to rest And one performs both actions, unless something 
hinders or compels [an mê h kôliièi ê anankazêi] [performing them]" (MA 701al3-6) 
«SeeSorabji (1980a), ρ 239 
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assumed to refer to external or physical impediments to action41, and it is 
certainly true that external circumstances are part of the conditions which have 
to be fulfilled for action to take place. The assumption, taken grosso modo, is 
quite unwarranted. 
In the first place, while discussing the conditions for actualisation of so-
called 'rational potentialities' (dunameis meta logou)*2 in Met Θ 5, Aristotle says 
that a statement of the condition 'while nothing external hinders' (mêthenos ton 
exô kôluontos) is uncalled-for in an (efficient-causal) explanation of action when 
the necessitating conditions are already specified.43 It emerges that the presence 
of an overruling (kuriôs) desire is a factor which needs to be mentioned apart 
from external conditions (perhaps in the major premise; Aristotle makes no 
mention of it at this juncture); so that we might on one interpretation, take ton 
dunamenon at EN 1147a30 to enclose external circumstances (Met 1048al0-24). If 
it were pointing to them, the me koluomenon-clause at EN 1147a30-l would, 
strictly speaking, be redundant 
Moreover, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle treats aúnamenos as virtually 
synonymous to 'nothing external hindering' (mêden ton exô ekôluen), and has the 
presence of a desire figuring quite autonomously among the determinants of 
action, required for pointing out guilt in judicial rhetoric: "for all, when they, 
being capable, wish [hotan dunamenoi boulêthôsi], act; for there is nothing 
impeding [empodôn gar ouden]" (Rh 1392M9-22).44 
Further, in the Ethics passage, Aristotle immediately goes on (EN 
1147a32) to elaborate his example by describing a universal belief with 
hindering force (kôluousa) being present in (enei) a not mentioned subject; and a 
few lines further (1147a34), he talks about an appetite 'being present in' (enousa) 
that same unmentioned subject These are not atypical, but idiomatical 
expressions which cannot just be glossed over at no cost45 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we have already seen that 
Aristotle describes the inhibiting workings of shame in the very same terms. 
The young, who live according to affection, are hindered by shame (hupo tes 
aidons kôluesthat) (EN 1128bl8). By the same token, enkrateia or self-control is a 
kôluousa hexis (EN 1146al3-4). It would be eccentric (to say the least) to maintain 
that (prospective) shame, an affection, or a mental disposition like self-control 
are external impediments to action. If they were, we would do well to rethink 
41
 Nussbaum (1978), pp 190-3, 343, seems to have mainly external impediments in mind, the only 
internal factor being (following von Wright) a cogmtme one, namely forgetfulness "We will not often 
accept forgetting as an external preventing factor (unless, of course, it is externally induced, as by a drug 
he is given without his knowledge), we will be templed to say he would not have forgotten if he had 
really wanted what we thought he wanted " 
42
 An example of a 'rational potentiality' is the skill of mediane 
« See also Ph 251a28-M0 
** Aristotle sometimes treats the verbs kôluein and emjiodizem on a par, Pit 199Ы8, 26, 255b4, 7,11,12, 23; 
24, 256a2 For the Wietonc passage in the text, see Bumyeat (1996), pp 101-2 If the difference is that 
between dunamenoi ranging over both internal and external conditions (»necessarily yielding action) on 
the one hand, and dunamenoi glossed as médiat ton exô ekôluen (=for the most part yielding action), then 
the EN formula dunamenon kat nié kôluomenon may (with kat exphcativum) include internal conditions 
« Met 1015a26-33, ЕЕ 1224Ь9, 31 
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some fundamental concepts, that of moral responsibility not being the last of 
them. 
7. The presence of rival desires and the absence of external impediments 
need to be stated separately. It is sometimes felt as a problem that when 
Aristotle comes to explain akrasia (EN 1147a24ff.) the akratic appetite is 
represented by Aristotle in a syllogism which is not prescriptively and 
compellingly practical in any absolute sense. What is more, a desire is rather 
loosely appended to the syllogism with which it appears to entertain not more 
than a coincidental connection. The passage quoted above continues: 
When, therefore, the universal [belief] which impedes is present [enei kôluousa] [in the subject], 
and [another universal to the effect] that everything sweet is pleasant, and that this is sweet 
(and this [belief] is active), and appetite happens to be present [tukhêt epithumia enousa], the one 
[belief] tells us to avoid this, but appetite leads; for it is capable [dunatai] of moving each of the 
[bodily] parts. (EN 1147a31-5) 
So stated, the appetitive syllogism is tantalisingly pale, without any trace 
of imperiousness urging its subject to rush towards the object and devour it. 
This is all the more strange if it is this appetite by which the akratic agent is 
overcome; there is not the slightest hint of its irresistibility. Aristotle's evinced 
awareness of the possibility of expressing the 'pro attitude' in absolutely 
prescriptive terms does not quite tally with his leaving it without issue in a 
context which seems to call for it more than that in which he actually deploys it 
(MA 701a32). Had he done so, the introduction of an extraneous appetite would 
have been otiose. But apparently it is not The following line is telling: 
hence it happens [sumbainei] that one behaves akratically attended, m a sense, by reason and 
belief [hupo logon pos kai doxès], not m itself contrary [enantias kath' hauten] to right reason [tot 
orthôi logôt], but coincidentally [kata sumbebêkos] - for the appetite is contrary, but not the belief. 
(EN1147a35-b3) 
The causal sense of the preposition hupo is not mandatory. As reflected 
in the translation, it may also introduce attendant features.46 If we take the 
syllogism that way, that is, as something contingently dependent, for its 
existence, on the presence of the appetite, we may come to see that what at first 
sight might seem to be a weakness in Aristotle's analysis of akrasia, the 
disparate syllogisms not admitting of collateral considerations, is, in point of 
fact, a strength. For the way Aristotle states the matter is supposed to indicate 
that the appetite is not made subservient to reason (ЕЕ 1219b27-31; 1224Ы-2), 
but that it, in turn, determines thought His point is, then, that all thought-
content involved in the akratic desire is a function of it and that it therefore is 
not a consideration in practical reasoning. It is not just the case that Aristotle 
not only does not need, for his account of akrasia to work, the 'adding up' of 
«LSJsv 
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reasons; but rather that it is quintessential that there is not, in akrasia, such 
'adding up'. 
When, in the third book, he comes to distinguish deliberate choice 
(prohairesis) from other psychological attributes with which it is bound to be 
confused he says: 
Foi deliberate choice \prohmresis] a not common to creatures belong reason, but appetite and 
temper [epithumm km thumos] are. And the akratic person acts on appetite [epithumôn], but not 
on deliberate choice; the self-controlled, conversely, [acts] on deliberate choice, but not on 
appetite. Also, appetite is contrary to [enanhoutai] deliberate choice, but not appetite to 
appetite. And appetite is of the pleasant and the painful [hêdeos km qnlupou], deliberate choice 
is neither of the pleasant nor of the painful. (EN Ш1Ы2-8)«7 
Hence Aristotle's remarks about the coincidental nature of the 
contrariety involved are not gratuitous. He is at pains to point out that it is not 
the accompanying doxa which directly counterpoises prohairesis, since this 
would disturb the essential contrariety between the latter and epithumia (cf. EN 
1119Ы1-2). And this he does by right, for it is precisely this what is needed to 
circumvent the control exerted by rational deliberation. What Aristotle wants to 
convey, by his deliberate partitioning off of the practical syllogisms, is that the 
akratic appetite takes its subject by surprise (EN 1145b30-l). What is so 'surd' in 
the problem is this, and nothing else. 
Still, this leaves us at a loss as to the question whether Aristotle can 
accomodate moral conflict in general. I think he can. But as a preliminary, we 
must subject Aristotle's account of deliberation to closer scrutiny. 
8. There is a philosophy of art (music, or sculpture), but there is not a 
philosophy of craft (carpentry, or pipefitting). Crafts, craftsmanship, and the 
related practices, having been continually scoured, pillaged, and squeezed out 
over the centuries in the quest for malleable illustrative material, are the 
disregarded victims of ruthless exploitation. They are (to redeploy the image of 
Alan of Lille) the wax nose of exemplification in Western philosophy. This may 
very well account for the astonishing persistence of certain recurrent errors, 
constituting another integral part of our venerable tradition. 
As late as 1938 R.G. Collingwood, in The Principles of Art, rather violently 
forced the crafts into his service, in order to develop his theory about artistic 
creation. Since it consiste in describing 'the' crafts in terms of overduly 
schematic traits, this device, to show that creation is different from fabrication, 
cannot but beg the central question. Let us briefly mention the two (for my 
purposes) most important characteristics. The first is the distinct conception of 
means and a single end defining the craft. The second the distinction between 
planning and execution: the craftsman's planning amounts to foreknowledge of 
4 7
 This passage supplies additional evidence for the position that the practical syllogism does not 
incorporate deliberation As otherwise endemic to his treatment of akrasia, the terms 'reasoned choice' 
{prohairesis), 'belief' {doxa), and 'nght reason' {ho orthos logos) at EN 1147a35-b3 share one referent, that is 
which practical reasoning issues, namely reasoned choice (see especially tN 1151a29-b22) 
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the desired outcome and the calculation towards this outcome.48 Such 
undifferentiated rigidity plainly defies the demands of realism - and it does so 
on both sides of the comparison. 
We can conveniently associate this conception of craft with a certain 
interpretation of Aristotle's conception of deliberation (bouleusis), as unfolded 
in the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics. A concise version of the picture is 
given by Ross in his 1923 monograph, paraphrasing the locus classicus for the 
means-ends construal (EN 1112bllff.)49: "Now deliberation is about what is in 
our power and can be done. It is about means, not ends; it presupposes a 
determinate end and considers how this can be attained. And, having worked 
back from end to means, it goes further back to the means to the means and 
continues till it has reached a means that can be adopted here and now."50 It 
has been argued that this is the 'restricted and technical' variety of Aristotle's 
ideas on deliberation.51 
We discern the contours of Humean instrumentality, notorious for its 
neutrality between the scratching of a finger and the destruction of the world.52 
Much has been made, in the avalanche of literature of the last few decades, of 
the question whether Aristotle's deliberation should be narrowly conceived as 
solely concerning 'external' means to given ends, much in the way proprosed 
by Greenwood.53 The communis opinio nowadays is that this view of the EN Γ 3 
account leaves too many aspects of actual deliberation off the page. I shall 
neither canvass nor criticize the proposals for legitimate extensions of 
Aristotle's account of deliberation. I shall take up this restricted notion on the 
supposition that if we succeed to make room for the weighing of considerations 
within this, we shall be able to do so on the extended conception. 
One cluster of arguments radiates from a point of translation; the Greek 
term which 'means' is supposed to render, ta pros ta telê/lo telos, is said to cover 
more than just means.54 Reflecting about ends is deeply ingrained in the 
phenomenology of deliberation. Neoptolemus' (rhetorical) ti drosô-question can 
be fitted into a deliberative pattern of seeking 'means' to a given or previously 
fixed 'end' only at the expense of a strained construction. Frequently, 'ends' 
themselves cannot, in turn, be seen in isolation from the 'means', and the 
widening of the term ta pros to telos seems to be an important step in the 
direction of linking them up. 
The preposition pros has a technical use in Aristotle, figuring in one of 
the designations for the categories (of being), that of what is usually called 
48
 Compare Plato's account in the Crary/iis, 389a5ff Collingwood's third characteristic, that of a 
presupposed material to be fashioned into something other, also figures in Plato's account 
« See also EN Ш1Ь27,1112b33-4,1113al3-4 (by implication), ЬЗЧ £E 1226b9-12, MM 1189a8-9, 24, 31, 
Rh 1362al8-9 
» Ross (1923), ρ 206 
51
 For discussion of this thesis, see Wiggins (1980b) 
5 2
 Hume, Treatise, π 3 3, ρ 416 '"Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to the 
scratching of my finger" 
5 3
 Greenwood (1909), pp 46-7 See Sherman (1989), ρ 70n23 for references 
5 4
 Commentators have been relieved to welcome constituents, initially ruled out by Greenwood's 
influential interpretation, among the things 'towards' or 'relative to' the end See e g Wiggins (1980a), 
pp 222-7, Cooper (1975), pp 10-23, Sorabji (1980b), pp 201-5 
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'relatives' (Cat 6a36-8b24). If the preposition is used with a view to this 
technical use, the expression ta pros to telos, in opposition with to telos proper, 
may be construed not as means conceived independently from the end for 
which they are means, but as things-conducive-to-the-end. One does not 
deliberate about ends independently from the things pertaining, or 
contributing, to it This may account for the fact that the object of deliberation 
(to bouleutori) is, in means-ends language, an end. As Aristotle says, no sane 
person deliberates about the coincidental finding of a treasure (EN 1112a27). 
Nobody does this because it is not in our power, and we see this because we 
cannot conceive of a way of exerting influence on it 
However, we need not and I think we should not, give the term its 
stringently technical sense to see the initial plausibility of the interdependence 
of ends and things which contribute to it in whatever way. I venture to contend 
that the term ta pros to telos is severely overdetermined. Recent exegesis, in its 
opposition to the restricted instrumental interpretation, has gone through 
considerable pains to wrest from it a more magnanimous sense; in particular, to 
make deliberation about ends possible. Not surprisingly, this development has 
brought with it its own technicalities. In point of fact, the term is quite 
('deliberately') non-committal and vague; it is a nuclear abbreviation of a 
family to which belong composite expressions like sunteinein pros (EN 1144a24-
5; ЕЕ 1214all) and (sun)teinein eis (ЕЕ 1226Ы1; 1227al7). The contexts in which 
these occur are by no means limited to deliberation; but they are invariably 
teleologica]. 
To be sure, Aristotle says that a doctor, a rhetorician, an administrator, 
'no more than anybody else of the others' deliberates about the end. Who are 
these 'others'? In virtue of what has preceded (EN 1112b2-10)55 and of the rôles 
enumerated we may infer that he has in mind the several types of craftsman in 
a society. Not all crafts, but those which do involve doubt about their 
proceedings in particular situations: for instance, we do not doubt about the 
way we write (ом distazomen pôs grapteon) (EN 1112b2; ££ 1226a34-b2). 
Contingency of its object, indeterminacy of outcomes, subjective uncertainty, 
and the need for deliberation, then, hold equal pace. And, as his reiterated 
msistence on the indeterminacy of its subject-matter evidences (EN 1094Ы1-9; 
1098a20-9; 1104a3-10; 1107a29-31), ethics is intricately entwined in this texture. 
Now when it is said that a rhetorician does not deliberate whether to 
persuade (or not) (EN 1112ЫЗ), Aristotle certainly does not mean that a 
rhetorician does not deliberate, in a concrete, particular case, about whether to 
attempt persuasion or not (EN 1112b24-6). What Anstotle means is this. A 
craftsman has one end, the formal object of the craft A doctor, Aristotle says, 
does not deliberate whether to heal. His very being a doctor is, over and above 
5 5
 Anstotle here links deliberation up with the ontological contingency and (relative) instability of its 
objects, entailing, conform his metaphysical stance, a corresponding lack of subjective certainty This is 
why we do not deliberate about the objects of the scientific disciplines in the strict sense, for these are 
necessary and unalterable 
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the lived subscription to the formal object of the craft56 As such, it is the single 
most important determinant not only of action, but also of deliberation itself: it 
is regulative of the aspect under which 'a case' is seen. To resort to the Freudian 
usage (only for clarificatory purposes): it becomes the 'censor' residing over the 
deliberative system. 
A doctor, then, within the limits of his craft does not deliberate about 
whether to heal, in virtue of being a doctor. Aristotle elsewhere says that a 
doctor does not prove that health is something good (ЕЕ 1218b22-4).57 Taken as 
an empirical observation, Aristotle might mean that a doctor not doubt while 
seeing the relevant cases (or more) sub specie finis. Being doctor is the menu, not 
a course on it It would seem that doubt, relatively neglected in discussions of 
the restricted account, is just what we need for our purposes. 
In the notion of doubt (couched in the verb distazein) as to how 
something is to be done, either in this way or in that, something is revealed of 
the structure of deliberation. It is the structure of the practical problem. The 
term sometimes expresses wavering between two alternatives, and is 
accompanied by the interrogative couple 'either... or... ' (poteron... ê... ) (Met 
1091al4; ЕЕ 1225M9-21) in a theoretical inquiry; at other times Aristotle seems 
to imply that the 'force' of a belief is eroded by doubt, and this presumably the 
case when its contradictory (or contrary) gains in plausibility (EN 1146al-2; 
b26-31). Now if the notion of doubt is so indigenous to deliberation, certainly 
Aristotle allows for the weighing of alternative or competing considerations in 
practical reasoning? 
9. Should we deny that 'doubf is a rather weak expression for the 
perturbation clouding Neoptolemus' mind? Philoctetes trenchantly implores 
Neoptolemus to reveal the causes of what he refers to as Neoptolemus 
'perplexity': 
NEOPT Ahi What am I to do [drôim' egô] next? 
PHIL What is the matter, boy7 Where has your talk strayed to? 
NEOPT I do not know where to turn my words in perplexity [taparon] 
PHIL But what perplexes you [aporets de tou SK]7 Do not say these things, my soni 
NEOPT But that is the point I have now come to in my trouble1 
PHIL Surely the thought of how distasteful my sickness is has not come home to you, so that 
you are no longer taking me on board7 
NEOPT Everything is distasteful, when a man has abandoned his own nature and is doing 
what is unlike him1 
PHIL But you are not doing or saying anything unlike your father, m helping a noble man' 
NEOPT I shall seen to be a traitor, that is what has long been paining me. 
PHIL Not on account of your actions; but your words frighten me' 
56
 This point is made m Wiggins (1980b), pp 225-6 To ate, again, Collingwood's Autobiography (pp 32-
3) "People will speak of a savage as 'confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining food' But what 
really confronts him is the problem, quite transitory like all things human, of spearing this fish, or 
digging up that root, or finding blackberries in this wood " 
57
 Which is not to say that he may not come to doubt his status The question then anses whether we 
would still be justified lo call him a doctor in an wiqiwhped way If we do, as we may, the subject is very 
likely to feel something like uneasiness at the designation 
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NEOPT O Zeus, what am I to do [ft drasô]7 Am I to be doubly convicted as a villain, by 
wrongful silence and by shameful speech7 (Phil 895-909) 
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7 
Shame and deliberation 
1. In the first book of Ovid's Metamorphoses we find the indefatigably 
adulterous Jove mixed up in the following quandary. Upon a presentiment of 
Juno's arrival he transforms his beloved Io into a heifer. When his spouse, 
grown suspicious by her husband's adulterous past, entreats him to deliver the 
beautiful animal to her, he starts deliberating: quidfaciat? "It is cruel to yield his 
love, not giving is suspicious. Shame it is which counsels him in one direction, 
love dissuades him in the opposite. Shame would have been overcome by love; 
but, if his wife (and sister) were denied such a small present, a cow, it might 
appear not to be a cow" (11. 617-21).1 So the poor Io is abandoned. 
Stories like this, skillfully condensed in hexameters, make us, nondivine 
and unmetamorphosed human beings, feel like tightropes balancing on a thin 
ridge between anthropomorphism and speciesism.2 To one side, there is the 
question of personhood of (non-human) animals - which need not detain us 
here.3 To the other side, there is an inescapable sense of the consequences of 
polytheism which makes the stories so intelligible to us. Even the 'father of 
gods and men', Jove (Pol 1259M2-4), for all his supernatural endowments, is a 
moral being, and as such is governed by doubt Jove's deliberation, however 
truncated under the pressure of time, shows us the workings and powers of 
prospective shame: it both contributes to and resolves the practical dilemma. 
And it does so, among other things, with rational calculation as an accomplice. 
This scene from the Metamorphoses serves to introduce the question 
which will plot the course of this chapter: can we amalgamate shame and 
rational deliberation in such a way as to account for the emergence of enkrateia? 
2. Let us take for a starting point where we left the matter at the end of the 
last chapter. Can Aristotle's allowance of 'doubf in deliberation be construed 
as an acknowledgement of the need to account for the pairing off of competing 
considerations so well-entrenched in the phenomenology of practical 
reasoning? I shall argue that 'doubf is only a faint shadow of that most severe 
1
 [Qliiid faciaf crudele suos adihcere amores,/ non dare suspectum est pudor est, qui suadeat tllmc,/ hinc 
dissuadet victus pudor esbet amare,/ sed, leve si mumis sociae genensque tonque/ vacca negaretur, poterai non 
vacca vìdert 
2Cf EN 1145al5-33, Pol 1253a25 
3
 For an interesting discussion with references to the Metamorphoses see Wollheim (19&4), pp 3-10 
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form of moral conflict we have encountered in Neoptolemus' bewilderment If 
such a conflict and the lessons it teaches are to play a significant role in the 
emergence of self-control, we must find a way of integrating it into Aristotle's 
account of deliberation; for we have already seen that the restricted version is 
not particularly hospitable to items transgressing the boundaries of technical 
instrumentality. 
By now it should not come as a surprise that one viable strategy for 
giving Aristotle's account of deliberation a more liberal appearance is 
conditional upon an extended scope of la pros to telos. We shall, therefore, 
comply with those advocating a broader construal of the term, so as to enlarge 
the class of items beyond means to a pre-established end; and we shall do so 
only to take this development to its logical conclusion. Those who are not 
interested in this part of the argument can take comfort from the fact that it 
bifurcates, at this very point into a detour and a short cut The reader who 
wishes to go all the way should just read on. The reader who wants to save 
time and trouble can conveniently skip the rest of this section and the next 
Before we expose the expression ta pros to telos to a yet different angle of 
interpretation, however, we should attend to some preliminaries, for it is worth 
our while, out of expository caution, to disentangle some strands which it is an 
exegetical commonplace to run together. Let us, once more, switch back to the 
procedures of dialectic as exhibited in the Topics. 
Dialectical examination begins from a problèma (or thesis) delineating the 
subject-matter (peri hou) of the ensuing debate.4 Not every question couched in 
the form of an interrogative disjunction of contradictory propositions is eo ipso a 
dialectical problem (problèma dialektikori), or, to put it circularly, a problem 
worthy or capable of dialectical scrutiny. There are requirements of a more 
substantive nature (which is not to say that the terms in which these are 
formulated are non-formal):5 
Fust, however, let it be determined what a dialectical proposition is and what a dialectical 
problem. For it must be posited that not every proposition and not every problem is 
dialectical; for nobody who is by his full wits would propose \protetnete] what nobody believes 
[to mêdent dokoun] and neither would he raise as a problem \probaloi\ what is evident \phaneron] 
to all [or most]'; for the latter has no perplexity [ouk ekha aportan], whereas the former nobody 
* The 'from which' (ex hou, ex Hon) of dialectical reasoning are frotaseis, a term commonly rendered 
'proposition' For the sake of brevity I shall in the sequel render these technical terms 'problem' and 
'proposition' - but not without remorse, as so many Anstotelian terms of art they have become 
inhabitants of numerous semantic territories Both problems and propositions are standardly cast in 
interrogative form and the (formal) difference between the two is conveniently represented by, 
respectively, 'p or -p?' and 'p?' (Top 101МЗ-Э6) 
5 1 distinguish formal from substantive entena because I believe Anstotle to make different points when 
he, on the one hand, explains in Top A 4 the relations between the predicables, problems, and 
propositions, and, on the other, in A 10 develops entena of 'dialechaty' Stump (1978), ρ 160, is 
therefore inaccurate when she says that "[n]ot every question of this form is a problem, but only those that 
are controversial" (italics mine) It is better to say that every question of this form is a problem, though 
not necessanly a dialectical one If Stump is right, Anstotle's remarks to the effect that not every problem 
deserves the predicate dialektikon are nonsensical (Top 104a4-5,105a3-4, cf ЬЕ 165a38-9) 
' Brunschwig (1967), ρ 14,126, brackets ê fois pletstois on the grounds that it is absent in one manusenpt 
and that Alexander of Aphrodisias apparently did not read it, the addition may have easily crept m 
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would posit [f/иле]. Now a dialectical proposition is a question [erôtêsts] which is endoxic to 
either all, or most, or the wise, and to all of the latter, or most, or most familiar, [and which is] 
not paradoxic [me paradoxus]; for someone would posit what the wise believe, unless it is 
contrary to the beliefs of the many [fais ton pollón doxais]. (Top 104аЗ-12) 
It is tempting to read into this passage a contradiction of the previously 
given characterisation of endoxa (reformulated in the immediate sequel to this 
passage).7 It is impossible for Aristotle, it is argued, at the same time to 
maintain both that matters universally agreed upon cannot form the subject-
matter of dialectic and that "a question which is endoxic to all may be 
dialectical".8 This interpretation, and in its wake the appearance of 
contradiction, however, are due to a double conflation - the minor component 
of which can be conveniently demoted to a footnote.9 
The more relevant and momentous mistake consists in construing the 
conditions for dialecticity promiscuously: by mapping them onto both 
problems and propositions, thereby making them both subject to the same set 
of criteria.10 In fact, they should be kept rigorously apart - and this can be 
managed by aligning the explicative remarks (introduced, in the quotation, by 
the words 'for the latter') 'chiastically' with the statement of the conditions: a 
dialectical problem is one which 'has perplexity* (aporian ekhei), and what is 
evident to all does not seem particularly perplexing. With dialectical 
propositions, then, it is exactly the other way round: nobody would posit what 
is believed by nobody.11 
This chiastic construction has several advantages. In the first place, since 
it saves Aristotle from inconsistency, the onus of proof may be passed on to 
those who champion promiscuity. Further, on the promiscuity thesis, some 
irregularities are left standing. How would they account for the sudden 
emergence of the condition of 'non-paradoxicity' (if I may 'barbarise') (Top 
104al0-l), not found in the initial characterisation of endoxa (Top 100b21-3)? 
This condition cannot apply to problems; for a thesis is both a problem and 
paradoxic (Top 104M9-20; 29-34). Again, dialectical problems may be matters 
of disagreement between 'the wise and the many7 (Top 104a4-5), whereas the 
because of the fact that the disjunction [è] рам ê lois pleistois frequently occurs in the immediate and 
more remote context The advantage of this reading is the preservation of the opposition mident-pasm 
7
 Compare Τσρ 100b21-3,104a8-12 the reformulation consists in the addition of a clause to the effect that 
a dialectical proposition is said to be a question endoxic to the classes mentioned in the original 
characterisation, but which is not paradoxes, ι e contrary to the beliefs of the many 
8
 Evans (1977), ρ 80, referring to Top 104a4-8,104b3-5 (n74) and to 100Ь21,104a9 (n75) 
9
 We should beware of obliterating the distinction between propositions/problems on the one hand, and 
dialectical propositions/problems on the other, dialectic, as it is proclaimed in the proemium of the 
Topics, aims at inculcating a capacity which enables one to reason about even/ problem (100al9-20), but 
this does not entail that every problem which satisfies the (weak) formal criteria is dialectical in the strict 
sense of the term 
i° See e g Irwin (1988), ρ 41 
11
 In Top A 10 Aristotle formulates such entena for propositions, and it is dear that he is doing this with 
an eye on what question may be reckoned to receive assent RA 1356b28-1357al the art of rhetoric, just 
like other arts, including dialectic, does not consider what is pithanon or endoxon to some particular 
person, but to persons of a certain kind (towisde) (cf SE 170b6-8) Both these arts of discourse presuppose 
an audience and interlocutors of a certain standard - which is anyhow a prerequisite for the development 
of a tedine, which deals with the universal (Met 981a5-M0) 
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condition as applied to propositions serves to rule out such disagreement (Top 
104all-2; cf. ЕЕ 1236Ь22; SE 173al9-30). 
If it is sensible to prise the dialecticity criteria for problems and 
propositions apart, we have succeeded in isolating the criterion 'having 
perplexity', accompanied by a negatively delineating gloss to the effect that this 
is what is obvious to all. The point of this piece of exegesis will become clear 
presently. 
3. With these distinctions in the back of our minds we can turn to 
Aristotle's discussion of dialectical problems in Top A 11, introduced by the 
following remarks (already quoted in chapter 2): 
A dialectical problem {problèma dialekttkon] is a consideration pertaining to [sunteinon pros] 
choosing and avoiding or to truth and knowledge, either itself or as a help to [has sunergon 
pros] some other thing of such a kind, ... For some problems it is useful [khrêsimon] to know 
with a view to [pros] choosing or avoiding, for instance, whether pleasure is to be chosen or 
not; others only with a view to knowing [pros to etdenm monon], for instance, whether the 
universe is eternal or not. (Top 104Ы-8) 
Aristotle here unambiguously stipulates the practical relevance of 
dialectic - and if we may set any store on expository priority this feature even 
gains in importance. Familiarity with practical problems 'contributes to' action 
because of its usefulness to decision-making; the primacy of praxis makes, in 
this context too, knowledge of moral matters functional to action, without, 
however, commitment to the distribution of priority of practical philosophy. 
Interestingly, Aristotle couches this relevance of (some of) these 
problems to other purposes in the very 'means-to-ends' terminology we 
encountered in his account of deliberation. Obviously, the words (sunteinein) 
pros (cf. EN 1144a24-5; ££ 1214al0-2; 1216a32-3) are to be construed in terms of 
utility (cf. Pol 1337b25-7); there is no hint of his saying that the consideration of 
the question whether pleasure is to be chosen or not is a means to pursuing or 
shunning i t (Which is one more reason to beware of giving the idiom of the 
deliberation passage from the Nicomadiean Ethics a too one-dimensionally 
instrumental or causal reading.) The very same term is employed in the 
Etidemian Ethics (in a passage positing rather than arguing that deliberation is 
not of ends) to refer to alternative courses of action: one deliberates the 
question "whether this or that pertains [poteron tode ê tode sunteinei]" to the end 
(££ 1226bll).12 
By amplification, then, if the assumption is warranted that the 
preposition pros points to a wider class of things, viz. those which are, at a quite 
general level, 'conducive to' an end, then there can be no objection to 
classifying the scrutiny of a dialectical problem itself among the things pros to 
telos. And if this is so, then it becomes at once clear why it is important to keep 
apart the two conditions of dialecticity; for if we could not throw up as a 
'2 F£ 1214all (some things smitaiia pros knowing), 1215a8-9,1216a32-3,1227al7,1241al7-8. 
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dialectical problem 'what nobody believes', deliberative creativity would be 
seriously impeded. On the other hand, if something is obvious, there would 
seem to be no need for deliberation - a point which is confirmed in the ethical 
writings (EN 1112b2; E£ 1226a33-b2). 
Ethical dialectic, since it is, on this line of interpretation, a deliberative 
'instrumenf, may directly contribute to the resolution of practical (not 
necessarily moral) questions. Of course, this poses questions about 
commensurability which I shall not, at this juncture, even think of broaching; it 
is my principal objective to show that we can, by bringing dialectic into the 
picture of practical reasoning, open up a whole avenue of deliberative 
possibilities, with the desired effect of rendering it on the whole more faithful 
to its phenomenology.13 Ethical dialectic, then, in teaching the prospective 
student of ethics about which problems to tackle and which not, teaches to 
deliberate practical problems, with, as we have seen, a view to action. 
4. The rudimentary 'either... or7 structure we retrieved from the notion of 
doubt (distazeiri) in deliberation takes on a more determinate form when we 
recognize dialectical scrutiny as conducive to decision-making. As we have 
seen, the condition of dialecticity to be satisfied by a problem is to 'have aporia' 
(Top 104a7; 105a3-7). This term (and its varieties) is so ubiquitous in the corpus 
that an enumeration of relevant passages could only diminish a sense of its 
importance. Since the term points to one of the most outstanding aspects of 
Aristotelian method in theoretical inquiry, it is often overlooked that it also has 
a practical charge. There is, in principle, no need to approach the notion 
indirectly, as we have just done, through Aristotle's ideas on dialectic. We 
could have taken the short cut as well. 
We remember Neoptolemus, having blurted out his version of the 
epitome of deliberative questions ('where do I go from here?7), disclosing his 
'perplexity' to Philoctetes: "I do not know where to turn my words in my 
perplexity [taporon]". And when Philoctetes, disconcerted by his misgivings 
aroused by these words, presses him to explain this 'perplexity' (aparéis tou su;), 
and that Neoptolemus 'should not talk like thaf, the latter replies to the effect 
that he has to (11. 895-99). 
'Perplexity', in fact, is a not uncommon translation for aporia, and, 
although not altogether satisfactory, one far superior to the trivializing (and 
popularizing) translation 'puzzle'. I shall adopt 'perplexity7 for several reasons: 
13
 Here are some suggestions Dialectic, if it is to play any part in deliberation, would seem to 
accomodate some form of meditation about ends is pleasure to be chosen or not7 Further, recalling that 
it gives us a way of circumventing petito pnnapu while examining the principles of a discipline, 
dialectical techniques seem well-adapted to ethical reflection (and Aristotle himself makes extensive use 
of it in the Nicomachean Ethics) By extension, it can play a major part m explanation and justification ex 
post facto, feeding forward into the deliberative future Again, we may wish to compare certain 
alternative options with respect to their moral character We may, while going through the arguments on 
both sides (dinporêsei), gain some clarity as to our implied beliefs and convictions We may wish to weigh 
the matter in the light of the beliefs of the wise and the majority, and refer to these so as to come to a 
solution of a mora] conflict 
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(1) it preserves continuity with the Philoctetes and Neoptolemus' dilemma, and 
we shall in this way be able to retain the important links with action (2) its 
undertones convey that something more is at stake than merely detached 
intellectual bewilderment, an impression one may get from a nearly exclusive 
focus on its employment in theoretical contexts, and (3) it conveniently, because 
faithfully, mirrors the logical behaviour of aporia in Aristotelian usage, i.e. 
ambigously vacillating between a state of mind and that which causes it 
There is unequivocal testimony for the 'subjective' sense in passages 
where the notion is treated more or less thematically. On the other hand, one of 
the functions of dialectic being diaporêsai, to review, or 'go through', the 
perplexities on both sides of a question (Top 101a34-6), the 'objective' is equally 
well testified. Aristotle opens book В of the Metaphysics by weaving the term 
into a polyptotic fabric, worn threadbare by quotation, elaborating on this 
function in quite evocative (and untranslatable) language: 
Going through the perplexities m the right way [to diaporêsai kalôs] is useful for those who want 
to progress [go on] well [euporêsai]; for progress [euporia] later is the solution [lusts] of previous 
perplexities [ton aporoumenôn], but it is not possible to solve when we are ignorant of the 
bonds, but the perplexity of thinking [hê tês dtanotas opona] makes this dear about the thing [we 
are concerned with]; for where [thinking] is perplexed [aporei], at that point it has undergone 
something very similar to people in bonds; for it is impossible to go forward m either 
direction. That is why we must have surveyed all difficulties before, both for the sake of these 
things and because of the fact that those who seek without gomg through the perplexities first 
[aneu tou diaporêsai proton] are similar to those who are ignorant of the direction they should 
walk, and, besides do not know whether they have found what was sought or not; for to this 
[kind of person] the end [to telos] is not clear, but it is for someone who has been previously 
perplexed [for proêporêkoti]. Moreover, it is necessary that he who has also listened to all 
contending arguments, as if they were parties to a suit, is better disposed [belhon ekhem]11 with 
a view to discriminating [pros to krinetn] [what is true and false]. (Met 995a27-b4) 
It is important to note that Aristotle speaks of 'perplexity of (discursive) 
thinking' (hê tês dianoias aporia) (Met 995a30), the incapacity of discursive 
thought 'to move on'; metaphorically, the mind is said to be fettered or chained 
(Met 995a32; EN 1146a24-5), unable to discern its way out Since a perplexity is 
a source of confusion which may force one to accept conclusions or to 
withdraw in suspension of judgement faute de mieux (ЕЕ 1217al3-4), the 
detection of the exact locus of the perplexity has, according to this description, 
therapeutic value. 
If we assume a problem to be a sincere15 translation of a perplexity, then 
we may justly describe its utterer as wavering between subscribing to a 
statement or its contradictory. Some problems are yielded by those beliefs 
"Ph 2ЯаЗО-3 
" I say 'sincere', for Aristotle sometimes speaks of aparan when someone raises a point just for arguing's 
sake, see e g Met 1011a2-3, the distinction is, however, clear at Met 1009al8-22, where he speaks of those 
who 'believe something from being in a state of perplexity' (ek tou aporésai hupolabon) on the one hand, 
and those who 'speak for argument's sake' (logou IJianii legousi) 
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for which there are contrary reasonings [enantioi sullogismoi] (for it has perplexity [aportan ekheí) 
whether it is so or not so [hcutôs ekha ê oukh hautes], because of there being convincing 
arguments [ptthanous logous] on both [alternatives]. (Top 104Ы2-4)16 
In a Topics passage which is generally adduced as evidence of subsidiary 
importance in the treatment of aporia Aristotle discusses the logical behaviour 
of the term. Perplexity, he says, is not an attribute of 'contrary reasonings' (Top 
145M-5), but 
the equality of contrary reasonings [he ton enantiôn isotês ¡ogismon] would seem to be 
productive [potêikon] of perplexity [íes aportas]; for when all things appear to us, reasoning on 
both sides [ep' amphotera], to be alike with respect to each side, we are perplexed [aporoumen] as 
to on which of both we shall act [praxômen] (Top 145Ы6-20).17 
The term logizesthai is, at any rate in straightforwardly practical contexts, 
equivalent to bouleuestai (EN 1139al2-3; 1141b8-14). Moreover, Aristotle 
sometimes calls bouleuesthai 'a kind of reasoning' (sullogismos tis) (Mem 453al4-
5).18 It is the job of logistnos to consider whether one should do 'either this or 
thaf (poteron praxei tode ê iodè) (DA 434a7-8) and the part of the soul which has 
the relevant competence, the logistikon, is also designated as to doxastikon, since 
both belief and practical wisdom (phronêsis) are about 'things that can be 
otherwise' (EN 1140b26-7; cf. 1143a6). We should distinguish, as it is legitimate 
to do, between an actual piece of (practical) reasoning and the capacity for it, 
which can be both denoted by the term logistnos. Hence it is the task of the 
faculty logismos to provide us with reasons whether to φ or to ψ, and both 
options can be supplied with their respective logismoi. 
The very notion of aporia, then, at least in practical affairs, not only 
presupposes, but is also defined by the 'either... or' structure characteristic of 
deliberation. One way to interpret 'perplexity' is in terms of deliberative 
deadlock. A stalemate produced by indecision, however, is inconceivable when 
there is no way of bringing them into one picture. There must at least be a 
higher-order belief to the effect that one finds oneself in such a situation. This 
belief is of a higher order because it is a belief about beliefs: it implies being 
brought about by counterpoising considerations which are both convincing. It 
is not merely a belief stating that 'I am in trouble'; for the trouble to be 
perceived requires the competition, and competition requires interaction. 
Robert Nozick puts forward a demand for a situational belief to counter 
the absurd claims of radical Bayesianism. Radical Bayesianism suggests that we 
could do away with the notion of believing a proposition altogether by 
defining degrees of belief in terms of probability assignments. Faced with a 
choice situation we should simply act upon the option maximizing expected 
16
 There may be some confusion about what is contradictory and what contrary, but at Met 1005b28-9 
Aristotle says that a belief is "contrary [enantia] to the belief of the contradiction [tes antiphaseös]" 
" See Tap 104M2-4,24-8,161b34-8,162al7-8, SE 3-4 
18
 Deliberation by manipulating phantasmata (DA 434a 5-10) is also essential to the process of recollection 
(anamnesis), since recollecting is a sort of reasoning (sHÍ/ogismos tis) which is performed by the 
deliberative faculty (to bouleutikon), and deliberating as well is a sort of reasoning, and a sort of search 
(zêtêsts hs) (Mem 453a№4, £N 1112b20-3) 
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utility. Yet it should be noted that such decisional procedures, if they are a 
realistic option at all, presuppose entire pockets of veritable, committal beliefs 
(among which, of course, an implicit or explicit subscription to the basic tenet 
of methodological individualism).19 
The conclusion is justified that Aristotle is perfectly aware of the 
possibility of moral conflict; although there is no statement of his justifying this 
position expressis verbis, considerable stretches of dialectic, and therefore of his 
method, crucially hinge on a notion of perplexity, which, in the 'subjective' 
sense, must refer to an integrative, complex state of mind. Consequently, we 
can plausibly pin down the locus of moral conflict, not in some vacuum 
between rivalling practical syllogisms, but somewhere before the explanation 
of action comes to the fore. So it emerges that the subsumpbon of akrasia under 
a general notion of moral conflict is, in Aristotle's case, categorically mistaken. 
It is not just a special case of moral conflict, as Davidson seems to think.20 
5. The project of creating space for moral conflict in practical reasoning 
completed, the next move is reviewing the possibilities for fitting shame into 
the picture. It goes without saying that not any arbitrary set of rival 
considerations eo ipso produces perplexity. Besides the whole welter of 
situational factors there is, as is clear from Sophocles' Neoptolemus, the utterly 
private and particular interpretations which a person brings to bear on them. In 
his portrayal of Jove deliberating, compressed so as to convey the feverish 
hurry he is in, Ovid nicely shows us how an affection like shame works hand in 
glove with rational calculation towards the solution to a problem. The answer 
to the question whether Aristotle would be disposed to put his seal on the 
obvious role of the affective in deliberation as depicted by Ovid depends on the 
notion of 'being convinced'. For the equal weight of contrary logismoi, comes 
about on account of their 'convincingness'. They are pithanoi logismoi, not just 
logismoi.21 
Aristotle's theory of the affections of the soul, insofar as it can be 
considered a fully fleshed out theory, is well-equipped to account for rather 
elaborate cognitive operations within the limits of an occurrent affection. The 
mere fact of pathos constituting one of the 'means of persuasion' in the Rhetoric 
has provided ample occasion to reflect on both presence and importance of the 
judgemental component of certain types of affection. Affections, for Aristotle, 
are not, at any rate, not per se, 'blind' forces; they too help to carve and gouge 
character. In any feasible programme of moral education the affections should 
be cultivated instead of extirpated. It is my firm conviction that this obvious-
seeming doctrine is the most important service Aristotle has rendered to 
Western culture; so that its tremendous significance can only be measured 
against its obviousness. 
i» Nozick (1993), pp 94-6 
*> Davidson (1980), pp 33-6 
2' See also Top 1 6 Ш 5 
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It is a mistake, I believe, when reviewing Aristotle's remarks on the 
several affections, to narrow down our scope to the initial definitions or 
characterisations he gives. Although a definition is supposed to capture the 
essence of the thing defined, it is by no means the case that a statement of this 
essence tells us all there is to the phenomenology of an affection. Certain 
important aspects may elude our grasp if w e neglect its implications. The 
paradigmatic and exemplary affection-type, anger (orge), is a case in point 
Having given its definition, Aristotle directly goes on to cut out traits which are 
phenomenologically indispensable to a correct appreciation of the affection and 
its significance in a holist tissue of intentional or mental phenomena: 
Let anger be a desire (orexis), accompanied by pain (meta lupês), for an [apparent 
(phainomenês)]12 retaliation on account of an apparent slight, which is not befitting, to oneself or 
to someone near to oneself. If this, then, is anger, then it is necessary (anankl) that... every 
[occurrence] of anger is attended by a certain pleasure, that [deriving] from an expectation [apo 
tes elpidos] of retaliating; for thinking [to otesthai] about accomplishing what one aims at is 
pleasant, but, on the other and,23 nobody aims at [ephtetai] things which appear to be 
impossible for himself [ton phatnotnendn adunatati autôi], and the person in anger aims at things 
possible for himself... for a certain pleasure follows [akolouthei] both for this reason and 
because they dwell m thought [en dianoiat] on retaliating; the phantasta,2* then, occurring at that 
moment, produces pleasure m them, like that [i.e. phantasta] mvolved m dreams. (Rh 1378a30-
blO) 
Let us briefly recapitulate some points airead made in previous chapters. 
Pleasure is implied by an experience of anger, that is to say, anger invariably 
and necessarily involves certain operations of the mind which yield pleasure in 
two (at least analytically) distinct ways. In the first place, the mere anticipation 
of quenching one's thirst for revenge is in itself pleasant And what should not 
escape our attention is that Aristotle connects these thoughts with the 
terminology of deliberation. There is an expectation, and not mere hope, (elpis) 
of retaliation, and this expectation is at least subjectively justified by the belief 
that revenge is within the range of the possibilities of the angry person.25 
Secondly, dwelling on the actual fulfilment of the promise of revenge 
apparently gives rise to or takes place under operations of the imagination. 
Over and above the services of the imagination employed in the 
workings of prospective shame w e reviewed two chapters ago, there is 
evidence that Aristotle views the affections in a more holistic vein than 
subsequent tradition has tended to do. The mention made of the faculty of 
22
 On phmnomenês, see chapter 4, section 9 
23
 Contrary to Rhys Roberts, in the Recused Oxford Translation, I prefer to render men. de at b2-3 stronger 
See Kennedy (1991), ρ 125 
2 4
 In view of the fact that the definite article at Ы0 has phantasm for an antecedent, I opt for leaving 
phantasm untranslated It is the faculty in virtue of which w e have images, both in its imaginative 
function and during dreams, so the most suitable translation would be referring to the actualisation of 
the faculty There is not one English word covering this 
2 5
 In the Rhetoric passage Anstolle uses the term ¡intintoti instead of the eph' hëmtn of the Ntcomachean 
Ethics That there is a close connection between these terms is not only obvious from semantical analysis, 
but from Aristotle's explicit remarks our deliberation is abortive when we encounter something 
impossible, when it "appears possible [diinaton phatnêtai]" we try to do it, "possible are those things 
which could come into being through us [di' hêmôn]" [EN 1112b26-7, cf Ш2а30-4) 
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phantasia is especially important in this connection, since Aristotle ascribes to 
humans 'deliberative phantasia' (he bouleutikê phantasia), in virtue of their 
capacity of reasoning (DA 434a5-7). He parenthetically adds: 
for whether one will do this or that, is airead the work of reasoning [logismou ergon]; and it is 
necessary to measure by one; for one pursues the greater; hence one is capable of making one 
image out of more [hen ek plewnôn phantasmatôn penetri]. (DA 434a7-10) 
Once again prescinding from the questions of commensurability thrown 
up by this passage, it is sufficiently explicit in allocating an important, but 
relatively ignored, role to the imagination in our deliberations. Certainly, if we 
can engage in imagination in such a way as to make comparisons between 
envisaged goods, we are licensed to infer that we can do many things more. To 
be sure, to admit imagination into the deliberative picture is not going to make 
it any the more determinate, but I can see no reason why theoretical sterility 
should be given the benefit of the doubt at the expense of phenomenological 
plausibility. And it certainly is plausible that the boundaries between 
(propositional) thinking and the manipulation of images are, to say the least 
vague and fluent26 Actually, these mental activities interpenetrate, and 
Aristotle displays realism in symbiotically distributing the pleasure derived 
from the sweetness of revenge among thinking and imagining. 
6. The rhetorical logos is composed of three parts, the speaker, his subject-
matter, and the hearer (ho akroatês), the 'judge' (ho krttês); the different types of 
hearers furnish the rationale for the classical division in the species of rhetoric, 
deliberative, judicial, and epideictic (Rh 1358a37-b8). Pathos is one of the three 
pistéis27 of Aristotle's technical art of rhetoric; it consists "in disposing the 
hearer in a certain way [en tôt ton akroatên diatheinai2* pôs]" by means of 
argument (dia/hupo tou logou) (Rh 1356al-3; 14-9). Its objective is influencing the 
judgement (krisis) of the hearer, since we are likely to evaluate a case differently 
when affected (Rh 1356al5-6; 1377b24; 28; 31-1378a5; 19-20). The hearer, then, is 
the final cause (telos) of the rhetorical logos (Rh 1358Ы-2) - or, to be more 
precise, the hearer's judgement 
since rhetoric is for the sake of judgement [heneka krtseôs] (for people nidge [knnousi] 
deliberations [fes sumboulas] and the verdict [he dike] is a judgement), it is necessary [anankê] 
not only to look to the argument [pros ton logon horan], that it may be demonstrative and 
persuasive [apodeikhkosv> kat pistos], but abo to construct oneself as of a certain moral character 
[poton tina] and to prepare the judge. (Rh 1377b20-4) 
2» See Williams (1995), ρ 38 
2 7 1 shall leave pisfis untranslated when it is a rhetorical term of art 
2 8
 For the distinction between diathesis and hexis, drawn in terms of longevity and liability to change or 
displacement, see Cat 8b27-9al3 
2
' The term apodakttkos should not be taken in the strong, highly technical sense of the Postenor Analytics, 
see Bumyeat (1996) 
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Three points deserve our special attention. Firstly, the raison d'être of 
rhetoric as an institution is judgement Further, this being so, something more 
than sound argumentation is required; Aristotle holds that since rhetoric is pros 
[ton akroatên], or 'relative to the hearer' (Rh 1358Ы), just like dialectic (Top 
155ЫО),30 it is necessary, teleologically, to take into account, in addition, other 
than discursive factors. Finally, the fact that Aristotle deems it necessary to add 
an explicative parenthesis indicates that there is a quite general sense in which 
discourse influences judgement by way of affectively disposing ite recipients. 
After these preparatory remarks, let us now shift our attention to the 
interplay of appetite and shame, since these are the affections we are concerned 
with. Of course, the Rhetoric definition of the generic notion of pathê, in addition 
to the enumeration of its species typical of characterisations of the affections 
throughout the corpus, focuses on rhetoric's specific teleology: 
The affections are those things through which [di' /iosa] people, because of then undergoing 
change [metaballontes], differ relative to their judgements [pros fas knsas], [and] which are 
accompanied by pam and pleasure, for instance, anger, pity, fear, and what other things of this 
kind there are, and their contraries. (Rh 1378al9-22). 
The idiom here (metaballein) reminds one of the change to which the self-
controlled person, despite his having base appetites, nevertheless does not 
succumb (ou metaballei) (EN 1151b9; 27-8). Now there are several channels 
affections may flow through in moulding judgement, the most straightforward 
and transparent being that of causation. Our loving someone may certainly 
cause a more favourable assessment of something the beloved has done - and 
one may be perfectly aware of this. Aristotle, however, seems not to be 
primarily interested in this pathway, since he phrases the alteration of 
judgement in terms of 'appearing' and 'believing': 
for neither to those who love and hate, nor to those m anger or calm do things appear 
Iphatnetai] to be the same [tanta], but either completely different, or different in importance; for 
the one who loves believes [doket] that the person about whom he produces judgement \poiatat 
ten knsin] either does not behave unjustly or only slightly, but the one who hates [believes] the 
contrary; and to the one who has an appetite [fòt epithumounti] and who is confident [euelpidi], 
when what will be is pleasant, it appears both that it will be and that it will be good but to an 
unaffected person [foi apathei\ and one who is annoyed the contrary [appears]. (RA 1377b31-
1378a5) 
Aristotle, then, is plainly interested in sincere belief. There is evidence to 
the effect that Aristotle views a change in judgement to be a constituent of an 
affection, instead of a mere consequence.31 It is impossible (adunatoti) for a 
judge to feel pity when a speech has fashioned him into a state of righteous 
indignation (nemesis) by proving to him that those who claim his pity are not 
30
 The kinship between dialectic and rhetoric is a recurrent figure of speech throughout the first chapters 
of the Rhetartc, starting with its famous opening sentence (Rh 1354al, see further e g Rh 1355аЗЗ-6, 8-21, 
1356а20-33, Ь35-7) 
эі Leighton (1996), ρ 21Ü 
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worthy of it (Rh 1387Ы7-21; cf. 1388а27-30).зг The modal words are important 
obviously certain judgements go with certain affections, so that one affective-
judgemental complex may be logically incompatible with another.33 
Prospective shame, in the strong sense we marked off in the penultimate 
chapter, since it is a veritable occurrence of shame and not just the mere 
prospect of a future shame, has a special efficacy in restraining base appetite 
(EN 1128M7-8). The difference between self-control and akrasia must be sought 
in the nature of the connection between the subjectivity and the intentionality 
of prospective shame. During the akratic action, akratic knowledge lacks force 
because it is displaced from the appropriate affective context Humbert 
Humbert's vehement desire may actually elicit the thought-content "Remember 
she [i.e. Lolita] is only a child"; but it is not more than that a free-floating 
thought, that is, detached from the complex it is supposed to belong to and 
accidentally attached to his overwhelming lecherousness. Aristotle nowhere 
says that an awareness of the wrongness of an akratic action is dormant he 
only says that the particular premise which would make it practically 
efficacious either completely fails, or lacks the required force (EN 1147a2-7; b°-
12). 
'To be led' by an affection, as airead noted, does not mean that one's 
rational capacities have been completely silenced or anaesthesized; rather, it 
means that they have been surrendered, or made subservient, however 
temporarily, to the dictates of the affection. It is the habitual plight of the 
profligate or intemperate to be deliberately led by appetite (EN НІСаІ-З),34 but 
it also the intermittent problem for the akratic person (EN 1147a34). We have 
already seen, in the last chapter, that this is just what Aristotle points to by 
means of the appetitive practical syllogism in the explanation of the akratic 
action. 
The self-controlled person, however, is not led by appetite (EN 1152a3), 
which is to say that he has been able to subjugate it entirely to the control of 
reason. But he still has it and the reason why he is not led by it is that through 
the internalised mechanisms described, shame sits in judgement on them. The 
self-controlled person is ashamed of his desires, and it is this shame which 
carries the prospect of his future self as having relinquished to them. In other 
words, shame disposes him in such a way as to be more easily convinced of a 
thought-content to the effect that, at the stirring of an appetite, he should omit 
the thing to which the appetite spurs him on. What appetite says will be 
pleasant, shame prospectively rules to be hurtful. This is why Aristotle gives as 
a reason (epei) for the self-controlled person's not being changed by appetite the 
fact that he is eupeistos, or 'easily persuaded', persuaded, that is, by logos (EN 
я Leighton (19%), pp 208-9 
4 3
 The fact that certain affections exclude the coexistence of others does not mean that there is only room 
for one affection at the time The at least partially affective mora] dilemma of Jove, determined by love 
and (prospective) shame, is a case in point 
3 4
 'Deliberately', since I take the phrase "so that he chooses these things [ι e pleasant things] instead of 
others [anb fon allôn hmreistliai]" to refer back to the etymological remark about the object of prohatrests 
{EN 1112al6-7) "what is chosen instead of other things [pro heterôn haireton]" (cf. ЕЕ 1226b6-8) 
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1151b8-10). Shame and logos, as in Jove's case, mutually reinforce each other. 
We should see how this works. 
7. Some philosophers (notably, Ryle, Wittgenstein) have conditioned us to 
empty our overcrowded minds of praeter nécessitaient intruders, and, not 
surprisingly, one of these ostracized items is the referent of the term 'being 
convinced' of something.35 Although it is quite natural to think of being 
convinced in a certain way, the issue is exceedingly liable to confusion - some 
of which may be removed by exploiting the epigraph to Joseph Conrad's novel 
Lord Jim, an aphorism of Novalis: 
It is certain my conviction gains infinitely, the moment another soul will believe m it, 
which, interestingly, is a (deliberate?) mistranslation of the original German: 
Es ist gewiss, dass eme Meinung sehr viel gewinnt, sobald ich weiss, dass irgend jemand 
davon überzeugt ist.3* 
The English gives a quite different sense by rendering 'Meinung' and 
'überzeugt sein' topsy-turvy. What it obscures seems exactly to be the 
naturalness alluded to: some sort of distinction between an opinion, and what it 
is like for someone to be convinced of it In other, not less misleading, words, 
'to be convinced' seems to point to the 'strength' of an opinion. Now as a result 
of the aforementioned twentieth-century mental clearance, we are quite 
confident that it is what the belief is about rather than the belief itself that we 
are convinced of. On this account, to be convinced of a belief has a thick air of 
pleonasm about it 
'To convince' is a success or achievement verb: it is logically impossible 
to unsuccessfully convince someone. According to Ryle, the grammatical fact of 
their being active verbs "has tended to make people, with the exception of 
Aristotle, oblivious to the differences of logical behaviour between verbs of this 
class and other verbs of activity or process".37 While writing this, Ryle may 
have had in mind the following remarks from De anima: 
but belief follows on [hepetat] conviction [pisfts] (for it is not possible that the believer is not 
convinced [pisteuem] by the things he believes), but conviction is present to none of the 
animals, but phantasia to many. Furthermore, every belief follows on [akolouthei] conviction, 
but conviction implies being persuaded [to pepeisthai], and logos persuades; phantasm is present 
to some of the animals, but logos is not (DA 428al9-24).M 
35
 See e g Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, §§ 333,607 
34
 Novalis (1805), I, ρ 188 It is probable that Conrad has used Carlyle's translation, from On Heroes, 
Hero-Worslup, and the Heroic m History (1841), lecture ш See Conrad (1989), ρ 353 
3'Ryle (1949), pp 149-53 
3" See Cat 4a21-bl3, Dì 23a32-5, 24Ы-2 In his treatise on dreams (Insom 458Ь29, 460M8) Anstotle repeats 
the well-known argument against this identification from De anima (428b2^4) the sun may appear 
(phametai) one foot across, but we may simultaneously have the true belief that it is larger than the 
inhabited world We can see the moon as sixpence (but do we, in normal circumstances' Sens 448M3-7), 
although "belief says [legei\ that what is seen is false", although it is sometimes captured by, if we may 
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Aristotle, so it seems, is also aware of the fact that it is the object one is 
convinced of, not the belief. Belief requires conviction, albeit not too much. This 
is how Aristotle begins his account of akrasia: 
About [the question whether] is is true belief [doxan alêthên] but not understanding [epistêmên] 
in defiance of which people behave akratically - it does not make a difference to the argument; 
for some of those who have beliefs [ton doxazonton] do not doubt [ou distazcusin], but trunk to 
know with exactness [montai akribôs eidenat]. If, then, those who have a belief will act deviating 
from reason more than those who have true understanding [ton epistamenôn] because of their 
being convinced of it only weakly [Ля to êrema ptsteuein], there will be no difference between 
true understanding and belief; for some are not less convinced of things they believe than 
others are of things they understand; as Herachtus makes clear. (EN 1146b26-31) 
Aristotle disapproves of those who do not admit of an uncertainty 
discount rate in their beliefs. Aristotelian epistemology is founded on, among 
other things, the dependence of subjective certainty of a mental state on the 
stability of its object (EN 1139a8-10). The state as well as its object belong to the 
category of relatives (ta pros ti), but they are not ontologicaUy convertible; 
otherwise there would be no perceptible without perception (Cat 7b22-8al2; 
Met 1010b30-1011a2; DA 402Ы4-6). The apex of epistemic states, episteme or 
(scientific) understanding, is defined by knowing (gignôskein) the explanation 
(aitia) of a phenomenon, together with some sort of awareness that its object 
'cannot be otherwise' (APo 71b9-12; 15-6; EN 1139Ы9-21); doxa, however, is of 
things which admit of change, and it is therefore liable to oscillations in truth-
value (Cat 4a23-6; Met 1039b34-1040al; APo 88Ь30-89а37; EN ІШЬЗЗ; DA 
428al9). A certain amount of reservation in belief, it appears, is legitimate, 
whereas mistaking mere belief for true understanding is, for Aristotle, a sign of 
epistemic corruption (cf. Top 161a30-4). 
Belief should accomodate for doubt: it must be open to revision by 
persuasion. Belief, then, comes labelled as such, that is to say, when it is not, for 
whatever reasons, inflated to the hypertrophic proportions of self-deceptive 
understanding. This reveals a vital feature of self-control. Aristotle is at pains to 
segregate the self-controlled, whom he sometimes describes as 'capable of 
abiding by belief (emttienetikos tèi doxa), to one side, from those who do change 
their mind, but do so for the better (Neoptolemus), and, to the other, from those 
who exaggerate perseverance - whom he collects under the generic designation 
of 'strong-headed' (hoi iskhurognômones) (EN 1151b5). One type of strong-
headed, the self-opinionated, is notoriously averse to any kind of rational 
say so, the sense-datum (insom 459a&-7) Now this contradicting power of belief should not be taken too 
literally, for in a related example the sense of touch is the contradicting (antrphêsi) 'other thing' (heteron 
ti) if we cross two fingers, they appear (¡ììmmetai) to be one, although we do not 'say' (phamen) that they 
are one, since we feel them to be two The sense of touch is, as Aristotle expresses it, the more 
authoritative or powerful one (Insom 460Ы8-22, 461al-6) See also Met 1011a33-4, where the senses of 
touch and sight are said to say (¡egei) that what is perceived is, respectively, one or two Aristotle quite 
frequently employs idioms of 'saying' where perceptions are concerned, see e g DA 426Ы9-22, MA 
701a32-3 
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persuasion; but, and this is important he is so from improper motives.39 The 
motivating pleasure of not being vanquished in dialogue (which is not, 
Aristotle implies, a noble pleasure such as the one by which Neoptolemus is 
seduced) assimilates the self-opinionated person, for all his tenacity, rather 
more to the akratic than to the self-controlled. 
Aristotle is quite clear about the fact that the epistemic state in defiance 
of which the akratic action occurs cannot be too weak; otherwise it would be 
subject to forgiveness rather than to blame, as is commonly accepted (EN 
1145b36-1146a4; 1145b9-10). The problem of the akratic agent, then, seems to be 
not that his pre-akratic conviction is too weak, but that it is too strong. It cancels 
out competing considerations, and it does so from improper motives. There is, 
in the akratic's psychology, no room for the legitimate doubt deliberation takes 
its starting-point from (EN 1112a34-bll; 1139al3-4), and doubt is nothing else 
than the claim of another consideration or belief countering another. So when 
Aristotle calls the akratic eumetapeistos, or easily persuaded to the contrary 
effect (EN 1151al4), he means that the agent is too readily persuaded; which he 
was anyway, before the akratic action degraded his conviction to mere flatus 
vocis. 
8. Shame, since it essentially involves heeding (internalised) others and 
their judgements about and assessments of one's self, may function as an 
important check on just such epistemic myopia. We have adduced two 
examples from classical literature in which prospective shame both provokes 
and decides moral conflict It is plausible to assume that neither Neoptolemus 
nor Jove would have been propelled into their predicaments would they have 
lacked a sense of shame. Shame is definitive of their conflicts by presenting its 
own reasons in a persuasive way. If we for a moment abstract from the 
question whether the De anima criteria (quoted above) for belief are at all 
plausible in that they make every belief depend on verbal persuasion, we can 
wrest from them something important for the argument 
It has been suggested that with the formulation of these criteria Aristotle 
describes a 'rhetorical' criterion for belief, or that he holds the emergence of 
belief to be dependent on dialogue with others.40 There can be no doubt about 
it that this is nonsense. Aristotle's high sensitivity against everything 
embodying even the slightest hint at vicious regress would have prevented him 
from holding such a doctrine.41 Richard Sorabji is surely right in rejecting the 
39
 This characterisation might well apply to Herachrus, who exemplifies the anomaly of conviction in 
belief beyond legitimacy, being convinced of what he says to an extent which equals (or even surpasses, 
as Aristotle seems to suggest) to the conviction of those having veritable understanding This passage 
should be read together with Plato's Tlieaetetus, 179e-180c, where Theodorus gives vent to the grudge he 
bears against the Heracliteans, levelling some devastating criticisms at the way the permanent flux thesis 
is reflected in the volatility of their debating techniques 
40
 By Labamère, 'Imagination humaine et imagination animale chez Anstote', pp 31-4, cited by Sorabji 
(1992), ρ 200, and (1993), pp 36-7 
1 1
 To someone objecting that his theory of the conventionality of language al D/ 16a3-9 does not seem to 
take account of an argument, like Quine's, that the establishment of a convention requires (conventions 
of) language, we can give an anachronistic reply by referring to David Lewis' impressive study 
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generalising thrust of this thesis by instead connecting it with Plato's doctrine 
of belief as the output of a silent (sigli) logos to oneself {pros hautori) (Theaet 
190a4-6), or a dialogos within the soul itself (pros hauten) without voice (aneu 
phones), conducted in silence (meta sigês) (Soph 263e3-264a2). If Aristotle would 
rule out self-persuasion, then every belief resulting from it would not be a 
belief (but apparently, a phantasia). The exclusively human capacity for self-
persuasion would not yield anything exclusively human - which Aristotle 
would deem absurd. 
Although it seems, on a phenomenological account at least, uneconomic 
to argue that my believing that the approaching thing is a man (Insom 456Ы0-2) 
requires verbal self-persuasion in foro interno, or that it is, in Platonic fashion, 
the outcome of a silent conversation within my soul conducted at bionic speed, 
there is an important part to be played by self-persuasion in deliberation. (Note 
that self-persuasion does not rule out the possibility of a dialogue with 
internalised others in one's own soul.) 
9. We have already referred to the increased likelihood of being persuaded 
when one's soul is worked, or disposed, by an affection, a pathos. It is a 
received complaint amongst commentators that throughout his writings 
Aristotle displays little constancy in formulating the scope of the pathê tes 
psukhês. In the enumerations found in the ethical works (EN 1105b21-3; ЕЕ 
1220Ы2-4) and in De anima (DA 403a3-7) epilhumia is conspicuously present 
again, if we may attach any importance to expository priority, we may ascribe 
to appetite a key role in Aristotle's ethical discussions of the affections, which it 
lacks in the second book of the Rhetoric. 
It is sometimes wondered what could explain this omission.42 One of the 
reasons invoked is that Aristotle, in the Rhetoric's second book, is primarily 
interested in those affections which are capable of altering judgement and that, 
since it is definitionally or conceptually devoid of reason, appetite is not 
worthy of consideration.43 To be sure, Aristotle does not discuss appetite as 
elaborately and thematically as, for instance, shame. On the other hand, it is 
simply not true that appetite is entirely excluded; for in the introductory 
Rhetoric passage quoted some pages ago, Aristotle explicitly refers to a 
modification of judgement in the case of someone who undergoes the influence 
of appetite (Rh 1378a3-5; 1379al0-24). However, Aristotle says that the 
judgement of someone who has an appetite for some future pleasure and is 
confident (euelpis) that he will attain to it will be influenced in such a way that 
it appears (phainetai) to him that it will come to pass (esesthai) and that it will be 
good (agathon esesthai). 
Convention, or we can answer, more plausibly, lhat Aristotle nowhere says that this theory is a theory 
about the origins of language 
a
 As it is by Leighton (19%) Hence his contenbon that Aristotle, in the Mietane, approaches something 
fairly similar to our conception of emotion See Leighton (1996), pp 220-231 
« Striker (1996), ρ 289 
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We recall that 'living by affection', a standard phrase of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, should be read as 'living by appetite'; and that Aristotle ascribes some 
capacity for practical reasoning to those who live in this kind of life: they 
pursue those things 'through which' (di hôn) pleasures will come to be (esontai) 
(EN 1179ЫЗ-4). It is not implausible to construe the term euelpis in terms of 
expectations (either legitimate or illegitimate) had about the future; in the case 
of anger we saw Aristotle connecting expectations (apo tês elpidos) of revenge 
with pleasure attendant upon an occurrence of anger (Rh 1378b2). Now it is 
indubitably true that Aristotle, in some contexts, says that appetite is devoid of 
reason (ом metekhei logon) (ЕЕ 1224b2; EN 1149M-2); but it is akratic appetite 
which is central in these contexts. For how would Aristotle otherwise be able to 
say that the appetitive part (to epithumêtikon) of the self-controlled person's soul 
does, in one sense of the expression at least, partake of reason (EN 1102b25-31; 
cf. 1119M3-8)? 
Shame, we saw, conceptually involves pain on the part of its subject 
relating to things 'appearing' (phainomena) to contribute to a blow to one's 
reputation (Rh 1383Ы2-4). In another context concerned with akrasia, appetite, 
however, is also said to involve 'appearing': 
for what is immediately pleasant [to êdê hêdu] appears \phainetai] both simply pleasant and 
simply good [feat haplôs hêdu kat agathon haplôs], because of [dia] not seeing the future. (DA 
433b8-10) 
Apparently, something can appear simultaneously both pleasant and 
good because of (dia) lack of foresight This explains why Aristotle, in the 
Rlietoric, glosses 'and is confident"; it takes another affection, namely, to be 
confident (tharrein), involving expectation or hope of deliverance (EN 1116a3-4; 
Rh 1383al7-8). Appetite on its own does not seem to have a temporal depth-
perspective. 
This is confirmed when Aristotle says that appetitive akrasia is more 
shameful than that caused by thumos or temper because of the fact that the 
person subject to the latter has in some way reasoned (sullogisamenos), whereas 
the former merely involves saying (eipêi) that something is pleasant (EN 
1149a32-b3). The akratic appetite, then, does not play any part whatsoever in 
the agenf s deliberations. Whereas the self-controlled person proceeds to those 
things of which he has already been persuaded (eph' ha pepeistai), appetite, as 
Aristotle has it, "leads [agei] while not persuading [ou peisasa]" (ЕЕ 1224Ы-2).44 
Likewise, the akratic agent excessively indulges in appetite "not because of his 
having been convinced" (me dia to pepeisthai) (EN 1151all-3). This means that its 
claims have not got the chance to be laid aside in deliberation. In here reside 
the very conditions for the surprise which is so central to akratic appetite.45 
«Cf ШШ7Ь34-5 
4 5
 This neatly fits what we have seen in the last chapter it was why I said that it was a strength rather 
than a weakness in Aristotle's explanation of the phenomenon that the practical syllogisms were 
dissociated Akratic appetite has the force it has because it circumvents deliberation, and so does not get 
the chance of presenting its credentials 
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10. The akratic appetite, because it is persuasively mute, does not get a fair 
chance to assert itself in deliberation, let alone to compete for deliberative 
priority.46 The difference between the states of being surprised and being 
perplexed lies in the role of conviction. I assume that it is not possible to be 
surprised by something one is convinced of, but, contrariwise, that surprise 
involves an awareness of a subversion, however short-lived, of what one 
believes, or what one is convinced of. This is what Aristotle aims at in his 
practical syllogistic description of akrasia. On the other hand, perplexity, as 
Aristotle conceives of it, requires a clash between two convincing claims, which 
ex hypothesi cannot surprise one.47 Surprise involves an awareness of a contrast 
between a belief successively superseding another,48 perplexity is defined by 
falling short of such a one-way commitment49 
Both states are integrative: they require some overarching awareness of 
diachronically or synchronically defined differences. As we have seen, it is 
perfectly possible for someone to be astonished at one's own behaviour, or at 
the stirrings of one's soul; we could say that it is part of the fun of being a 
rational animal to be susceptible of surprise. The Aristotelian akratic agent is 
taken unawares by the sudden upsurge of the appetite, it befalls him 
unexpectedly; Aristotle resorts to an analogy to make this clear: 
for some people, just like those who have tickled other people before are not [themselves] 
tickled, m this way, having beforehand both perceived \promsthomenot] and seen [proidontes] 
and woken up themselves and their reasoning faculty \proegetrantes heautous km ton logtsmon], 
are not defeated by the affection [hupo ton pathous], whether it be pleasant or painful. (EN 
1150b22-5) 
Appetite presents its object as both pleasant and good, and it can do so 
because of a lack of foresight Now foresight is just what is provided by 
prospective shame and ite mechanisms. The self-controlled person, it is true, 
has the base appetites to which the akratic agent gives in and which the 
virtuous person has succeeded in regulating. But as soon as they assert 
themselves in their intentional guise prospective shame becomes efficacious. 
Shame infects and suffocates the primitive, non-reasoned description of 
appetite's intentional object and it does so by blasting its framework of 
immediacy. This, it should be noted, it is only capable of doing because of its 
intimate ties, through deliberative imagination, in cooperation with the faculty 
of rational calculation. 
to
 The term is, of course, Williams', see Williams (1985), pp 183-4 " A consideration has high deliberative 
pnonly for us if we give it heavy weighting against other considerations in our deliberations (This 
includes two ideas, that when it occurs in our deliberations, it outweighs most other considerations, and 
also that it occurs in our deliberations ) " 
4 7
 Note that this does not rule out the possibility of being surprised at one's perplexity Equally, I may be 
surprised at a consideration popping up, but m that case I am surprised at its being there at all, and it is 
this what makes for the perplexity. 
«· Davidson (1985), ρ 479 
4 9
 Of course there is plenty room for surprise m or at one's perplexity 
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Analogous to persuasion on the interpersonal level, self-persuasion is 
much more effective when considerations fall on soil worked by an affection. 
Significantly, regret, the акта tic's typical reaction to the forfeiture of the good, 
is not to be found in any of Aristotle's enumerations of the pathê tês psukhês; 
and, like appetite, it is absent from the Rhetoric list of affections plying listeners 
into a susceptibility of persuasion. 
Although one should be careful to appropriate exemplary material from 
the Topics for one's purposes, we may perhaps attach some significance to the 
fact that Aristotle, adopting Plato's threefold division of the soul of the Republic, 
situates shame in the reasoning, and therefore deliberating, part (to logistikon) 
(Top 126Э8).50 As Ovid shows, shame reasons; and it persuades because its 
reasons fall on soil worked by itself. 
In the last chapter I stressed that self-control coincides with the stage in 
which a consideration gains an enriched or deepened articulacy. This claim can 
now be appreciated against the background of self-persuasion as a criterion for 
belief, of considerations competing for deliberative priority in a state of 
perplexity, and of its capacity of being a party-pooper. Since shame brings with 
it a particularly strong consciousness of one's less favourable sides, it is able to 
mediate between appetite and reason. The self-controlled person is not liable to 
be surprised by appetite because he is aware of the fact that he has them, and 
he is aware of them because the slightest stirring inevitably triggers the 
workings of shame. He has integrated, so to say, his appetites into his 
deliberative repertoire. This the akratic has not managed to do. 
11. There can be no doubt about that one of the most effective ways to rule 
out an action is to have it never come to thought in the first place. Bernard 
Williams is quite right when he writes that "[o]ne does not feel easy with the 
man who in the course of a discussion of how to deal with political or business 
rivals says, 'Of course, we could have them killed, but we should lay that aside 
right from the beginning'."51 However, we should stop and ask what is the 
source of this uneasiness. For it is a well-known feature of the phenomenology 
of deliberation that such thoughts do in fact occur all the time; part of which is 
expressed when it is said that one 'toys' with a certain idea. 
In times like ours, in which scandals of infanticide spread like wildfire, 
we often hear the understandable expressions of moral indignation, 
expressions which are suspiciously similar to the reactions evoked by the 
murders committed by our serial killer. Only a small minority of people 
professes to understand why a mother in a state of postnatal depression throws 
her unremittingly crying child out of the window of her flat An only slightly 
larger group of people will acknowledge similar thrusts in themselves. Sure, 
one can argue that such considerations should never have arisen in the first 
place; but this presupposes that one is already, in Aristotelian terms, well 
5 0
 Rep 571c9, 606c-6, contrast Laws 646e4-647a2 I owe these references to Fortenbaugh (1975), pp 32; 37-
8nl 
'i Williams (1985), ρ 185 
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within the precincts of virtue. It requires self-understanding (and another 
virtue, courage), a sincere acknowledgement of the amoral or immoral stains on 
the self, to be able to blot them out The examined life, the product of ruthless 
self-scrutiny demands openness - to oneself, but also to others. 
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Appendix 
There is a methodological excursus in the Eudetnian Ethics which is 
heavily redolent of its Nicomachean counterpart In this appendix I shall show 
that it can be analysed in the same way as expounded in chapter 1. The 
Eudetnian digression introduces the discussion of friendship: 
We must find an account [/ogos]1 which will, simultaneously, both render [apodôsei] most things 
believed about these things [ta dokounta pen toutdn] and solve the perplexities and the 
contrarieties [tas enanhôseis]. This will be the case, when the contrary beliefs appear reasonable 
[eulogôs]; for [gar] such an account will be most in agreement [homologoumenos] with the 
phainomena. It follows that the contrarieties remain [menan], when what is said [to legomenon] is 
in one sense true, but not m another. (ЕЕ 1235ЫЗ-8) 
The first observation to be made is that on (Г) both the remark on 
'agreement* with the phainomena (Ы6-7) and what it is supposed to explain (gar) 
are reduced to triviality. Our understanding of method is not much enhanced 
by the claim that an account which both 'renders common beliefs' and removes 
their mutual inconsistencies is most consistent with common beliefs. Once 
again, syntax shows us the way and, once again, an antecedent is queried, 
namely that of teuton in ta dokounta peri toutôn. Aristotle's subject is friendship 
(philia), so one would expect the text to have peri autês. All the more so, because 
shortly before 'two beliefs about friendship' (doxai peri philias) have been seen 
not to invite examination; only those which are 'nearer and appropriate to' 
(engguterô kai oikeiai) the phainomena do (££ 1235a29-31). 
The two beliefs, held by natural philosophers (phusiologoi) are discarded 
on the ground that they are 'ail-too general' (lian katìiolou) and separated by a 
rift too wide for dialectic to bridge (££ 1235a29-31; GA 748a8-9; cf. Pol 1260a24-
5; Pit 253a32-5).2 Accounts of too general a scope are 'empty' (ícenos) or 'logical' 
(logikos), that is, too 'far removed' from or 'inappropriate' to the principles of 
1
 I read logos at line ЫЗ, with the Codex Laurentmnus 81 4, instead of Sylburg's tropos and the loipos of 
theMSS 
г
 Ci EN 1147b6-9, where the question of the dissolution of akratic ignorance is referred to phusiologoi 
Apparently, this question transgresses the boundaries of ethics, since it involves principles of explanation 
which are not 'peculiar' (iifion) to the affection of akrasia, but are common to other affections as well 
This distnbution of scientific competence is, as we shall see in the text below, extremely important for an 
understanding of Aristotle's treatment of akratic knowledge and ignorance It point to a very special, and 
limited, sense of the term pathos throughout the discussion 
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the inquiiy at hand (GA 747b28-30; 748a8-ll; ЕЕ 1217a2-3; Ы6-25). They violate 
an obligation, couched in, roughly, two formulations, resting on accounts in 
variegated contexts.3 The first formulation states that they should 'render' 
(apodidonai) the phainomena (DA 402b22-4).4 The second that they, as may be 
gleaned from the quotation, should be 'in agreement with' (homologeisthai) them 
(ЕЕ 1235Ы6-7).5 
However, our text speaks about rendering, not phainomena, but dokounta. 
If we take this, question-beggingly, as evidence for (I), we reintroduce the 
problem of triviality. Yet there are more telling counter-indications. Only a 
couple of lines further Aristotle distinguishes between the verbs dokein and 
phainesthm by aligning them with different faculties of the soul, doxa and 
phantasia respectively. This implies that 'what is believed' may, but need not, 
conflict with 'what appears' (££ 1235b27-30). It would be most awkward if this 
'principle' or 'hypothesis' (ЕЕ 1235b25; 30-1) governing the ensuing inquiry 
would be completely dissociated from the methodological programme outlined 
for it 
Consequently, the beliefs which are to be 'rendered' are beliefs about 
that is, in agreement with, the phainomena. And the statements of mese beliefs, 
as the latter part of the passage makes clear, may suffer from unclarity, 
ambiguity, or apparent inconsistency.6 So if the beliefs are safeguarded by the 
phainomena, we only need to repair for frictions due to infelicities and the 
vagaries of semantics. In order to forestall the encroachments upon the 
aforementioned constraints the right manner of inquiry (zêtein), 'about other 
things as much as about natural beings', is to start from 'what actually obtains' 
(ία huparkhonta) (GA 748al4 -5).7 
3
 I assume these to be two expressions for one and the same requirement. 
« Meteor 365a34-7; Met 1073b36-7; 1074al; ЕЕ 1236a25-6. Compare DA 402b22-4 with 408аЗ-5; 409M1-8; 
'affections of the soul' (potile tes psukhés) are what is referred to be coincidental properties (sumbebêkota) 
to be deduced from an acceptable account of the soul, on penalty of 'emptiness'. The enigmatic Unta ten 
phantasum of 402b23 could be gesturing towards the coextensiveness of a suppressed phomomena and 
sumbehêkota. This would provide another link, although a rather tenuous one, between pathi and 
phainomena, for these terms can stand in for each other {APo 75bl; 76al3; 15; ЫЗ; cf. GA 789b20; Met 
997a7) 
» See APo 89a4-6; DC 306b5-7 (cf. 293a25-31), GC 315a4-5; 325a23; 336Ы7, GA 760b31-3. 
« As is rightly noted by Barnes (1981), pp. 492-3. 
7
 Huparkhonta and phainomena cover the same ground in the programmatical text APr 46al7-27 See for 
hupartiumta APo 81a22-3, Ph 208aS4; 210Ь32Ч 211a9, Meteor 353Ы7-8, Rh 1396Ы-2 
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Samenvatting 
De Politiek der Passie: Aristotle over de Voorbereiding op Moraliteit 
De interpretatie van Aristoteles' ethische methodologie wordt beheerst 
door een orthodoxe analyse (in het betoog aangeduid met de afkorting (I)) van 
het methodologische programma dat te vinden is aan het begin van boek 7 van 
de Ethica Nicomachea (EN 1145b2-7). Deze orthodoxe analyse gaat ervan uit dat 
één van de argumenten van het artikel Tithenai ta phainomena van G.E.L. Owen 
definitief beeft aangetoond dat in deze passage de termen phainomena (letterlijk 
'de dingen die verschijnen') en endoxa (letterlijk 'gerespecteerde opvattingen') 
als coëxtensief moeten worden beschouwd. 
Owen's argument, dat primair gericht is tegen de interpretatie van Ross, 
die phainomena vertaalt als 'waargenomen feiten', vormt de standaard voor de 
interpretatie van andere methodologische reflecties in Aristoteles' oeuvre. In 
het eerste hoofdstuk wordt een lans gebroken voor Ross' interpretatie. 
Aangezien Owen's argument berust op een interne inconsistentie is er geen 
noodzakelijke reden de connectie van de term phainomena met empirische 
waarneming te verbreken. Op deze wijze kan verhinderd worden dat de 
coëxtensiviteit van de twee termen de maatstaf wordt voor de interpretatie van 
andere methodologische reflecties (hoofdstuk I). 
Volgens de interpretatie verdedigd in dit proefschrift moeten de 
gerespecteerde meningen die relevant zijn voor de dialectische analyse van een 
bepaald vraagstuk aan de mimimale eis voldoen dat zij de phainomena 
respecteren. Er wordt voor gepleit de objectieve betekenis van de term te zien 
als voortkomende uit de subjectieve: die phainomena zijn feiten die schijnen aan 
een bepaalde categorie van waarnemers, net zoals, volgens Aristoteles, dat wat 
goed schijnt aan moreel goede mensen goed is. Het verwijt van sommige 
commentatoren (zoals Hardie) aan Aristoteles' adres, dat hij methodologie en 
psychologie niet duidelijk onderscheidt, is derhalve ongerechtvaardigd. Voor 
een adequaat begrip van het praktische karakter van Aristoteles' ethiek is het 
essentieel beide als met elkaar verweven te beschouwen. 
De eerste beginselen van de ethiek, die deels beginselen voor het 
handelen zelf, deels beginselen voor de beschrijving van morele verschijnselen 
(zoals akrasia, oftewel het gebrek aan zelfbeheersing) zijn, openbaren zich, 
conform de methodologische analyse, in de waarneming en de daarmee nauw 
verbonden faculteit van de verbeelding (phantasia). Wanneer we het absolute, 
objectieve phainomena in nauw verband zien met het werkwoord waarvan het 
afgeleid is (phainesthai), dat met een dativus een subjectieve zin krijgt, dan valt 
er, onder vasthouding van het voorafgaande een ander licht op een 
methodologische passage uit de Ethica Eudemia. Daarin spreekt Aristoteles over 
de Overbodigheid' van de dialectische beschouwing van de opvattingen (doxai) 
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van bepaalde groepen van subjecten: aangezien 'ook aan kinderen, mentaal 
gestoorden en zieken bepaalde dingen het geval schijnen (phainetat)'. Het is 
duidelijk waarom, conform de interpretatie ontwikkeld in hoofdstuk 1, deze 
doxai geen endoxa zijn: zij wortelen immers niet in phainomena in absolute, 
objectieve zin. 
Wanneer deze passage wordt geïnterpreteerd in de geest van de 
orthodoxe analyse, gaat een belangrijk ontwikkelings-psychologisch moment 
van Aristoteles' ethische leer verloren. 
Aristoteles dringt herhaaldelijk aan op het belang van ethische paideia 
(vorming) als noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor onderwijs in de ethiek. Deze 
vorming (tot stand gebracht door gewenningsprocessen) heeft een cognitief en 
een conatief aspect de toehoorder moet niet slechts in staat zijn ethische 
proposities te begrijpen (in abstracte zin), maar zich, in het begrijpen, erdoor 
laten motiveren. Aangezien het doel van de ethiek niet kennis, maar handelen is, 
worden die groepen van toehoorders die door hun cognitieve en/of 
motivationele repertoire niet bij machte zijn deze proposities om te zetten in 
handelen uitgesloten van het onderricht Dit zijn de 'losbandigen (akolastoi) in 
zwakke zin': degenen die, omdat zij niet door de ondeugd der losbandigheid 
(akolasia) de bevrediging van hun lichamelijke begeerten (epithumia) 
achtemajagen, nog wel om te vormen zijn, zij het niet door onderwijs in de 
ethiek. Net als bij alle mensen wortelen hun opvattingen over wat goed is in de 
produkten van hun pitantasia, maar bij hen valt de inhoud van deze phainomena 
samen met de intentionaliteit van hun begeerten. Dit is de reden dat hun 
opvatting van het goede niets anders is dan 'zindelijk genof. 
Het hebben van de juiste motivatiestructuren is dus een vooronderstelling, 
niet een beoogd resultaat, van het onderwijs in de ethiek. Volgens een 
belangrijke, maar doorgaans onderschatte passage uit de Politica is de vorming 
van het mobvationele repertoire op haar beurt een voorwaarde voor die van 
het rationele deel van de ziel. Het (niet-discursieve) phainetai, dat door 
Aristoteles aangevoerd wordt als een verklaring ('aangezien') voor zijn advies 
de opvattingen van losbandigen in zwakke zin niet onder de loupe te nemen, 
dient derhalve gelezen te worden als een index van het feit dat de opvattingen 
van deze groepen wortelen in hun begeerten. Onder de orthodoxe analyse gaat 
dit ontwikkelingspsychologische moment ten onder (hoofdstuk 2). 
Ethische paideia evenwel heeft, naast de ervaring en de juiste 
motivatiestructuren die het resultaat zijn van gewenningsprocessen, nog een 
andere, minstens zo belangrijke component dialectische bekwaamheid, 
verworven in het beoefenen van ethische dialectiek. 
De Aristotelische dialectiek berust echter op de Aristotelische ethiek: 
daar dialectiek het redeneren met gerespecteerde opvattingen of endoxa is, moet 
men in staat zijn deze te identificeren. Daar Aristoteles ethische endoxa 
definieert met behulp van het concept van 'goed karakter7 (gerespecteerd is wat 
een goed karakter zou kiezen te doen), moet men de beschikking hebben over 
dat laatste concept De dialectiek op zichzelf kan ons hieromtrent geen uitsluitsel 
geven. Ethische dialectiek kan derhalve niet zonder de andere componenten. 
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Ethische endoxa zijn vertalingen van de motivaties (de wensen of boulêseis) 
van goede karakters. Derhalve wordt de succesvolle verdediging van 
dergelijke posities beloond met morele goedkeuring, mits de verdedigde 
positie strookt met de eigenlijke motivaties van de verdediger; de opponent zal 
trachten eventuele discrepanties genadeloos uit te buiten. Dit betekent dat men 
door het bedrijven van ethische dialectiek leert 1) de gangbare morele 
opvattingen te rechtvaardigen en te onderbouwen, 2) karakters (van anderen, 
maar ook van zichzelf) te interpreteren en 3) de eigen motivaties te 
harmoniseren met de publieke moraal, verwoord in de eigen positie (hoofdstuk 
3). 
Het conatieve deel van de ziel, inclusief de wens (boulêsis), is, tezamen 
met de verbeelding, direct bij de geboorte aanwezig. De verbeelding speelt een 
cruciale rol, niet alleen in het ontstaan van conatieve toestanden, maar ook in 
de motiverende kracht van die toestanden. De analyse van een conatieve 
emotie zoals woede laat zien dat de verbeelding de genotrijke bevrediging van 
het verlangen naar wraak (de essentie van woede) presenteert De 'iconiciteif 
van de verbeelding staat borg voor de motiverende kracht van het affect 
waarvan die verbeelding de intentionaliteit draagt Daar genot en pijn 
ondervonden worden (onder andere) in de verbeelding (door haar intieme 
connecties met de waarneming), wordt in de verbeelding de band gesmeed 
tussen het intentionele object enerzijds en genot en/of pijn anderzijds (hoofdstuk 
4). 
Al deze leermomenten zijn echter op hun beurt afhankelijk van een 
ontwikkeld schaamtegevoel - en schaamte (aiskhunê, aidôs) is de emotie die het 
motivationele repertoire van het subject van ethische paideia reguleert Het 
belang van schaamte voor Aristoteles' ethiek wordt in het algemeen 
onderschat' de behandeling van deze affectie in de ethische gschriften is 
rudimentair en fragmentarisch. De crucial rol van schaamte moet daarom niet 
zozeer uit de expliciete theorie alswel op grond van haar vooronderstellingen 
geconstrueerd worden. 
Daar een eis voor deelname aan het onderwijs in de ethiek de omzetting 
van haar proposities in handelingen is, is zelfbeheersing (enkrateia) de minimale 
voorwaarde voor kwalificatie. De centrale factor in de genesis van 
zelfbeheersing is schaamte, of liever, de operaties van de verbeelding die 
centraal staan in het voorzien van schaamte. Schaamte verhindert toegeven aan 
lichamelijke begeerten en het ligt dus voor de hand dat de losbandigen in 
zwakke zin, oftewel de groepen die door Aristoteles gediskwalificeerd zijn als 
toehoorders, niet over een adequaat potentieel aan schaamte beschikken. 
Schaamte is een emotie die betrekking heeft niet zozeer op wat men doet 
alswel op wat men is. De algemene wens een goed mens te worden (één van de 
vereisten voor het onderwijs in de ethiek) wordt door schaamte als het ware 
'geparticulariseerd': centraal in het schaamtegevoel is de voorstelling van een 
zeker goed mens (doorgaans een geïnternaliseerde ouderfiguur), die een 
cruciale rol in het (vroege) leven van de persoon speelt Deze geïnternaliseerde 
figuur waakt over alle lagen van de persoonlijkheid, dus ook over conatieve 
roerselen. Daar echter het perspectief van deze voorstelling dat van de 
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geïnternaliseerde figuur zelf is, moet het innerlijk leven van die figuur ook 
doorzichtig zijn (dit is waar schaamte en dialectiek elkaar aanvullen) (hoofüstuk 
5). 
Schaamte reguleert het repertoire van het rationele overleg (bouleusis). 
TA] zorgt ervoor dat bepaalde opties van voor af aan worden weggefilterd; deze 
dienen zich eenvoudigweg niet maar aan als opties. Bij de zelfbeheerste 
persoon dient zo'n optie zich aan, maar zij wordt, als gevolg van de pijn die de 
verbeelding van de voorziene schaamte kleurt, niet geïmplementeerd. 
Schaamte is hier werkzaam met haar volledige fenomenologie, d.w.z. met haar 
intentionaliteit én subjectiviteit Het is evenwel ook mogelijk dat (zoals bij 
Neoptolemus uit Sophokles' Philoktetes) slechts de intentonaliteit van een 
voorziene schaamte, zonder de subjectiviteit (en derhalve zonder pijn), zich 
roert In dat geval is de motiverende kracht van schaamte te gering om de 
handeling te beletten. 
De rol van schaamte werpt ook een licht op het gedrag van de 
onbeheerste (de akratês). Een opvatting of mening (doxa) dient ruimte te laten 
voor twijfel. Twijfel is niet alleen een beslissend kenmerk van praktisch 
overleg, maar is ook vervat in de notie van een praktische aporia: een situatie 
waarbij twee redeneringen voor twee tegengestelde opties elkaar in evenwicht 
houden. De ethisch-dialectische beschouwing van een ethisch probleem (een 
'problèma1 is de vertaling van een aporia, een vraag met de vorm 'φ of -<?/) 
draagt, net als overleg, bij tot een praktische keuze. Maar als de dialectische 
beschouwing van een moreel probleem geïntegreerd kan worden in Aristoteles' 
conceptie van overleg, dan betekent dit dat er binnen deze conceptie plaats is 
voor morele conflicten. 
Het praktisch syllogisme is niet een representatie van overleg; de maior 
staat veeleer voor de keuze die voortspruit uit het overleg (prolmiresis). Dit 
betekent niet dat de onbeheerste persoon, die tegen de geest van deze rationele 
keuze handelt, geen benul heeft van moreel conflict binnen zijn overleg. Het 
betekent veeleer dat hij meent dit conflict achter zich gelaten te hebben 
(immers, er is een beslissing tot handelen genomen). Daar Aristoteles 
onbeheerstheid analyseert in termen van twee praktische syllogismen (de maior 
van de andere staat voor de lichamelijke begeerte), moet dit betekenen dat de 
onbeheerste geen bewustzijn van een conflict heeft Met andere woorden, de 
onbeheerste wordt overrompeld door zijn begeerte. Dit is waarom de 
onbeheerste wel berouw heeft van zijn daad, maar geen schaamte ondervindt. 
In tegenstelling tot schaamte, die men voelt voor wat (of wie) men is, voelt men 
berouw voor handelingen; berouw is compatibel met het zich distantiëren van 
de eigen handeling, schaamte niet 
Schaamte is het zaad voor ethische reflectie en morele motivatie. Geen 
van de andere pijlers die de voorbereidende vorming voor het discursieve 
ethisch onderwijs schragen kan zonder een fundering van schaamte (lioofastuk 6 
en 7). 
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STELLINGEN 
1. Het verwijt dat Aristoteles in zijn ethiek methodologie en 
psychologie door elkaar haalt is niet gerechtvaardigd; het 
inzicht dat eerstgenoemde een functie is van laatstgenoemde 
is juist noodzakelijk voor een correcte waardering van Aristote-
les' adagium dat de ethiek handelen (praxis) en niet kennen 
tot doel heeft (p. 35). 
2. Diegenen die zich beklagen over de 'desintegratie van de sa-
menleving' doen er goed aan zich te realiseren dat onverschil-
ligheid tegenover de ander een ingrediënt is in iedere vorm 
van tolerantie. 
3 . Het aanmatigende van de 'dialoog over mensenrechten' ligt 
niet alleen in de veronderstelling dat onze mensenrechten 
universeel zijn; het is minstens zo aanmatigend het universe-
le karakter van de dialoog voor lief te nemen. 
4. De dialectiek kan niet de methode zijn voor de bepaling van 
ethische beginselen, omdat een endoxicale propositie over 
dergelijke beginselen gedefinieerd wordt met behulp van het 
begrip 'goed karakter' (p. 67). 
5. Een adequate analyse van het morele gehalte van schaamte 
wordt belemmerd door de vooronderstelling dat schaamte een 
reactie is op 'shocks to our self-respect' (John Rawls) of een 
'diminishment of self (Bernard Williams). Schaamte is even-
zeer een reactie op uitingen die het zelfrespect sterken (com-
plimenten, loftuitingen). 
6. De eufemistische inkleding van de Endlösung was niet zozeer 
een instrument om haar gruwelijkheid voor buitenstaanders 
te verdoezelen, maar om haar voor haar architekten emotio-
neel mogelijk te maken. 
7. Het feit dat het subject een probleem is geworden in het Wes-
terse denken betekent niet dat het subject, maar dat het 
probleem kenmerkend is voor dit denken. 
8. Het feit dat de Nederlandse sportjournalist een reeds gepro-
moveerde club hardnekkig een promovendus blijft noemen is 
op zich al een reden om een Europese superliga in het leven 
te roepen. 



